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1Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Tuna institutions facing dynamic interests
Overfishing and overcapitalisation of fisheries over the last four decades has raised concerns 
about the ongoing sustainability of global seafood provision. Such concerns are even more 
pronounced in so called trans-boundary fish stocks such as tuna. For instance, the most recent 
global assessment indicates that only 69% of fish stocks are within biologically sustainable 
levels, down from 90% in 1974 (FAO 2016). But tuna has in general terms fared even more 
poorly. Among the principal tuna species, 41% of stocks are estimated to be fished at 
biologically unsustainable levels (FAO 2016). If tuna stocks are continued to be made 
vulnerable to overexploitation it will have a measurable impact on global seafood 
consumption. Total annual catches of tuna and tuna like species is 7.7 million tonnes, or 9%
of total global fisheries production. It will also have an impact on wealth and wellbeing of 
coastal, and predominantly developing nations, who catch these tuna, with international trade 
worth of around US$ 6 billion a year.
On closer inspection the importance and sustainability of ‘tuna’ is divided clearly among 
species. The largest single set of tuna species are found in tropical waters. Just under half of 
global tuna catches are skipjack tuna with 3 million tonnes landed each year. The 
complication is that skipjack associates with yellowfin (1.5 million tonnes per year) and 
bigeye tuna (400,000 tonnes per year) (FAO 2016). But while skipjack is neither overfished 
or subject to overfishing, both yellowfin and bigeye have at different times been overfished
and subject to overfishing (Harley et al. 2015). The reason for the precarious status of 
yellowfin and bigeye is that juveniles of these two species are caught with skipjack as so 
called ‘non-target species’ of purse seine fisheries utilising fish attraction devices – floating 
buoys around which pelagic species including tuna congregate (see Hare et al. 2015). While 
fishing and coastal nations wish to continue expanding skipjack catches, stock assessments 
have signalled the need to set limits on the exploitation of yellowfin and bigeye. As argued 
by Allen (2010), the reluctance to set such limits highlights many of the challenges facing 
trans-boundary fisheries worldwide.
States have made gradual progress in creating effective management regimes for trans-
boundary tuna stocks. Two important developments have been made in the last four decades. 
First, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was ratified in 1982, establishing 
exclusive economic zones under the jurisdiction of coastal states (EEZs) (UN 1982). Second, 
the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) of 1995, provided a framework for 
countries to cooperate in the multilateral management of trans-boundary stocks such as tuna,
through the establishment of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). Central 
to the UNFSA is the promotion of science-based and precautionary approaches to set limit 
reference points for fishing effort.1 But in spite of these requirements for RFMOs being
clearly set out in the UNFSA their application has remained patchy at best (see Aranda et al. 
2012).
1 See Article V and VI of the UNFSA 1995. 
2The apparent slow progress by RFMOs in fully complying with the UNFSA is underlined by 
the economic importance of tuna to coastal states and fishing nations, as well as its role in 
providing global markets with a relatively cheap source of (canned) protein. Defining
sustainable fishing has been made contentious by the different positions and agendas of these 
coastal and fishing states, who support a highly diverse harvesting industry and highly 
concentrated processing industry for seafood (Havice et al. 2010, Havice et al. 2017). Seen as 
such, tuna fisheries provide insights into contemporary global environmental governance, 
replete with dynamic political interests of commercial sectors, conservationists and sovereign 
states (Hanich et al. 2010, Havice et al. 2017). Comparisons can be drawn to climate change,
another trans-boundary environmental problem, where achieving international consensus on 
stabilization targets for greenhouse gas emissions through various mitigation measures is 
fraught with the misalignment of interests of politicians, scientists and policymakers (Young 
2003, Wangler et al. 2012). In the case of tuna fisheries, state arrangements for management 
have been slow and ineffective because of the competing economic and political interests that 
continue to undermine long-term cooperative decisions.
The key challenge of the international tuna regime, like the governance of other global 
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fishing states over fish in the high seas or what are termed ‘areas beyond national 
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From the perspective of Pacific coastal states then, instituting effective tuna management 
faces two major challenges. First, the challenge of overcoming what they perceive to be an
unequal distribution of economic returns to fishing nations from the tuna resources (see also 
Chand, Grafton et al. 2003, Aqorau 2006, Barclay and Cartwright 2007, Aqorau 2009, 
Havice 2010). Second, and closely tied to the first, ensuring that ambitions to maintain or 
2The apparent slow progress by RFMOs in fully complying with the UNFSA is underlined by 
the economic importance of tuna to coastal states and fishing nations, as well as its role in 
providing global markets with a relatively cheap source of (canned) protein. Defining
sustainable fishing has been made contentious by the different positions and agendas of these 
coastal and fishing states, who support a highly diverse harvesting industry and highly 
concentrated processing industry for seafood (Havice et al. 2010, Havice et al. 2017). Seen as 
such, tuna fisheries provide insights into contemporary global environmental governance, 
replete with dynamic political interests of commercial sectors, conservationists and sovereign 
states (Hanich et al. 2010, Havice et al. 2017). Comparisons can be drawn to climate change,
another trans-boundary environmental problem, where achieving international consensus on 
stabilization targets for greenhouse gas emissions through various mitigation measures is 
fraught with the misalignment of interests of politicians, scientists and policymakers (Young 
2003, Wangler et al. 2012). In the case of tuna fisheries, state arrangements for management 
have been slow and ineffective because of the competing economic and political interests that 
continue to undermine long-term cooperative decisions.
The key challenge of the international tuna regime, like the governance of other global 
commons, is one of cooperation. Current institutional regulatory frameworks, including 
RFMOs, are thought to be insufficient to achieve the policy goals of biological and economic 
sustainability (Petersen 2006). This is because of (1) the diverse and dynamic political 
interests of actors, (2) inappropriate incentives for continuing unsustainable fishing practices,
(3) inadequate knowledge on the impacts of different fishing gears such as fish aggregating 
devices (FADs), and (4) the continued high demand for limited resources and ineffective 
governance (Grafton et al. 2006). From the perspective of coastal states, allowing increased 
catches in their waters also provides a short-term means of supporting the small isolated 
populations (Langley et al. 2007, Langley et al. 2009, Harley et al. 2011). Central to the 
challenge of instituting sustainable management is therefore finding ways of combining short 
and long term benefits from tuna fisheries to incentivise cooperative decision making.
Arguably the region best representing the apparent trade-offs between sustainability and 
equitable wealth generation from tuna is the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). In 
this region eight small island coastal states account for 60% of global tuna catches (Hamilton 
et al. 2011), and as such share a common interest to increase economic returns from their tuna 
resources. But like all other ‘tuna regions’ in the world (such as the Eastern Pacific, North 
Atlantic, Southern Ocean and Indian Ocean) instituting sustainable management has been 
complicated by not only the migratory nature of tuna stocks, but the predominance of distant 
water fishing fleets (with historical claims) operating in their waters. In the WCPO this is all 
the more pronounced because Pacific island nations have never invested in fishing fleets, 
leaving the extraction of tuna in their EEZs to these distant water nations in return for access 
fees. Also common to all tuna management is the wider challenge of cooperation between 
fishing states over fish in the high seas or what are termed ‘areas beyond national 
jurisdiction’.
From the perspective of Pacific coastal states then, instituting effective tuna management 
faces two major challenges. First, the challenge of overcoming what they perceive to be an
unequal distribution of economic returns to fishing nations from the tuna resources (see also 
Chand, Grafton et al. 2003, Aqorau 2006, Barclay and Cartwright 2007, Aqorau 2009, 
Havice 2010). Second, and closely tied to the first, ensuring that ambitions to maintain or 
3
even increase wealth to coastal states based on purse seine fishing with FAD targeting 
skipjack tuna does not negatively impact on yellowfin and bigeye tunas (see also Langley, 
Wright et al. 2009, Harley, et al. 2014 Hare et al. 2015). Balancing these issues goes to the 
heart of what can be termed the ‘tuna dilemma’ – coastal states argue that they are not 
receiving a fair share of the benefits from the tuna fishery, which has undermined their ability 
or willingness to reach an agreement over sustainability.
Taking this tuna dilemma as a starting point, this thesis argues that successful implementation
of effective tuna fisheries management in the WCPO requires governance arrangements that 
can address both sustainability and equity – or put in more common terms, ‘sustainable 
development’. Sustainable development remains a contentious concept given its definition 
and application depends on the perspective of different countries and socio-economic 
contexts. The common understanding of the term sustainability is derived from the 1987
United Nations Brundtland Commission definition of “meeting the needs of the presents 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UN 1987, 
p.6). It emphasises the need for long term goals in decision making that ensures both social 
and economic development to be defined in terms of sustainability for all countries. Equity is 
inherent to this definition, referring to the best possible outcome in sharing economic benefits 
between participating actors, i.e. between the harvesters and coastal state resource owners 
(Aqorau 2006, PNA 2010). 
In tuna management, sustainability of tuna stocks and equal distribution of tuna benefits, is 
addressed by setting long term biological and economic objectives of coastal states and by 
creating institutions responsible for tuna management in the WCPO (Parris et al. 2006, Parris 
2010, Yeeting et al. 2016, Emery et al. 2017). It is well understood that sustainability and 
equity can be achieved through better cooperation and adequate management strategies, 
through efficient institutions (Squires et al. 2016). Efficient institutions are those that can 
facilitate coordination between dynamic actors and interests toward a common goal (Hilborn 
et al. 2005). This refers to the role of so called ‘governance institutions’ in organising and 
enforcing management measures through appropriate regimes, contracts and agreements 
(Williamson 2000, Pacheco et al. 2010). Appropriate regimes refer to implicit and explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures, that incorporate incentive schemes 
that can influence individual choices to secure collective welfare and improve collective 
participation (Grafton et al. 2006, Pacheco et al. 2010, Kozenkow 2013, Squires et al. 2016). 
Academic scholarship on international fisheries (and environmental) agreements suggest that 
(full) cooperation is ideal (Munro 2004, Bailey et al. 2010, Hannesson 2011). Much of this 
literature, however, focuses on state-to-state cooperation and not on the myriad other 
‘private’ or market actors that also cooperate to reach sustainability outcomes. It is also not 
clear in this literature what challenges states face in cooperating with industry and NGOs in 
developing a mix of economic and political governance arrangements for tuna sustainability.
Such cooperative arrangements are becoming all the more important in the tuna industry 
given the close relationship of distant water fishing nations and private fleets they represent 
(see Havice and Campling 2017). In response to these gaps in knowledge, this thesis explores 
the emergent transition away from what might be termed as ‘old tuna regimes’, dominated by 
state regulatory systems and state-to-state cooperation, towards what is labelled here as ‘new 
tuna regimes’ that combine state and non-state institutions to address historical inefficiencies 
in achieving sustainability and equality. 
4This thesis posits that the rise of a new tuna regime can be observed in Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO) where a wide range of state and market based sustainability 
institutions are being employed in tuna fisheries (outlined by Miller 2014). In particular a 
sub-group of eight tuna-rich countries of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) –
signatory of an international agreement signed in 1982 that sets terms and conditions for tuna 
purse seine fishing licences in their collective EEZs (PNA 1982). The members, made up of 
the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, have started to play a leading role in 
creating innovative institutions that combine state and private approaches in managing their 
tuna for sustainability.
1.2 The Western and Central Pacific and sub-regional PNA
The Pacific region is divided up into two geographical areas: the WCPO and the Eastern 
Pacific Ocean (EPO) (Figure 1.1). The area of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC), the RFMO responsible for the management of tuna stocks in the 
WCPO, was established by the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC Convention) 
which entered into force on 19 June 2004. Within the WCPO and WCPFC convention area 
are 22 island states and territories covering over 31 million sq km of ocean space – making it 
the largest of the five tuna RFMOs globally. The WCPFC is also the youngest of the tuna 
RFMOs and seen as one of the most successful given the progress it has made in establishing 
science based advice to members states since its inception.
Within the WCPFC convention area lies the most productive area for tuna – in the equatorial 
zone stretching between 100 north and south of the equator (Langley el at. 2009, Havice 
2013). This area directly corresponds to the waters of the eight tuna rich countries of the 
PNA, providing 80% of the total WCPO tuna catches and around 60% of global tuna supply 
every year (Hamilton et al. 2011). The PNA countries claim sovereignty over the tuna 
resources in their collective EEZs, but are challenged with lack of property rights over tuna 
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction (see Figure 1.2 for high seas areas). 
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Figure 1.1 Convention area of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(source: WCPFC 2000)
Figure 1.2 Map of the PNA (source: Havice 2013)
6The PNA members share ‘common interests’ over tuna resources given their dependence, as 
developing island states, upon the rational development and optimum utilisation of tuna 
resources occurring in their fishing zones and as a common stock (PNA 1982). In an attempt 
to safeguard their common interests the PNA members took a further step by initiating new
tuna regimes to address the complex tuna management issues associated with increasing 
purse seine efforts in the WCPO (Miller et al. 2014, Yeeting et al. 2016). They adopted a
series of new measures including the vessel day scheme (VDS) to control purse seine effort 
in 2007, three implementing arrangements for effort and catch control for purse seine and fish 
aggregating device (FAD) management, and went through the third party Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) assessment certification in 2011 that led to the certification of the PNA 
fishery since 2012. In doing so the PNA have attempted to move beyond the cooperative 
stalemate that has led to slow progress at the level of the WCPFC. They have, as such, sought 
to go beyond the limitations of old tuna regimes and explore the possibility of a new tuna 
regime.
The VDS scheme arises from a cooperative arrangement of the PNA for the management of 
the western purse seine fishery that accounts for around 80% of the total fishing efforts in the 
WCPO every year (Havice 2013).2 It establishes a system of tradable fishing days allocated 
to the parties in an attempt to regulate and control purse seine fishing effort. There is hope 
that the VDS would bring efficiency to the fishery if fully implemented by member countries.
Successful implementation, therefore, depends on the level of compliance to the VDS rules. 
But it remains unclear what level of compliance to VDS is needed to maintain the support of 
the countries supporting cooperation and therefore fisheries regionalism at the sub-regional 
level. 
The MSC certification and eco-labelling scheme is a private-led governance initiative used by 
the state to help promote sustainability goals. The PNA is using the MSC certification to 
achieve sustainability goals and in increasing transparency and governance in the fishery. The 
certification applies to the fishery and harvesting operations up until the catch is landed. 
More than 40% of the tuna caught in the Western and Central Pacific are MSC eligible 
(Banks et al. 2012). This certification applied as PNA-licensed WCP Purse Seine sets on 
unassociated/ Non fish aggregating device (FADs) free schools, and purse seine set using 
natural log, with skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) and yellowfin (Thunnus albacares) as 
the target species. Successful implementation requires cooperation and collaboration between 
PNA member states and private fishing companies thus relevant for the analysis of public-
private engagement in promoting multilateral arrangements and fisheries regionalism 
particularly at the RFMO levels. 
In framing the emergence of these in the Western and Central Pacific ocean as a shift from an
‘old’ to a ‘new’ tuna regime, this study examines the extent to which barriers to cooperation
between states, as well as between states and private sector, can be overcome. Before 
expanding on the analytical approach taken in the thesis, we first outline key barriers in old 
tuna regimes.
2 See Palau Agreement 1992 (Amended 2007, 2009)
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1.3 Cooperation in ‘old’ tuna regimes
Sustainability is as much a problem of (in)efficient institutions as it is of cooperation. 
(In)efficient institutions are driven by a combination of factors and forces stirred by diverse 
political interests. In the WCPO, these political interests are coordinated through the complex 
cooperative arrangements of three regional organisations: the WCPFC, the Pacific Islands 
Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) and the PNA (Aqorau 2006). These cooperative 
arrangements are designed to coordinate diverse political interests of member states in 
managing their shared tuna resources with aims to maximize economic benefits, as well as to 
ensure sustainability of tuna stocks. Nevertheless, these cooperative arrangements are often 
challenged with the unequal distribution of benefits among coastal states, making it difficult 
to reach an agreement on sustainability goals.
To further understand the central problem associated with this diversity of interests, we now 
turn to a short review of four key inefficiencies that characterise ‘old’ tuna regimes in the 
context of the WCPO: (1) weak political institution to enforce property rights (Barclay et al. 
2007, Langley et al. 2009, Havice 2010, Havice et al. 2010), (2) compliance issues in relation 
to regime ineffectiveness (Langley et al. 2009, Hanich et al. 2010, Pintassilgo et al. 2010, 
Bailey, et al. 2013), (3) asymmetric information and incentive gaps (Beddington et al. 2007, 
Vestergaard 2010, Banks et al. 2012, Jensen et al. 2013), and (4) inadequate incentives for 
fishers and managers to promote precautionary management approaches (Hilborn et al. 2005, 
Grafton et al. 2006, Bailey et al. 2016, Squires et al. 2016).
1.3.1 Weak political institution (Lack of property rights)
Management of tuna resources are complicated by the weak attribution of property rights that 
define patterns of exploitation as well as responsibilities for resource stewardship (Aggarwal 
et al. 2006, Perman et al. 2011). As outlined above, cooperation is needed to effectively 
manage shared, common and straddling resources like tuna because property rights are held 
in common. Generally, private use rights allow individuals or corporations to exclude others 
from using that resource. Common property is where a community, through either formal or 
informal mechanisms, controls right to exploit a resource held by persons in common (Scott 
2000, Aggarwal et al. 2006). States hold common property rights over tuna resources, but 
allocate and design private property rights through individual quota systems in allowing 
resource users (private actors) access. However, because of unresolved issues with the design 
and allocation of property rights in the region, participating actors continue to compete for 
control and access of tuna resources.
The attribution and allocation of property rights are conducted through designated political 
institutions. Political institutions are responsible for formal rules such as constitutions, laws, 
and property rights. The aim of political institutions is concerned with improving 
coordination, supporting ‘good’ economic institutions, solving collective action problems and 
allocating access to resources through the protection of property rights and fostering 
economic benefits (Acemoglu et al. 2004). Limitations of the formal rules to protect common 
interests in connection to the allocation of property rights lead to weak political institutions.
A common assumption is that the lack of property rights leads to market failure,
inefficiencies and the overexploitation of resources (Coase 1984). Efficiency in the allocation 
8of property rights is often challenged with two issues: (1) the design and assignation of
property rights (whether a private, a public or a common system can lead to higher 
efficiency), and (2) capacity to exercise property rights (transaction and enforcement 
problems) (Kozenkow 2013). These issues are common to all RFMOs and have the potential 
to undermine or weaken the formal political institutions to protect property rights.
The design and assignment of property rights is made particularly complex by the nature of 
migratory species and thus the lack of coastal states property rights beyond national 
jurisdictions and in the high seas. From the perspective of Pacific island nations, the nature of 
migratory tuna stocks challenges the effectiveness of sovereign rights over the tuna resources 
and economic aspirations of nations. In short, these nations have no control over tuna 
resources outside their jurisdictions (Barclay et al. 2007, Havice 2013). Designing quota 
systems, whether based on total allowable catches (TACs) or total allowable efforts (TAEs),
are often debated for their efficiency in reducing fishing impacts. For instance, New Zealand, 
the EU, US and Canada are all strong advocates of TACs and are criticising the PNA for 
using TAEs (PNA 2014). Regardless of which form of right is used, both forms create 
tensions on the distribution of benefits among states and between states and fishing 
companies.
To set and enforce rights, an effective monitoring and enforcement is also required. But this 
too is expensive and difficult to enforce. The principal resource owners (usually the states) 
are often characterised as having limited capacity to perfectly monitor and control fishing in 
their waters. Furthermore, agreeing to appropriate conservation and management measures 
(CMMs) is difficult as states usually oppose measures that negatively impact their interest 
leading to slow processes in adopting measures for sustainability. Understanding how new 
tuna regimes can address problems with property rights is therefore a key piece of the puzzle.
1.3.2 Compliance and regime effectiveness
The second characteristic of old tuna regimes is their complexity. Previous literature on 
complex governance and regime effectiveness reflects the challenges of international 
agreement in relation to multiple goals and purposes because of diverse interests (Biermann 
et al. 2009, Gerber et al. 2009, Wangler et al. 2012). This literature refers in large part to the 
interests of states in making relative improvements to an environmental problem. In 
particular the literature has focused on what factors lead states not to commit to strong action. 
In international and regional settings, as lamented by Finus et al. (2008) and Wangler et al. 
(2012), evidence of successful international agreements is scarce.
Such problems are also common in tuna regimes, but is made even more complicated by the 
fact that the majority of active fishers (agents) in these waters are vessels from distant water 
fishing nations. From a coastal state’s perspective, foreign countries with fishing interest in 
the region often exert pressure on fisheries regulation at the regional and national levels 
(Havice et al. 2010). They do so by influencing the terms of regulations towards the interest 
of their own fleets, even though these interests often conflict with the environmental and 
economic objectives of Pacific island countries (Hanich et al. 2010). As also claimed by 
Havice et al. (2010), firm-level strategies also hold important implications for environmental 
and economic outcomes, but are largely outside of the control of coastal states due to their 
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limitation to regulate commercial activities. These complexities pose serious challenges for 
the effectiveness of tuna regimes in governing compliance, and therefore affect the stability 
of cooperation between member states. 
DWFNs are impacting the stability of cooperative tuna management given they are external 
agents to the treaties that underpin regional regimes, whilst at the same time arguing for 
historical rights. This is true of the WCPO, but also seen in the Indian Ocean and other 
regions where DWFNs claimed historical rights before coastal states’ EEZs were established. 
It is often claimed that DWFNs continue to influence coastal states position by offering 
incentives or benefits to support their commercial interests (Havice 2010, Aqorau 2015). And 
as Balton and Zbicz (2004) argue, the first instinct of most governments in any international, 
regional and sub-regional arena is to protect and promote their own national interest with the 
best information they have. But in doing so, external actors and interests add to the 
complexity of the tuna governance system in the WCPO, thus driving some non-compliant 
behaviour, which can again lead to the instability of tuna agreements.
Previous studies of regime theory (e.g. Hilborn et al. 2005, Young 2011) and game theory 
(e.g. Munro 2008, Bailey et al. 2010, Hannesson 2011) argue that cooperation is ideal and 
can only be achieved when members have an incentive to comply and stay in the agreement. 
Thus the success of any regime depends on these incentives and the willingness of members 
to stay and comply. Nevertheless, the willingness to comply is challenged with external 
incentives offered by external players such as DWFNs. They form part of the tuna 
management complexity particularly at the regional and international setting where private
actors and DWFNs are involved. This thesis examines how new tuna regimes can facilitate 
the stability and effectiveness of regional tuna agreements for sustainability and equity. It will 
also look at how these new regimes affects the historical coastal-DWFN relationship and the 
weak bargaining position of the coastal states seen in the context of old regimes.
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The third characteristic of old tuna retimes is imperfect control by resource owners over 
private agents such as fishers. In the fisheries economics and governance literature this 
imperfect control is linked to what is termed ‘asymmetric information’ and is conceptualized 
as a ‘principal-agent problem’. The principal-agent problem describes the situation where the 
principal is the resource owner, here the state, who hires an agent, here fishing firms, to fish 
in their waters based on regulations set by the principal (Jensen et al. 2002). An asymmetric 
information problem arises when the states (principal) cannot perfectly monitor fishers’
(agents’) actions, leading to poor performance and creating incentive gaps between the actors 
(Macho-Stadler et al. 1997).
An incentive gap is the measurable difference between the states and fishers objective. The 
challenge for resource managers is to try to reduce existing incentive gaps by means of 
aligning incentives between the two actors (Jensen et al. 2002, Vestergaard 2010). Under the 
old tuna regimes, incentive gaps are not well understood as state regulations dominate tuna 
regimes without acknowledging the role of private actors and incentives, despites the latter 
putting pressure on states’ sustainability decision. Old tuna regimes commonly fail to identify 
incentive gaps let alone close them by aligning state and private objectives. Such closure is 
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made all the more difficult given that multiple levels of incentive gaps may exist with 
multiple states and private actors.
Asymmetric information and incentive gaps are also seen as challenges to achieving 
sustainability. Under the condition of asymmetric information, it is often impossible to 
achieve the first best option. With asymmetric information, fisheries managers cannot 
facilitate effective contracts and agreements design for sustainability without access to 
perfect information about the fishery. This thesis fills this gap by exploring what new tuna 
regimes can do to address information asymmetries in tuna fisheries, and in doing so close 
incentive gaps which had been ignored by old regulatory regimes. 
1.3.4 Inadequate incentives and misalignment
The fourth characteristic of old tuna regimes is the failure of institutions to incentivise 
behaviour and decision making in promoting sustainability. Under the 1995 UNFSA trans-
boundary fish stocks are required to implement precautionary approaches to management, 
including harvest control rules (HCRs) and reference points for all managed species.3 These 
should be implemented by subregional or regional fisheries management organisations on the 
basis of the best scientific evidence available. HCRs are pre-defined management actions that 
should be taken in response to changes in stock status (Bruyn et al. 2013). Biologically-based 
limit reference points are essentially the goals of a fishery – for instance, fishing within 
maximum sustainable yield (ibid.). When a limit reference point is approached, measures 
should be taken to ensure that it will not be exceeded (Allen 2010). On the basis of these 
rules, limits and targets also called harvest strategy is required to specify pre-determined 
management actions for defined species necessary to achieve agreed biological, ecological, 
economic and social management objectives (Hampton et al. 2012).
RFMOs have faced considerable challenges in establishing HCRs and reference points to 
promote a precautionary approach to management as required under international laws (Allen 
2010). HCRs and their biological reference points should be developed in the management 
planning stage with the involvement of all stakeholders (Hampton et al. 2012). However, the 
complex nature of tuna fisheries, including multiple species and gear types, contributes to the 
difficulties for member states in agreeing to management measures that promotes the 
adoption of pre-cautionary approaches. 
Previous studies (e.g. Havice et al. 2010, Aranda et al. 2012, Bruyn et al. 2013 and others)
argue that the adoption (or not) of HCRs and reference points by RFMOs is a function of the 
(mis)alignment of political and economic goals of participating states given their vested 
interests in different species of tuna, the fishing gears used to catch them and the protection 
of often long standing access arrangements (see also Bailey et al., 2013, WCPFC, 2014). In 
other words, at the RFMO levels, these studies claim that the old tuna regimes or institutions 
have largely failed to provide adequate incentives for states and fishing industries to agree to 
precautionary approaches.
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) Fisheries Code of Conducts  
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All four characterisation (and problems) outlined above are driven by the nature of trans-
boundary tuna problems and the associated dynamic political interests and actors. Central to 
the challenges faced by old tuna regimes is that they are less able to address the inefficiencies 
of political institutions that influence the design of governance institutions i.e. decision 
making processes and instruments for sustainability and equity. This thesis demonstrates that 
in an attempt to overcome these institutional challenges a range of economic instruments 
have been implemented hence leading to the emergence of new tuna regimes which now play 
a crucial role in restructuring decision making processes towards sustainability. The next 
section provides a brief outline of three theories addressing cooperation in international 
environmental regimes before turning to outline the relevance of an integrated game theory 
and new institutional economic framework to understand and explain the emergence of new 
tuna regimes.
1.4 Cooperation and the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework 
The NIE framework is an approach designed to integrate approaches from economics, law 
and social and political sciences to explain and address complex societal (and fisheries 
environmental) problems (Williamson 1990). In response to the challenges outlined above in 
section 1.3, the NIE framework provides a means of assessing how different institutional 
arrangements drive or hinder cooperation to development management measures for 
resources such as fisheries between states using market incentives. More specifically it is 
used to examine current institutional arrangements and identify ways forward to more 
efficient and effective modes of sustainability governance of trans-boundary stocks under 
varying degrees of public and private international cooperation. To achieve this, coalition and 
principal agent theories (two applications of game theory) are applied to strengthen the NIE 
framework in analysing new tuna regimes. This section reviews the application of NIE 
framework and game theory in fisheries agreements before proceeding to discuss the 
relevance of integrating game theoretic approaches.
1.4.1 New Institutional Economics
The varied success of RFMOs in achieving the economic and biological objectives desired of 
them is largely a function of the competing (and sometimes contradictory) interests of the 
actors involved. Recognising this, scholars and policy makers alike have argued for more 
effective and coherent institutional frameworks for global environmental governance 
(Petersen 2006, Biermann et al. 2009, Young 2011). The NIE framework is one approach to 
both understand the role of and interplay between political and economic institutions that can 
enable decision makers to incentivize and improve the design of rules for resource use over 
the long term (e.g. Williamson 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2004, Pacheco et al. 2010). In the 
context of RFMOs, such interplay can represent interactions between states and private actors 
(such as fishers or processors), and by default the legal and market logics in which they are 
embedded.
NIE seeks a middle road between sociology, political science and economics. As outlined by 
Pacheco et al. (2010), political science is interested in how institutions are formed through 
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political action, sociology on the organization of actor engagement and legitimacy, and 
economics on the enforcement of property rights, through the creation of law and policy. All 
three fields are, however, fundamentally focused on rule formation and their use in shaping 
action. Seen as such, NIE is a means of understanding the interaction of dynamic social 
processes that lead to the creation and recreation of rule systems based on market, political 
and social ‘logics’ (Kozenkow 2013). As Kozenkow (2013) argues, NIE expands mainstream 
neoclassical economics by considering how rights and transaction costs affect social and 
political incentives in addition to economic behaviour. In a similar line this thesis is 
interested in using the NIE framework to examine the design of new market based and 
incentive based approaches to complement regulatory, command and control together with 
eco-system approach to help promote cooperation and governance for sustainable outcomes.
The dynamic interaction between these market, political and social logics is inherent to the 
NIE framework. As regimes evolve to respond to new social, economic or environmental 
challenges they reframe old issues, and in doing so allow for changes in terms of who is 
involved in influencing the creation of new rules (Muzaka 2010). As introduced by 
Williamson (2000), the NIE framework analyses this dynamism by breaking regimes into 
four institutional levels that identify the conditions under which public and private interests 
can enable rather than constrain effective resource management and allocation (see Figure 
1.3). Each of these levels also change at different speeds – similar to different sized cogs of a 
gear box. In doing so the framework allows for a better understanding of the role of economic 
institutions in either weakening or strengthening political institutions and in restructuring 
governance institutions.
Level one of Williamson’s framework focuses on social institutions – including norms 
customs, traditions and codes of social conduct. These social institutions are slow to change, 
but hold pervasive influence over a range of social processes – including individual action.
Level two of the framework points to the political institutions. Representing the state, these 
institutions are made up of the “executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of 
government” (p. 598). These political institutions also exert de jure power, as in most 
instance their legitimacy follows from democratic processes of policy and law formation. 
Level three of the framework represents governance institutions, constituted by rules for that 
craft order for contracts and enforcement mechanisms in the pursuit of mutual gains from, for 
example, the exploitation of natural resources. Finally, level four encompasses economic 
institutions that structure incentives and motivations for transactive decisions making. In 
contrast to political institutions these economic institutions exert de facto power, drawing on 
the legitimacy of everyday modes of production and consumption.
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Figure 1.3. A Dynamic New Institutional Economics Framework. (Based on Williamson 2000 
and Acemoglu et al. 2004)
As outlined by Ostrom (1990), all of these levels do not exist in silos, but are instead subject 
to continuous review as a function of the actors, knowledge and resources that constitute each 
set of rules as well as move in and out of each level. She also argued that economic 
institutions, are the fastest in renewing themselves means they are more subject to 
experimentation and iterative improvement compared to the other institutional levels (see 
also Pacheco, 2010; Overdevest et al. 2014). As these institutions adapt with new knowledge, 
resources and interests of actors they influence the creation of governance, political and 
social institutions. But they are at the same time also themselves influenced by political 
decisions aimed at capturing rents from economic behaviour (e.g. Liebecap 2008). In 
between these levels governance institutions, as rules in action, are the outcome of the 
interaction between economic and political levels. As illustrated in Figure 1.3, this 
combination of both political, governance and economic institutions can be described as the 
prevailing ‘governance’ framework, reflecting the incentives of decision makers to choose 
certain policies, the inclusion of actions, and ultimately how a decision making process leads 
to different choices, each with their own economic outcomes (see for example Borner 2005).
The NIE framework is imminently useful for examining the governance of public resources, 
such as fisheries, especially where so called market or incentive based instruments are used in 
parallel to the state. Institutional economics has been influential in analysing the impact of 
public policy by providing insights into the role of incentives created through economic 
institutions to achieve desired environmental outcomes (Paavola 2007). It is particularly 
relevant to problems where cooperation is central to the success of reaching these outcomes. 
This means not only understanding how economic incentives are applied and responded to by 
agents, but also how state’s decision making conditions and voluntary collective action over 
environmental resource use. In short, it is then possible to ask how cooperation can be 
sustained and improved. In the context of tuna fisheries, this means questioning how ‘old 
regimes’, which have failed due to weak motivation and incentives for cooperation, can 
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transition to new regimes which create decentralised motivation for self-governance and/or 
improved compliance to state regulation. 
But while NIE provides an analytical framework to examine the shift from old to new tuna 
regimes, NIE alone is not sufficient to further our understanding on the extent of how this 
shift from old to new regimes, nor how they can contribute to the long term cooperation. For 
that, this thesis integrates coalition theory and principal-agent theory to complement and 
strengthen the NIE framework. The integration of these theories provides a deeper 
understandings of the extent to which the shift from old to new tuna regimes can be 
understood in view of better cooperation among the states and between states and private 
companies using incentive based mechanisms.
1.4.2 Game theory – coalition theory and principal agent theory
Game theory has been used widely to examine strategic interactions in international 
agreements for trans-boundary problems. Its application to fisheries agreements began in the 
late 1970s around the time when the 200 mile zone was recognised, establishing de facto
property rights of coastal states over the fish in extended zones (Bailey et al. 2010, 
Hannesson 2011). Game theory has been applied extensively to the issue of how such shared 
fish stocks will be exploited (Lindroos 2004, Kronbak 2007). Questions focus on how 
cooperation can be achieved given that countries differ, the outcomes of competition versus 
cooperation and what could be done to secure a cooperative outcome (Bailey et al. 2010, 
Hannesson 2011). For instance, coalition theory, one branch of game theory, analyses 
international environmental agreements on trans-boundary problems caused by externalities, 
such as migratory tuna stocks (Bailey et al. 2010, Hannesson 2011). This research examines 
the extent to which cooperative arrangements succeed or fail to secure positive environmental 
outcomes (e.g Lindroos 2004, Kronbak 2007, Pintassilgo 2010 and others), as well as the 
degree of stability of the cooperation in maintaining these outcomes over time (Dellink 
2011). 
For example, Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) found that grand coalitions of states can be stable 
and lead to pay-offs for cooperation. But they also found that breaking out of such grand 
coalition results in the depletion of the fish stock. Pintassilgo (2003) builds on Kaitala and 
Lindroos’s (1998) findings by claiming that coalitions are likely to be undermined by one 
member leaving and profiting from free riding on the remaining coalition. Such observations 
open up further questions around the internal and external stability to further understand how 
political and external influences impact the willingness of states to maintain cooperation over 
time (Hannesson 2011). It is exactly this line of questioning that this thesis focuses on. For 
instance, how external economic institutions influence the internal stability of the coalition 
between PNA member states in effectively setting governance institutions.
Returning to the NIE framework, the challenge is then to understand the extent to which 
coalition theory can determine whether new tuna regimes are strengthening (coalition 
stability) or weakening (coalition instability) political institutions. More specifically, 
coalition theory can be used here to examine the effectiveness of new tuna regimes and how 
they strengthen formal political institutions (or state cooperation) for collective participation.
Additionally, the thesis extends the analyses of cooperation beyond states to examine the 
potential of public-private cooperation through goal alignment. In doing so, this thesis uses 
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principal-agent theory (yet another branch of game theory) to examine cooperation between 
coastal states and private fishing companies in managing tuna resources for long term 
outcomes (Hannesson 2011, Kozenkow 2013). Principal-agent theory has been variously 
applied to trans-boundary fisheries to analyse, the relationship between fisheries regulators 
and fishing agents characterised by incentive gaps, and the level of compliance under 
conditions of imperfect information and imperfect control, termed ‘asymmetric information’
problem in the fishery (Jensen et al. 2017). Asymmetric information has two forms; moral 
hazard, referring to imperfect control of effort and catch, and adverse selection, referring to 
imperfect information about the agents’ interests and conditions (Jensen et al. 2002, Bailey et 
al. 2016, 2017). With asymmetric information, incentive gaps are observed between fisheries 
regulators and agents. 
The principal-agent literature models the effect of incentive schemes and the options to close 
incentive gaps through, for instance, subsidies (Jensen et al. 2002), landing and effort taxes 
(Clarke and Munro 1987), individual transferable and non-transferable quotas (Jensen et al. 
2001, Jensen et al. 2002), and logbook schemes (Jensen et al. 2007). Specifically, these 
studies emphasise the need to close incentive gaps and thereby open up questions about the 
role of incentive schemes making private information transparent in order to close these gaps.
In the context of trans-boundary regimes the application of principal-agent theory also helps 
to identify the existence of multiple incentive gaps between the multiple levels of governance 
that prevail in regional governance regimes (e.g. Bailey et al. 2016).
Again returning to the NIE framework, third level governance institutions, where contracts 
and agreements are located provides space for the analysis of public-private interaction using 
principal-agent theory. Specifically, principal-agent theory can examine the role of new tuna 
regimes in addressing asymmetric information problem and improve governance institution 
by closing incentive gaps between the states and private fishing companies. By examining 
this interaction through principle-agent theory this thesis examines how new tuna regimes 
facilitate closing of multiple levels of incentive gaps between states and private fishing 
companies in the PNA fishery.
In analysing the extent of how institutional changes formulate new tuna regimes and how 
new regimes restructure incentives and outcomes, integration of NIE framework and coalition 
theory and principal-agent theory is utilised. Both coalition and principal-agent theory are 
fisheries economics approaches and tools used to examine the extent to which new tuna 
regimes restructure institutions at different levels (see Figure 1.4). The integration and 
application of these theories implies that understanding interaction between the NIE levels 
can be improved by analysing how cooperation is enabled or hindered by incentives and 
constraints to the delivery of these incentives.
1.5 Research questions
This thesis examines the emergence of and transition to a new regime for managing 
governing sustainable and equitable trans-boundary tuna stocks in the WCPO. In doing so the 
research seeks to understand: i) the shift from political institutions new the interplay political 
and market institutions, and ii) how these new tuna regimes influence management outcomes. 
To achieve this the central question of the thesis is:
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What characterises the shift from old to new regimes for trans-boundary tuna management,
and to what extent is the emergence of a new tuna regime able achieve sustainable and 
equitable outcomes in the Western and Central Pacific?
In answering this central thesis question, the thesis systematically address the following four 
specific questions which correspond in turn to the four empirical chapters (see Figure 1.4 for 
thesis structure).
First, how has the shift from an old to new tuna regime come about and what institutional 
changes implemented in the PNA have facilitated this shift? To better understand the rationale 
for new tuna regimes, the second chapter provides an in-depth analysis of an historical shift 
from old to new regimes in the context of a sub-regional PNA fishery and its influence over 
the WCPFC. In doing so the chapter outlines in greater detail the role of the NIE institutional 
levels and how the interaction between these institutions affect change at both sub-regional 
and regional levels in the WCPO.
Second, to what degree has the implementation of the vessel day scheme in PNA brought 
about greater stability to the signatories of the Palau Agreement? This question is addressed 
in chapter 3 by examining the extent to which the PNA, as a coalition, are incentivised to 
maintain their cooperation through the vessel day scheme. In doing so, the chapter
investigates how the VDS as an economic institution strengthens the PNA as a political 
institution. Based on this analysis insights are drawn on whether and how international 
cooperation can be improved through the economically derived incentives.
Third, to what extent does third party certification increase transparency through improved 
monitoring and control and, in doing so, address misaligned interests between states and 
private sector actors in the fishery? This question is addressed in chapter 4 and focuses 
specifically on issues of asymmetric information and as such uses principal-agent theory to 
investigate the extent of how private schemes like the MSC is able to address asymmetric 
information problem and close incentive gaps in the fishery. Again, this chapter focuses on 
the role of an economic institution (the MSC) to influence the PNA as a political institution in 
the formation of governance institutions like harvest control rules and conservation and 
management measures.
Fourth, can private institutions such as third party certification facilitate improvements to 
conservation and management measures at the RFMO level? This last question moves 
beyond the WCPO to explore the role of private institutions again focusing on MSC program
in three RFMOs. This final empirical chapter seeks to conduct a comparative analysis of 
three RFMOs in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic oceans and their interaction with the MSC. 
Specially, the chapter highlights the extent to which the MSC incentivises the adoption of 
precautionary management measures as required of them under the United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement. As such the chapter provides a further examination of how economic and 
political institutions interact to forge new governance institutions for sustainable and 
equitable tuna fisheries.
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Figure 1.4 Thesis outline – Integrating coalition and principal agent theory in NIE 
framework
1.6 Research methodology
1.6.1 Research strategy and design – Case study
To answer the thesis questions a case study methodology is employed. The use of case 
studies is commonly used in social science qualitative research to make empirical inquiries 
on problems connection to real-life contexts (Yin 1994). The research takes an inductive 
approach by starting with theory in formulating the research goal and questions that are going 
to be tested in the research (Boeije 2010). The case studies help in setting a platform where to 
apply and test the theory to real-life. In doing so, the thesis uses a mix of: (1) historical 
institutional analysis based in documents and interviews; (2) observations of meetings and 
negotiations (3) mixed qualitative and quantitative interviews and document reviews.
The various chapters in this thesis are also based on multiple inductive cases. The value of 
such an approach is that it can address a phenomenon from different ‘viewpoints’ or ‘angles’, 
meaning that generalisations around a phenomenon, such as the interaction of the state with 
incentive based mechanisms, can be made more convincingly (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007). As outlined by Tolentino-Zondervan (2017), the use of multiple inductive case studies 
is also well suited to understanding new and innovative phenomena of private incentive 
mechanisms. Because their impacts and influences are still in motion multiple cases around 
the same wider case (in this thesis, the PNA), can again contribute to more generalizable 
results.
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1.6.2 Data collection
Data was collected through a combination of semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation at the tuna regional meetings, literature and document (regional and national) 
reviews. Data collection was conducted from 2013 to 2017 for all four chapters. The details 
of specific field work are covered in each of the following chapters. The initial research 
activity involved participating as part of the Kiribati and PNA delegation team in the WCPFC 
and PNA annual meetings in 2013 and 2014 respectively, with the intention of informing 
participants of the research and establishing networks with tuna informants. These were 
followed by a series of interviews and document analyses in building up the data sets for all 
four questions. 
Participant Observation. Throughout the research, conferences and meetings relevant to the 
study were attended. Participant observation proved particularly helpful in establishing 
networking and relationships with key tuna informants around the region and globally (Boeije 
2010). The key tuna meetings attended include the 2013 and 2014 Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the 2013 European Tuna Conference, the 2014 
PNA, Palau Agreement, Federated States of Micronesia Arrangements (FSMA), and 2015 
Pacific Tuna Forum. Most of these meetings were attended as a participant, to gain 
knowledge on the most up to date debates on the status and development of tuna management 
measures. Fortunately insider information was also collected through participation in the 
Kiribati delegation team at the 2014 and 2015 WCPFC meetings. It provide the opportunity 
to observe the strategic interactions of state and non-state actors in tuna negotiations at the 
RFMO level. Participation at subregional PNA, Palau Agreement and FSMA meetings, not 
only provide a good understanding of the structure of multiple tuna arrangements, but also 
provide the opportunity to observe member states’ actions in close sub-regional meetings 
without fishing states and companies. To maintain the balance of interpretation, interviews 
with all stakeholders from state to private is also conducted. 
Semi-structured interviews. Qualitative and semi-structured interviews were conducted 
(where possible) at the meeting venues and subsequently by appointment with interviewees. 
Semi and open structured interviews were used to give interviewees the freedom to share 
their personal and professional perspectives and experiences (Boeije 2010). Both face-to-face 
and online interviews were used throughout the research. Any further information, including 
clarifications from the interviews were sough via email. Online communication is particularly 
useful as informants are spread across the globe. Interviews were recorded where permission 
was given, and notes were taken where recording was not permitted. 
A total of 82 interviews were conducted throughout the research period from December 2013 
to March 2017. Before the interviews, questions were prepared to structure and guide the 
reciprocal discussions between researcher and interviewees. Different interview questions are 
asked to different participants depending on their role. The majority of the interviewees 
worked directly with tuna, either as: i) state representative, ii) expertise (regional officials and 
consultants) and iii) private actors (fishing companies, conservationists and non-government 
organisations) (see Table 1.1). The interview questions were organised and structured in line 
with the research questions. Some participants were repeatedly interviewed throughout the 
research given their expertise and knowledge on the case studies and tuna fishery in general. 
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Table 1.1 List of interviews
Corresponding chapter;
Time scale of interview
Type of Respondents
(Face to face and online 
communication)
Number of 
Respondents
Chapter 2; 
December 2013 to December 2014
Govt. fisheries officials 4
Experts 7
Privates 3
Chapter 3;
March 2015 to December 2015
Govt. fisheries officials 6
Experts 12
Privates 4
Chapter 4;
March 2015 to March 2017
Govt. fisheries officials
Experts
Privates
12
12
6
Chapter 5;
October 2016 to March 2017
Govt. fisheries officials
Experts
Privates
-
7
9
Total interviews 82
Explanation of respondent type and repeated respondents
i. Govt. fisheries officials; Government representatives (6 repeated)
ii. Experts; Regional fisheries officials* (3 repeated), consultants (2 repeated), scientists (1 repeated), and 
researchers 
iii. Privates; NGOs, fishers, companies (1 repeated), clients
*Regional and subregional RFMOs: WCPFC, PNA, FFA, SPC, IOTC, ICCAT
Document analysis. Throughout the research process, document analysis was conducted to 
complement the qualitative data collected from observations and interviews. The documents 
examined range from peer reviewed publications, to technical reports from government and 
non-government organisations. These documents provided quantitative evidence and support 
to qualitative interview data. Document analysis was also essential given most quantitative 
data are difficult to obtain during the interviews (e.g. catch, effort, and economic data). 
Moreover at the fleet and national level, economic data are treated with confidentiality. 
To avoid issues of confidentiality, only reports available in the public domain were used; for 
example from organisations like the PNA, WCPFC, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO) and other RFMOs. For calculations, quantitative effort and economic 
data, the research used aggregated data made available by PNA delegations and the PNA 
Secretariat. Consent was given by the PNA Secretariat to use their data for this research. 
We now turn to the first empirical chapter of the thesis, which provides an analysis of the 
shift from regulatory policy to new economic policy instruments through the lens of new 
institutional economics.
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Chapter 2. Implications of new economic policy instruments for tuna management in 
the Western and Central Pacific.
Abstract
Tuna management in the Western and Central Pacific is complicated by the conflicting 
interests of countries and agents exploiting tuna resources in the region. Historically, 
regulatory attempts by Pacific Island Countries to control fishing effort within their Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) have met with limited success. The introduction of new economic 
policy instruments by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), such as the vessel day 
scheme (VDS) and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, has supported and 
complemented existing conservation and management measures. By bringing in new 
incentives for the PNA states, greater control over fishing effort and the formulation of 
perceptibly new sustainable fishing practices have emerged. Using a new institutional 
economic framework, this paper analyses the shift from regulatory policy to new economic 
policy instruments through the lens of new institutional economics. The results show how the 
adoption of the VDS and MSC certification program has brought new changes and 
improvements to tuna negotiations, to agreements, and to outcomes amongst parties. 
Investing in these new instruments has elucidated ways in which new economic institutions 
strengthen de jure political control over trans-boundary fish resources and fishing fleets.
This chapter has been published in Marine Policy.
Yeeting, A., S.R. Bush, V. Ram-Bidesi and M. Bailey (2016) Moving towards new economic 
policies for Tuna Management in the Western and Central Pacific – The Case of the 
PNA. Marine Policy 63: 45-52.
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2.1 Introduction
The impact of the skipjack tuna purse seine fishery on the more vulnerable yellowfin and 
bigeye tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) has become 
increasingly controversial in recent years (Langley et al. 2009). Stock assessments from the 
WCPO consistently report that bigeye is overfished while yellowfin remains fully exploited 
(Harley et al. 2013, Harley et al. 2014). The impetus to continue (over)exploiting these more 
vulnerable stocks comes from the economic importance of skipjack to coastal states – who 
rely on revenues from licensing arrangements with mixed fishing vessels ranging from distant 
water fishing nations to locally owned and joint-venture fishing vessels. Pacific coastal 
states’ revenue from licensing arrangements ranges from between 2% to almost 60% of their 
GDP (Barclay et al. 2007, Havice 2010, Bell et al. 2015). Developing management 
arrangements that balance the ongoing exploitation of skipjack tuna stocks, while reducing 
pressure on yellowfin and bigeye tuna, is therefore largely dependent on cooperation for 
balancing conservation and economic goals between the 16 coastal states of the Pacific 
including the eight Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) states. 
Despite continued recognition of the conservation and economic benefits that can be derived 
from improved cooperation around tuna management in the region (Bailey et al. 2013),
examples of effective cooperative international regimes remain scarce (Hilborn et al. 1988, 
Sumaila 1999, Ram-Bidesi et al. 2004, Bailey et al. 2010, Havice et al. 2010). It is also 
apparent that past access arrangements governing the WCPO tuna fisheries have not led to 
significant increases in economic returns to coastal states, until the recent implementation of 
the Vessel Day Scheme in  2012 (Havice 2010, Havice et al. 2010). Inappropriate incentives, 
inadequate knowledge, a high demand for limited resources, and ineffective governance are 
noted among the main contributing factors that undermine cooperation (Grafton et al. 2006, 
Grafton et al. 2006). As (Campbell et al. 2015, Hanich et al. 2015) note, cooperative 
measures that deliver on both effective management and equitable distribution of wealth from 
these resources have therefore remained a central development policy objective for the 
region. 
Contrary to this trend, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), a sub-regional group of 
eight tuna rich countries, have strengthened the coordination of tuna fishery management 
across their joint jurisdictions. The PNA members have adopted two new economic policy 
instruments – the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) in 2005 and the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) certification program in 2011 – in an attempt to strengthen and complement existing 
regulatory conservation and management measures for tuna fisheries. The new policy 
instruments have been adopted by the PNA group to ensure both the ecological objectives of 
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the economic goals of 
its member countries are achieved. These new approaches are intended to influence 
individual countries’ choices around securing collective welfare in the fishery, thereby
improving not only cooperation and tuna governance in the Pacific (Havice et al. 2010), but 
also meet Pacific island countries’ aspirations of gaining greater benefits from tuna (Barclay 
et al. 2007).
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This paper examines the design and implementation of these new economic policy 
instruments through the lens of New Institutional Economics (NIE); an approach designed to 
integrate approaches from economics, law and social and political sciences to explain and 
address complex societal (and fisheries environmental) problems (Williamson 1990). The 
paper describes the reasons for the shift to these new economic instruments and analyses how 
they influence the political (de jure) and economic (de facto) control over fishing resources in 
the waters of the PNA. In doing so we analyse how this shift has come about and the 
institutional changes that have been implemented by the PNA as a result. The paper begins by 
introducing the NIE framework before providing an overview of regional tuna treaties and 
regimes and the conditions under which the PNA has shifted from a regulatory approach to 
new economic policy framework. Finally, we examine how these policy instruments affect 
the de jure and de facto power over fishing resources in the PNA.
Data and information were gathered through literature and document review, as well as 
interviews and observations at regional and sub-regional tuna management meetings from 
December 2013 to December 2014. These meetings included the 10th and 11th regular 
meeting of the WCPFC, 19th meeting of the Parties to the Palau Agreement, 19th meeting of 
the Parties to the Federated States of Micronesian (FSM) Arrangement, and 33rd annual 
meeting of the PNA. In addition, 14 in depth interviews were conducted with senior officials 
and delegations from each of the PNA countries, officials and consultants from the regional 
organisations in particular Fisheries Forum Agency and PNA Office, and fishers or vessels 
operators, observers and NGO representatives.
2.2 New Institutional Economic (NIE) Framework 
The complexity of balancing the interests of multiple conflicting states, has led to the 
emergence of international regimes that seek to combine both regulatory and market logics 
into finding solutions for global environmental problems through international cooperation 
(Biermann et al. 2008, Young 2011). As a result, the perceived ineffectiveness of command 
and control approaches have led to questions about how states and other actors try to achieve 
desired outcomes. Creating the right incentives then becomes central to the effectiveness of 
institutions. As regimes evolve in response to the emergence of new issues, they reframe old 
issues, allow for the entrance of new agents, and/or the changing interests of existing agents, 
leading to new knowledge and/or a redistribution of power (Muzaka 2010). Understanding 
such a dynamic institutional environment is essential in determining the conditions under 
which public and private interests can enable rather than constrain effective resource 
management and allocation.
A conceptual understanding of this evolving process can be derived from new institutional 
economics (NIE). NIE is relevant for understanding how dynamic political interests influence 
decisions over the (environmental) governance of trans-boundary and common resources, by 
focusing on the processes that lead to inefficient policy outcomes and the design of 
innovative policy solutions. To this end, NIE offers an interdisciplinary approach to analyse 
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the form and function of institutions in allocating rights and responsibilities for efficient 
resource use and stewardship (Coase 1984, Williamson 1990, Hodgson 2006, Paavola 2007).
Williamson (Williamson 2000) provides a hierarchical NIE framework consisting of four 
institutional levels, each with a different pace of change (see Figure 2.1). The first two levels 
refer to informal and formal institutions. Informal or social institutions include socially 
embedded norms customs, traditions and codes that often hold slow change but pervasive 
influence over societal conduct. Formal or political institutions constitute the institutional 
environment within which “executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of 
government, as well as the distribution of powers across different levels of government” are 
located (p. 598). Level three of Williamson’s hierarchy refers to institutions of governance, 
constituted by rules for mitigating conflict and creating mutual gains by ‘crafting order’
through contracts and enforcement mechanisms. Finally, level four refers to economic 
institutions that structure incentives and motivations for ‘day-to-day’ transactions and 
decisions making. The dynamic nature of agents, resources and knowledge encompassed by 
economic institutions are subject to continuous review, with greater frequencies of change 
compared to governance and political institutions (Ostrom 1990). This also means that 
experimentation and iterative improvement are also likely in these economic institutions 
compared to the other institutional levels (Pacheco et al. 2010).
The four levels are ordered to the extent that ‘higher’ levels have a direct influence over those 
below. So that social institutions direct the formation of political institutions which craft the 
conditions under which everyday economic practice occurs. But while Williamson 
recognised that feedbacks between levels are possible, he did not elaborate what these 
feedbacks would be, nor what consequence they might have. Recognising this gap, Acemolgu 
et al. (Acemoglu et al. 2005) argue that the interactions between these institutional levels are 
fundamentally based on feedbacks which determine the distribution of two types of decision 
making power. First, de jure power derived from the political institutions that underscore 
state representation, and second de facto political power derived from economic institutions 
that determine the allocation of economic resources. They argue that the control over 
resources, such as trans-boundary fish stocks, at any given time is determined by a process of 
co-production between political (level two) and economic (level four) institutions 
(Williamson 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2004).
Following Acemoglu et al. (Acemoglu et al. 2005) economic institutions are therefore not a 
function of political institutions, but instead constitutive of political decisions to capture the 
benefits associated with economic outcomes (Borner 2005). Likewise, it opens up the 
possibility for political institutions to directly structure economic institutions, and in doing so 
internalise incentives for improved resource stewardship (Acemoglu et al. 2005). But 
returning to Williamson, this process of co-production is not a binary process. It is instead 
mediated by ‘level three’ governance institutions. Recognising this mediating role therefore 
opens up questions about the design of these governance institutions, how they are 
negotiated, what incentives they ‘craft’, and ultimately how they influence the balance 
between political de jure and economic de facto power. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, this 
combination of both political, governance and economic institutions can be described as the 
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prevailing ‘governance’ framework, reflecting the incentives of decision makers to choose 
certain policies, the inclusion of actions, and ultimately how a decision making process leads 
to different choices, each with their own economic outcomes (Borner 2005).
(Formal / Political Institution);
Treaties and agreements
(Economic Institution); 
Distribution of resources -
Incentives and motivations
(Governance Institution); 
Trade, negotiations, contracts
Informal  Institution:
codes of conducts
L 1
L 2
L 3
L 4
De  jure
De facto
Change in institutions
Agents, resources, knowledge
Influence
Feedback
Scope of analysis
Figure 2.1 Theoretical framework of political and economic institutions (adapted and 
modified from Williamson 2000 and Acemoglu et al. 2005).
2.3 PNA’s shifting focus to incentive driven strategies
The introduction of the VDS and MSC certification of free school purse seine fisheries 
demonstrates a clear shift in strategy from using political to economic institutions to govern 
trans-boundary fisheries by the PNA. In this section we outline the challenges faced by 
political institutions and the corresponding emergence of these two economic policy 
instruments, as well as the relationship of these instruments to contemporary fisheries 
management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
2.3.1 Palau Agreement and Federated States of Micronesian Arrangement
Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), tuna 
fisheries are governed at different geographic and jurisdictional levels and scales from 
subnational to national and regional (Fanning et al. 2007). In the Pacific access to sovereign 
resources have been governed through a combination of bilateral access and joint venture 
arrangements, both of which also aim to provide economic development opportunities and 
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lower transaction cost for coastal states.  However, despite the goal of managing regionally 
shared resources, the outcome of these arrangements have often favoured the interests of the 
fishing industry dominated by foreign owned, but locally flagged and joint venture vessels. 
These industry interests have then in turn, been expressed as national interests at the regional 
level (Barclay et al. 2007, Havice 2010, Kumoru 2014, Pangelinan 2014). As a result access 
arrangements for tuna fisheries in the WCPO have failed to provide significant increases in 
economic returns to coastal states (Grafton et al. 2006, Havice 2010). While most bilateral 
agreements are rather driven by national political aspirations, weak governance and a lack of 
political will related to multiple competing interests, have led to a continued overexploitation 
and inefficient allocation of tuna resources. 
The first shift towards new economic policy instruments was initiated through the Palau 
Arrangement in 1992 and the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (FSMA) in 1994. 
The Palau Arrangement restricted the number of purse seine vessels in PNA waters to 205 
(Wright et al. 2006, Langley et al. 2009) and the FSMA provides preferential access to 
vessels engaged in domestic development and offering discounted fishing licenses and 
reciprocal access between PNA member countries (Langley et al. 2009, Havice 2010).
Reflecting a wider shift to inter-state investment in fishery resources, the FSMA also marked 
a fundamental shift in the design of access agreements by offering incentives for economic 
development opportunities through domestic initiatives (Havice 2010, Havice et al. 2010, 
Havice 2013). For example, while giving coastal flagged state vessels preferences, both the 
Palau Agreement and the FSMA required the development of domestic fisheries, ports and 
infrastructure, as well as the provision of employment opportunities for PNA nationals.
Despite the conditions set out by both arrangements, it became clear by 2000 that these goals 
have not been reached (Langley et al. 2009). The FSMA failed to promote investment in 
domestic development largely due to the lack of transparency and limited development 
opportunities provided by joint venture partners, despite having been in operation in the 
region for the past 20 years. As argued by national officials, distant water nations offered 
limited development opportunities that were also not conducive to national aspirations, and 
offered very limited employment opportunities for nationals. Furthermore, as argued by 
interview respondents, the Palau Agreement failed to create a competitive environment for 
vessels given the lack of support from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). Vessel 
numbers were fixed at 205 leaving no room for competition, and allocation rights were given 
to vessels instead of PNA members (Ram-Bidesi et al. 2004, Langley et al. 2009). The result
was a stagnation of access fees charged by the PNA at 5 to 6% of catch values (Havice 2013),
jeopardising hopes that foreign investment would increase.
Over time it also became apparent that the measures put in place by the Palau Agreement and 
FSMA were ineffective in mitigating negative effects of purse seining on yellowfin and 
bigeye tuna. The fishery faced a continued expansion of ‘effort creep’ associated with the 
entry of larger more efficient vessels and the expanded use of georeferenced floating fish 
aggregating devices (FADs) (Langley et al. 2009, Hanich et al. 2010, Shanks 2010). As a 
result, catches have been consistently increasing over the years, albeit at a reduced rate 
(Aqorau 2015, Clark 2015). The latest record indicates that the 2014 WCPFC statistical catch 
26
lower transaction cost for coastal states.  However, despite the goal of managing regionally 
shared resources, the outcome of these arrangements have often favoured the interests of the 
fishing industry dominated by foreign owned, but locally flagged and joint venture vessels. 
These industry interests have then in turn, been expressed as national interests at the regional 
level (Barclay et al. 2007, Havice 2010, Kumoru 2014, Pangelinan 2014). As a result access 
arrangements for tuna fisheries in the WCPO have failed to provide significant increases in 
economic returns to coastal states (Grafton et al. 2006, Havice 2010). While most bilateral 
agreements are rather driven by national political aspirations, weak governance and a lack of 
political will related to multiple competing interests, have led to a continued overexploitation 
and inefficient allocation of tuna resources. 
The first shift towards new economic policy instruments was initiated through the Palau 
Arrangement in 1992 and the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (FSMA) in 1994. 
The Palau Arrangement restricted the number of purse seine vessels in PNA waters to 205 
(Wright et al. 2006, Langley et al. 2009) and the FSMA provides preferential access to 
vessels engaged in domestic development and offering discounted fishing licenses and 
reciprocal access between PNA member countries (Langley et al. 2009, Havice 2010).
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Havice 2013). For example, while giving coastal flagged state vessels preferences, both the 
Palau Agreement and the FSMA required the development of domestic fisheries, ports and 
infrastructure, as well as the provision of employment opportunities for PNA nationals.
Despite the conditions set out by both arrangements, it became clear by 2000 that these goals 
have not been reached (Langley et al. 2009). The FSMA failed to promote investment in 
domestic development largely due to the lack of transparency and limited development 
opportunities provided by joint venture partners, despite having been in operation in the 
region for the past 20 years. As argued by national officials, distant water nations offered 
limited development opportunities that were also not conducive to national aspirations, and 
offered very limited employment opportunities for nationals. Furthermore, as argued by 
interview respondents, the Palau Agreement failed to create a competitive environment for 
vessels given the lack of support from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). Vessel 
numbers were fixed at 205 leaving no room for competition, and allocation rights were given 
to vessels instead of PNA members (Ram-Bidesi et al. 2004, Langley et al. 2009). The result
was a stagnation of access fees charged by the PNA at 5 to 6% of catch values (Havice 2013),
jeopardising hopes that foreign investment would increase.
Over time it also became apparent that the measures put in place by the Palau Agreement and 
FSMA were ineffective in mitigating negative effects of purse seining on yellowfin and 
bigeye tuna. The fishery faced a continued expansion of ‘effort creep’ associated with the 
entry of larger more efficient vessels and the expanded use of georeferenced floating fish 
aggregating devices (FADs) (Langley et al. 2009, Hanich et al. 2010, Shanks 2010). As a 
result, catches have been consistently increasing over the years, albeit at a reduced rate 
(Aqorau 2015, Clark 2015). The latest record indicates that the 2014 WCPFC statistical catch 
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record was slightly higher than in previous years, but relatively stable compared to the 
average over the past five years (Clark 2015, WCPFC. 2015).  The provisional 2014 purse 
seine catch was estimated at 2,020,627 mt, was the highest on record. Skipjack catches 
accounted for 1,957,693 mt – 68% of the total catch, yellowfin catch is the second largest at 
608,807 mt – 21% of the total catch, and bigeye and albacore are around 161,299 mt and 
132,849 mt – 6% and 5% of the total catch respectively (WCPFC. 2015).
By 2010 bigeye tuna was overfished and overfishing still continues. To remediate this 
situation, the scientific committee of the WCPFC has called for a reduction of at least 32% in 
fishing mortality from the average 2006-2009 levels, signalling a need for new mechanisms 
to address overfishing, and provide a long-term solution to stock decline (WCPFC. 2014, 
WCPFC. 2014).
2.3.2 Shift to New Economic Policy Instruments 
In response to lower returns from access arrangements and the perceived erosion of sovereign 
control over resources by distant water nations represented by the WCPFC, the PNA called 
for a review of the Palau Agreement in 2000 with assistance of the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA). At the conclusion of this review in 2007, it was decided to move from capacity limits 
to effort control. The outcome was the adoption of the VDS in 2005 to replace the limit of 
205 purse seine vessels under the Palau Agreement. In doing so, the PNA increased control 
over the level of fishing effort with limited fishing days in an effort to support both ecological 
goals set by the WCPFC and economic goals of the PNA member states.
The goal of the VDS is to improve economic benefits to resource-owning states by generating 
a real limit on fishing days, thereby creating demand and competition between vessel 
operators. The scheme does not put restrictions on the number of vessels, but rather provides 
flexibility for new entrants that may offer higher fees. Economic gains with VDS are 
measured and dependent on the price charged per fishing day. Fishing days allocated to 
coastal states were limited and fixed, so coastal states were given more flexibility to either 
use the benchmark price or independently increase the price of their days (PNA 2012). By 
tightening effort and limiting the number of days, the PNA has aimed to further increase 
competition for licenses while also improving fishing efficiency by eliminating inefficient 
vessels (Pangelinan 2014). Although alternative systems were proposed, the VDS was 
adopted because it was seen as technically feasible, with real time monitoring through a 
mandatory vessel monitoring scheme (Havice 2013). However, full adoption of the scheme 
was delayed until 2012 because of diverse political interests undermining the necessary 
consensus by PNA members to move to full implementation. The current allocation of days is 
based on the 2010 effort levels (WCPFC. 2014, WCPFC. 2014). The recommended PNA 
Total Allowable Effort (TAE) in which Parties allocated effort for 2015 is 44,623 days (PNA. 
2014).
In parallel with the implementation of the VDS, the PNA also initiated steps to move towards 
MSC certification – widely seen as the ‘gold standard’ for fisheries management 
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(Gulbrandsen 2009). This was not the first consideration to have the tuna fishery certified. 
However, earlier proposals were never taken forward, largely because of bycatch issues 
associated with FAD-based purse seine fisheries, and because of the perceived weakness of 
sustainability claims around pole and line fisheries (Brownjohn 2014). The goal of the new 
initiative was to certify skipjack tuna in PNA waters that employ ‘free school’ or non-FAD 
purse seining, thereby reducing effort on vulnerable non-target yellowfin and bigeye tuna 
with purse seining associated with FADs (Miller et al. 2015). In doing so the PNA sought 
certification of potential landings equivalent to approximately 60% of the WCPO fishery, and 
help create a new market for sustainably certified purse seine tuna. The hope is that this 
market would lead to greater overall recognition and credibility for the PNA implementing 
arrangements and (again reinforcing the Palau and FSM Arrangements) ensure higher 
control, economic returns and commercial opportunities for member countries.
The PNA also saw MSC certification as a means of capturing more market control over the 
tuna traded from their waters. In 2010, the PNA secretariat entered into a 50/50 joint venture 
with the Dutch based company Pacifical BV to promote and market MSC certified skipjack 
(Miller et al. 2015). Fishers changing their practices to comply with the MSC non-FAD 
requirement are rewarded with a 10% price premium, with canneries receiving a further 3%, 
and the PNA/Pacifical receiving a further 7% (Brownjohn 2014). Having gone through both 
pre-assessment (independent third party assessment) and full assessment (stakeholder’s input) 
processes, PNA was granted MSC certification in 2011 and a chain of custody (COC) 
certification in 2013. The first Pacifical MSC tuna products were on European supermarket 
shelved in November 2013.
2.4 Analysis of the VDS and MSC certification
From the perspective of new institutional economics both the VDS and MSC certification are 
designed to (re)allocate rights and responsibilities by packaging and delivering economic 
incentives for compliance with state defined conservation and management measures. The 
intended outcome of implementing these instruments by the PNA is to enhance the protection 
of member’s common interest over state owned and controlled tuna stocks, as established 
under UNCLOS 1982, and create a competitive advantage as well as economies of scale 
within the region. The question remains, however, as to what extent have they been able to 
achieve this goal. Returning to our combined NIE framework (Figure 2.1), we now examine 
how these new economic policy instruments have realigned the interaction between political, 
governance and economic institutions and in doing so influenced the de facto and de jure
control over tuna resources in the region. 
2.4.1 The Vessel Day Scheme
The VDS is based on vessel days held by the members of the PNA that are allocated through 
the Total Allowable Effort (TAEs) and the Parties Allowable Efforts (PAEs), both of which 
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are determined at the annual meeting of the PNA. The WCPFC, which includes distant water 
fishing nations, agrees on conservation and management measures in a given year that will 
support or maintain maximum sustainable yield (MSY) based on the best available scientific 
information (WCPFC. 2014). Subsequently, the PNA members determine TAEs and 
allocated PAEs (measured in vessel days) among members based on historical effort and 
biomass levels that will support ecological objectives of the WCPFC (PNA. 2014).
Additionally, the PNA governs the VDS by agreeing on the minimum benchmark price of 
fishing days or vessel days, and through a trading mechanism for transferrable days among 
members. The minimum benchmark price of a vessel day, give members the flexibility to sell 
their days for higher prices.
The implementation of the VDS can be broken into four phases. In the first phase, from 2007 
to 2010, the design of the VDS progressed with some PNA members starting to sell vessel 
days to purse seine vessels. However, because the coverage of the scheme was partial and 
alternative access remained possible through non-participating members, the scheme was not 
successful (Aqorau 2009). The second phase saw the full implementation of the VDS in 2011 
with hard limits on the PAEs. The third phase saw all member states agreeing to the 
establishment of a benchmark price through a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
in 2012. With this MOU, the PNA members took the first step to form a cartel-like agreement 
to control fishing day price and increase revenue from purse seine fishing vessels (Havice 
2013). At this time member states recognised the value that was being created by capping 
purse seine fishing effort leading to an increase in demand of fishing days, and increasing 
competition among fishing vessels. Their vision for the VDS at this point was that inefficient 
vessels would be removed from the fishery as prices would be driven up by more efficient 
vessels. The fourth phase saw a commitment by PNA members to also trade days among 
themselves, with the goal of creating greater flexibility to more efficiently allocated effort, 
and thereby create an incentive for members not to overshoot their collective TAE (Kumoru 
2014, Pangelinan 2014, PNA. 2014, Taanga 2014).
Although the VDS has been widely seen as a success, a number of criticisms have been 
levelled at the scheme, focused on unresolved technical loopholes and the lack of evidence of 
improved fish stock health. For example, stock analysts claim that fishing mortality per day is 
expected to increase because vessels participating in VDS have become more efficient at 
catching fish via investment in human and physical capital and technology (Banks 2014, 
Harley et al. 2014). Also, while VDS places limit on purse seine effort, it has failed to place 
limits on the use of FADs, which is considered by some as key in addressing the decline in 
bigeye tuna stocks (Aqorau 2014). The inconsistent application of fishing and non-fishing 
days also remains a key challenge to effective monitoring and enforcement, leading to under 
reported fishing days and thus undermining the goal of restricting effort. For instance, in 
2014, a record of non-fishing days has reached 8041 days, which is about 65% higher than 
the level it should be (PNA. 2014, Aqorau 2015).  Finally, concern has been raised that the 
existence of non-VDS areas and participants within the WCPO will continue to put pressure 
on the conservation goal of the VDS given the free-rider effects of non-VDS participants are 
able to attract distant water fishing vessels to fish outside PNA waters. It is for these reasons 
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that the VDS is reviewed annually to allow members to examine its effect, as well as improve 
the VDS.
Despite these concerns, the VDS has created clear economic returns. From 2010 to 2015 
access fees have increased from 3-6% to 14% of the total value of tuna landed from PNA 
waters. These returns have led to further strengthening the PNA’s commitment to support and 
improve the VDS. Indeed, part of VDS improvement is the continued review of the MOU on 
benchmark price every year, which has resulted in an increase in benchmark price from 
US$5,000 in 2012 to US$6,000 in 2014 and $8,000 in 2015, and a further restriction on 
fishing effort (PNA. 2014). At the regional level, the VDS is gaining recognition and 
acceptance by the WCPFC (Aqorau 2014, Pangelinan 2014), which also appears to have 
increased the profile and overall bargaining power of the PNA with distant water fishing 
nations.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the economic incentives created through the VDS have also fed 
back into strengthening de jure political control over sovereign resources in three ways. First, 
the VDS has created a mechanism through which the PNA members are able to collectively 
and directly renegotiate fishing access with DWFNs, instead of at the WCPFC and through 
often divisive bi-lateral agreements. The VDS therefore appears to have empowered PNA 
members to take ownership and exercise rights and control over the allocation of their 
sovereign waters through a regionally coordinated and standardized negotiation structure 
(Kumoru 2014, Pangelinan 2014). It has also enabled PNA states to incentivise binding 
conservation measures through regional monitoring and enforcement, given allocation is 
determined by biomass and average actual vessel days in their respective EEZs. Third, the 
VDS provides member states with further leverage to expand control over purse seine vessels 
under the two multilateral agreements in the region including: (1) the Federated States of 
Micronesian Arrangement (FSMA) and (2) the United States Treaty (UST). In both cases, 
vessels have to incorporate VDS in their agreements with the eight PNA members indicating
a significant shift in both de jure and de facto control over tuna resources.
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Figure 2.2 VDS dynamics and implications.
2.4.2 MSC certification
The MSC certification of free school or non-FAD purse seining complements the VDS by 
changing the catchability of a portion of purse seine fishing. By having the fishery certified, 
the PNA members’ intend to generate added value from tuna through greater domestic 
participation in the tuna supply, set conditions for access to high value markets for fishing 
vessels and generate greater control over the activities of the purse seine fleet.
There are three key incentives provided by the MSC certification program. First, Pacifical 
BV (of which the PNA Secretariat is a 50% shareholder) set an initial price premium for 
MSC compliant tuna at 14%, which is expected to be distributed among fishers, processors 
and retailers (Banks et al. 2012). The price premium is intended to be paid to reward agents 
and partners taking part in the value chain of the MSC eligible tuna products. At the 
harvesting level, it is expected to motivate fishers to invest in non-FAD fishing, which will 
assist the PNA and WCPFC reach conservation goals for bigeye tuna (Brownjohn 2014).
Second, certified skipjack will have preferential market access to EU and US retailers who 
have committed to selling MSC certified fish by 2018 or 2020 (Miller et al. 2015). In Europe, 
supermarkets dominate global canned tuna sales, with an increasing volume under direct 
contract to retailers selling the fish under their private labels (Miller et al. 2015). Despite the 
certified volume being limited to approximately 0.2% of the potential MSC eligible catches 
in 2014, PNA is hopeful that between 50-60% of the PNA tuna catches can eventually be 
MSC labelled (Brownjohn 2014). Finally, by also certifying the chain of custody PNA 
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members also hope to ‘push’ processing companies to invest in domestic processing plants 
and in doing so support the original FSMA goals for increasing domestic economic benefits.
Since obtaining the chain of custody certification in May 2013, it took the PNA two years to 
deliver its first supply to the market, largely due to an ongoing conflict between ‘Pacifical’ 
and Ell Dolphin safe label (Miller et al. 2015), limited supply of certified tuna, and delays in 
delivering processed tuna to the EU supermarkets (Brus 2014). It is premature to determine 
the economic outcome of MSC certification, given that progress has been limited due to the 
voluntary nature of the programme. Nevertheless, the annual net wholesale value of MSC 
certified products up to September 2014 has reached US$4.5 billion (Atuna 2014). Having
MSC representing an increase on the same amount of landed product it is thought that PNA 
could earn up to 5% of MSC’s net wholesale value, an estimated annual revenue PNA can get 
from participating in the value added tuna products besides revenue only from access fees 
every year (Brownjohn 2014).
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the MSC has provided the PNA with a means of developing new 
incentives to shape everyday fishing practices. Just like the VDS, the MSC certification has 
enabled the PNA to increase their de jure control over the tuna industry in two directions. 
First, MSC compliance provides a reinforcement of existing state-based monitoring and 
enforcement measures, such as 100% observer coverage and the separation of FAD and free-
school catches. In this way the investment in the MSC certification program is expected to 
support the enforcement and protection of property rights through the VDS. Second, and 
extending beyond the VDS, the MSC chain of custody certification provides greater 
transparency on where, when and how the fish is being caught and processed, which adds 
economic data that was previously not included in the wider governance of the fishery (PNA. 
2015). By directly engaging in the tuna value chain, where global supply remains lower than 
demand, the PNA have used the MSC to reinforce the original aspirations of the FSMA. PNA 
countries such as PNG and the Solomon Islands are responding by establishing new contracts 
with processing and fishing companies to invest in improving domestic processing plants
(Brownjohn 2014). Building on this, the PNA members are now discussing landing quotas, 
whereby fishing vessels could offload the catches in their domestic plants for processing 
(Kumoru 2014). In doing so, the PNA countries are able to again further contribute to 
domestic economic growth and employment opportunities for PNA members. If the PNA can 
eventually compete with Thailand, their main processing competitor;1) by supplying their 
catches to their domestic plants and 2) by exercising greater control over the tuna supply 
through VDS, by putting further restrictions on fishing effort. 
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Figure 2.3 MSC certification dynamics and implications.
2.5 Discussion
Seen through the lens of NIE, our analysis demonstrates a clear interplay between de facto
control of the PNA states and the de jure control of firms and distant water fishing nations, 
driven by the iterative feedback between political and economic institutions. Furthermore, 
our analysis indicates that the PNA has been able to strengthen their control over the tuna 
resources within their collective EEZs by extending what has proven to be relatively weak de 
jure power under regional treaties through the introduction of the VDS and MSC 
certification. In doing so, the PNA has developed greater control over the de facto power of 
everyday fishing practices, and consequently, extended sovereign control over transnational 
fish stocks and fishing fleets.
Our analysis also demonstrates, following Acemoglu et al. (Acemoglu et al. 2004, Acemoglu 
et al. 2005), the reinforcing role of continual feedback between political and economic 
institutions in the PNA. The results show that the VDS and MSC program change the 
incentive structure of resource and market access for distant water fishing nations and in 
doing so directly reinforce the formal political institutions associated with tuna conservation 
and wealth generation. In the case of the VDS, the benchmark price and trading mechanism 
has transformed access rights away from the distant water fishing country to the distant water 
fishing vessel level. In doing so, the scheme creates leverage for the PNA states to counter 
the normative and economic power of member states represented at the WCPFC level (Miller 
et al. 2015). But it is the fourfold increase in revenues to PNA states that appears to have 
been most influential in reinforcing state power beyond what the Palau Agreement alone was 
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able to accomplish in the previous 14 years that has reinforced political support for the 
scheme.
The MSC certification is similar to the VDS in that both are economic institutions which 
allows the PNA to exercise greater control over everyday fishing practices. In doing so, it 
also shifts attention from the country to vessel level. But instead of regulating resource 
access, the MSC certification regulates market access by stipulating what changes need to be 
complied with to land and sell MSC labelled fish to export markets. The feedback from MSC 
regulation of fishing practices and market access is seen in the partnership of the PNA with 
Pacifical BV, delivering a direct economic return for every tonne of MSC fish landed and 
sold. As such, the PNA receives a direct incentive to continue investing in harvest control 
rules that underlie both associated and un-associated FAD fishing. Like the VDS, the MSC 
certification therefore enables greater de jure power through the use and feedback from 
economic institutions which in turn enables greater de facto control over tuna resources.
Both cases also demonstrate the importance of governance institutions (Williamson 2000) in 
mediating the feedback between political and economic institutions. Williamson’s 
observation of the ‘third level’ governance institutions appear to be fundamental to these 
feedbacks. The extension of de jure power of the PNA states and the erosion of de facto
power of distant water fishing vessels is facilitated through the VDS and MSC as economic 
institutions, but neither of these economic institutions are directly related to the formal state 
institutions of the PNA members. Instead, governance institutions such as the benchmark 
price and trading mechanism of the VDS, and the harvest control rules required for MSC 
certification, have enabled a translation of the multi-lateral treaties such as UNCLOS, the 
Palau and FSM Arrangements into terms that directly regulate economic practices. 
The greater cooperation between PNA states that both economic institutions have fostered 
also appears to be influencing the negotiation of major international treaties of PNA 
members. For instance, the PNA member states appear to be pressuring Kiribati to review 
their fisheries partnership agreement with the EU to comply with the VDS and other purse 
seine management regimes in the PNA (Taanga 2014). As the EU increases its market power 
over the region, the PNA countries are consolidating not only resource access, but also 
market access (Brownjohn 2014). In addition, the recognition and popularity of VDS has led 
to greater interest by non-PNA members, such as Tokelau joining the Palau Agreement, 
allowing for an expansion of VDS application to non-PNA waters (Aqorau 2014). A similar 
integration of MSC compliance between member states is more problematic, however ideas 
of tabling compulsory landings have been discussed (Kumoru 2014) with the wider goal of 
standardisation and integration of the PNA management for all purse seine vessels in the 
region and ensuring more participation in the value chain of the tuna products.
Despite the apparent successes of applying economic institutions for gaining greater political 
control over trans-boundary fish stocks, the future trend and success of such a strategy 
remains unclear. Following a new public management line of thinking (e.g. Christensen et al. 
2002), this paper might be seeing the gradual merging of political and economic institutions, 
and as such an extension of de jure over de facto power. But this extension appears to be only 
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able to accomplish in the previous 14 years that has reinforced political support for the 
scheme.
The MSC certification is similar to the VDS in that both are economic institutions which 
allows the PNA to exercise greater control over everyday fishing practices. In doing so, it 
also shifts attention from the country to vessel level. But instead of regulating resource 
access, the MSC certification regulates market access by stipulating what changes need to be 
complied with to land and sell MSC labelled fish to export markets. The feedback from MSC 
regulation of fishing practices and market access is seen in the partnership of the PNA with 
Pacifical BV, delivering a direct economic return for every tonne of MSC fish landed and 
sold. As such, the PNA receives a direct incentive to continue investing in harvest control 
rules that underlie both associated and un-associated FAD fishing. Like the VDS, the MSC 
certification therefore enables greater de jure power through the use and feedback from 
economic institutions which in turn enables greater de facto control over tuna resources.
Both cases also demonstrate the importance of governance institutions (Williamson 2000) in 
mediating the feedback between political and economic institutions. Williamson’s 
observation of the ‘third level’ governance institutions appear to be fundamental to these 
feedbacks. The extension of de jure power of the PNA states and the erosion of de facto
power of distant water fishing vessels is facilitated through the VDS and MSC as economic 
institutions, but neither of these economic institutions are directly related to the formal state 
institutions of the PNA members. Instead, governance institutions such as the benchmark 
price and trading mechanism of the VDS, and the harvest control rules required for MSC 
certification, have enabled a translation of the multi-lateral treaties such as UNCLOS, the 
Palau and FSM Arrangements into terms that directly regulate economic practices. 
The greater cooperation between PNA states that both economic institutions have fostered 
also appears to be influencing the negotiation of major international treaties of PNA 
members. For instance, the PNA member states appear to be pressuring Kiribati to review 
their fisheries partnership agreement with the EU to comply with the VDS and other purse 
seine management regimes in the PNA (Taanga 2014). As the EU increases its market power 
over the region, the PNA countries are consolidating not only resource access, but also 
market access (Brownjohn 2014). In addition, the recognition and popularity of VDS has led 
to greater interest by non-PNA members, such as Tokelau joining the Palau Agreement, 
allowing for an expansion of VDS application to non-PNA waters (Aqorau 2014). A similar 
integration of MSC compliance between member states is more problematic, however ideas 
of tabling compulsory landings have been discussed (Kumoru 2014) with the wider goal of 
standardisation and integration of the PNA management for all purse seine vessels in the 
region and ensuring more participation in the value chain of the tuna products.
Despite the apparent successes of applying economic institutions for gaining greater political 
control over trans-boundary fish stocks, the future trend and success of such a strategy 
remains unclear. Following a new public management line of thinking (e.g. Christensen et al. 
2002), this paper might be seeing the gradual merging of political and economic institutions, 
and as such an extension of de jure over de facto power. But this extension appears to be only 
35
possible at scales above the nation state – akin to so called ‘new fisheries regionalism’ 
(Miller et al. 2014). At the centre of this upscaling of control are the governance institutions 
of the PNA, implementing incentives and cooperation that provide an alternative ‘region’ to 
the WCPFC that incorporates the interests of distant water fishing nations (see also Campbell 
et al. 2015). Without effective governance institutions setting incentives for cooperation 
between states and the inclusion of vessels, both interplay between the Palau and FSM 
Arrangements and the VDS and MSC are likely to be less effective. 
It also remains unclear how these instruments can contribute to conservation objectives of 
state-based conservation measures over the long term. Although WCPO stocks of skipjack 
and yellowfin have been reported to be in a healthy state in 2014, overfishing continues, 
catch rates continue to increase (WCPFC. 2014). At the same time the market indicates 
excess supply of tuna resulting in declining tuna prices (Brus 2014). It is worth noting, that 
technology also evolve with new instruments, contributing to the ongoing power struggles 
between coastal and fishing states, requiring new and additional instruments. While the VDS 
and MSC certification may provide PNA members incentive to extract better economic gains, 
it also provides firms and fishing companies, incentive to invest in larger efficient vessels. 
Efficiency in fishing could improve tuna market prices in the long run, but with greater 
possibility leading to overcapitalisation and overfishing. Solving such issues may require yet 
a new balance between political, economic and governance institutions.
2.6 Conclusion
Our analysis highlights the significant institutional shift from a regulatory based regime to 
new economic policy based incentives for tuna management in the waters of the PNA aimed 
at both improving the conservation outcomes and domestic wealth generation. The 
experience with the VDS and MSC certification demonstrates that these new economic tools 
can contribute to these goals because they provide a means of realigning de facto economic 
with de jure political power. In doing so the instruments appear to have strengthened existing 
international treaties, provided a strategy to counter the influence of distant water fishing 
nations over the PNA member states under the WCPFC, and established greater credibility to 
the PNA’s own conservation and management measures. 
The results also demonstrate that the success of new economic policy instruments in aligning 
political and economic institutions is dependent on the effectiveness of meso-level 
governance institutions. The cooperation of the PNA members in maintaining these 
governance institutions has contributed to the apparent success of these economic tools in 
strengthening de jure control over tuna resources. Whether these arrangements can be 
maintained will in large part be determined by the strength of continued PNA cooperation 
and the delivery of incentives for ongoing investment in the institutions such as the VDS and 
MSC certification by PNA states. By internalising the economic externalities associated with 
overfishing into these political institutions, durable long-term improvements in the PNA tuna 
management may well be possible. But to ensure success, both regional and sub-regional 
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institutions need also to continue to provide effective governance institutions that will enable 
both political and economic actors to realise the incentives available. 
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Chapter 3. Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance: the case of the Parties 
to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery 
Abstract
Purse seine fishing of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) raises 
concern over increasing impacts on yellowfin and bigeye tuna by-catch. To address 
sustainability concerns, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) adopted the Vessel Day 
Scheme (VDS) for the management of purse seine fishing in the WCPO. The VDS has the 
potential to improve economic benefits for PNA members and to contribute to sustainability 
of the tuna stocks, and since 2012, has become an important mechanism to regulate fishing 
access rights in PNA waters. Despite this, monitoring and enforcement remain weak leading 
to violations of the agreement. Using a game theoretic framework, this paper examines the 
effectiveness of the VDS and its implications for fisheries regionalism. We examine the 
payoffs of member countries of the Nauru Agreement under full compliance, and payoffs 
under the currently observed partial compliance. Our findings indicate that member states’
partial compliance with VDS rules plays a role in stabilising the agreement. Requiring full 
compliance, on the other hand, may encompass strong incentives for PNA members to 
deviate from the VDS since third parties offer attractive benefits in return for privileged 
access to fishing grounds. However, pragmatic tolerance of deviations from full VDS 
compliance seems to play a facilitative role in promoting cooperation and fisheries 
regionalism.
This chapter has been published in Regional Environmental Change. 
Yeeting, A. D., H.-P. Weikard, M. Bailey, V. Ram-Bidesi and S. R. Bush (2017). "Stabilising 
cooperation through pragmatic tolerance: the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) tuna fishery." Regional Environmental Change: 1-13.
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3.1 Introduction
Regionalism, or the development of shared processes and structures between geographically 
proximate states (Gochhayat 2014, Miller et al. 2014), gained prominence in the management 
of trans-boundary fisheries in the 1970s in response to increasing depletion of the world’s
fisheries resources (Tsamenyi et al. 2001). Today fisheries regionalism involves cooperation 
among states to develop policies, mobilise resources and execute relevant activities with 
appropriate degrees of integration (Hughes 2005, Hegland et al. 2012). In complex 
environmental and political ‘seascapes’ like the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), 
regional and sub-regional organisations have become the cornerstone of economic and social 
development of Pacific Island states, strengthening their position in the international policy 
arena that addresses trade, conflicts and trans-boundary marine resources such as tuna.
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), established in 2004, is 
responsible for managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in the WCPO 
(Tsamenyi et al. 2004); a region that accounts for approximately 60% of annual global tuna 
production (Harley et al. 2014). However, the effectiveness of the WCPFC to achieve 
sustainable management of tuna stocks is challenged by the dynamic and diverging interests 
of Pacific Island member states and those of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs),
including access and foreign aid agreements with the United States (US) and the European 
Union (EU) (Langley et al. 2009, Hanich et al. 2010, Bailey et al. 2013). Amidst these 
interests, the WCPFC is tasked with maintaining the healthy status of the purse seine fishery 
for skipjack tuna while establishing conservation and management measures for non-target 
yellowfin and bigeye tuna stocks (Harley et al. 2014). Additionally, the Commission needs to 
consider demands of Pacific Island nations to increase harvesting of skipjack tuna, of which 
they receive only 3-6% of the total landed value but that value contributes up to 10-40% of 
their GDP (Aqorau 2006, Havice 2010).
Predating the WCPFC is the 1982 sub-regional Nauru Agreement instituted to promote the 
equitable and sustainable use of tuna with the WCPO. The eight Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (PNA) include the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu (see Figure 
3.1). About 80% of the skipjack tuna caught in the WCPO is sourced from their waters,
making them heavily dependent on the resource (Aqorau 2009, Harley et al. 2015). In 2007 
the PNA countries adopted a Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) and implemented it in 2012 under 
the Palau Agreement, with the aim of improving control and management of the skipjack 
purse seine fishery (Aqorau 2009). The VDS is an economic instrument designed to limit the 
fishing effort of purse seine vessels by setting a benchmark price and allocating tradable 
fishing days. In this way, the PNA are seeking to strengthen their position as a regional 
fisheries organisation by reinforcing cooperation through more effective and equitable trans-
boundary management of tuna.
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Figure 3.1 Map of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) and non-PNA countries 
(Hanich and Ota 2013).
While the VDS has become an important economic mechanism to regulate fishing rights in 
PNA waters, its implementation remains dependent on the interests of both member states 
and DWFNs. This dependence in turn challenges the overall stability and effectiveness of the 
PNA as a ‘new’ form of fisheries (sub-) regionalism that can overcome the limitations of the 
WCPFC (Havice et al. 2010, Havice 2013, Miller et al. 2014). PNA officials acknowledge 
that the effective implementation of the VDS could potentially improve economic rents and 
at the same time achieve sustainability objectives (Aqorau 2014, Kumoru 2014, Pangelinan 
2014). Yet, it has proven difficult to implement a level of monitoring sufficient to achieve 
full compliance with VDS rules due to (pre)existing multilateral fishing access and trade 
agreements with major international players such as the EU and US (PNA 2014, PNA 2015).
This paper analyses the present-day internal stability of the Palau Agreement by assessing the 
incentives each member has to either stay or leave (using data from 2014) (Pintassilgo et al. 
2010, Hannesson 2011). In doing so we examine the role of transfers from third parties like 
the US and EU to the PNA members to remain in or deviate from the VDS. We use the terms 
‘full participation’ to refer to membership, and ‘full compliance’ to refer to members’ actions 
in accordance with the VDS. ‘Partial agreement’ refers to some party leaving the Nauru 
Agreement while others stay on, and ‘partial compliance’ refers to violation of VDS rules 
while maintaining PNA membership. The basis of our analysis is the allocation and use of 
VDS fishing days within agreed limits of total allowable efforts (TAEs), or sale of these days 
at or above a benchmark price. We determine PNA members’ payoffs under partial and full 
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compliance. In doing so we determine how the level of VDS compliance facilitates 
cooperation towards strengthening the PNA as a new form of fisheries (sub-) regionalism.
The following section provides a brief account of the application of coalition theory to 
international fisheries agreements. We then present details of the VDS in the presence of 
(pre)existing tuna treaties, explain our methodology for calculating payoffs, and present our 
results. Finally we discuss and evaluate the wider political economic setting of (pre)existing 
access and trade agreements using the case of Kiribati and Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
Kiribati and PNG are key players with the largest fishing efforts in the region, and are 
countries who can either severely impair the agreement or foster compliance with the VDS.
3.2 Internal stability of fisheries agreements
Coalition theory (a branch of game theory) has been applied widely to analyse international 
environmental agreements on trans-boundary problems caused by externalities, such as 
migratory fish stocks (Bailey et al. 2010, Hannesson 2011). There is consensus in the 
literature on international fisheries management that countries with shared resources benefit 
from regional cooperation to conserve and manage those resources (Lindroos et al. 2008, 
Rahikainen et al. 2008, Bailey et al. 2010, Hannesson 2011, Walker et al. 2016). Knowing 
that cooperation can be beneficial, it is important to understand the wider political context 
that has, in many cases, undermined the potential for cooperation in the first place. The focus 
of current research on international environmental agreements using coalition theory is 
therefore an analysis of drivers of stability of cooperation. In the literature, stability of an 
agreement is defined as a situation where each member of an agreement is better off than if it 
were to leave the agreement and to act as a free rider (internal stability) and, at the same time, 
there is no outsider (non-member) who would be better off by joining the coalition (external 
stability) (Lindroos 2008, Pintassilgo et al. 2010).
Theoretical studies of international environmental agreements suggest that so-called 
‘shallow’ agreements, with a low level of commitment, are associated with broader 
participation, and that shallow agreements can lead to more effective cooperation than 
agreements with ambitious targets and strict rules (Barrett 1994, Barrett 1998, Finus et al. 
2008). A common assumption in this literature is that deviations from international 
agreements occur when incentives to violate the agreement outweigh the gains from
compliance (Mitchell 2007, Finus et al. 2008, Wangler et al. 2012), or when there are 
loopholes in the agreement (Havice et al. 2010, Havice 2013, PNA 2014). Finus and Maus 
(2008) further argue that, given persistent free rider incentives, a stable coalition is not 
always facilitated by full compliance. Rather, members may find it beneficial to slightly 
deviate, and prefer this to leaving the agreement. However, it remains unclear whether this 
deviation will be tolerated by other members in the long-term. Our study provides empirical 
evidence for the theoretical finding that pragmatic tolerance, i.e. allowing for less than full 
compliance, may stimulate participation.
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3.3 Data and approach
We operationalize and apply the concept of pragmatic tolerance in a three-step approach. 
First, using VDS data from 2014 we analyse the Palau Agreement in the context of the 
multiple tuna treaties existing in the region. The different treaties do not only have separate 
goals and applications, but may also conflict with VDS implementation. We estimate 
revenues from access fees based on the rules for different fleets and countries that define the 
uptake, monitoring and enforcement of the VDS. We calculate countries’ payoffs under full 
and partial compliance with the rules of the VDS, taking into account transfers from third 
parties and their implications on countries’ payoffs. Second, comparisons of payoffs allow us 
to study incentives for deviation that are inherent to (pre)existing access and trade agreements 
with third parties. Finally, we provide a more in depth analysis of the two most influential 
countries in the PNA, namely Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, and the influence of their 
access and trade agreements with the European Union and the US.
Our analysis is based on information and data gathered through interviews, observations and 
document reviews of a number of regional fisheries meetings attended by the first author.4 A
total of 22 interviews, including online communications, were conducted between 2014 and 
2016 with officials from all PNA countries and experts from the PNA office, the Pacific 
Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), and industry. Qualitative and semi-structured 
interviews were recorded where permission was given, and notes were taken where recording 
was not permitted. Quantitative data – at fleet and national level – are challenging to obtain, 
due to confidentiality, therefore we rely on reports that are made available in the public 
database domains of the WCPFC, FFA, and Secretariat of the Pacific Community to calculate 
external incentives. We also use aggregated VDS data made available by PNA delegations 
and the PNA Secretariat to calculate countries’ payoffs. Details of data used for calculations 
are provided in supplementary materials.
3.4 Implications of tuna treaties on the VDS
3.4.1 Tuna regimes and VDS
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the declaration of the 200 
miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provide the legal framework for countries’ right to 
manage and exploit resources within their designated zones (UNCLOS 1982). The EEZ 
declaration has motivated Pacific countries to build a forum to promote regional 
harmonisation of fisheries policies as a means to jointly manage tuna resources and provide 
technical advice and support for tuna access agreements (Havice 2010). However history 
shows that slow progress has been made towards the effective management of both economic 
returns and sustainability of tuna stocks.
4 The meetings attended include the 10th and 11th regular meeting of the WCPFC, 19th and 20th meeting of the 
Parties to the Palau Agreement, 19th and 20th meeting of the Parties to the Federates States Micronesian 
Agreement, the 33rd and 34th meeting of the PNA, and the 5th Pacific Tuna Forum meeting.
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Prior to the VDS, access to fishing in the Pacific was regulated through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with DWFNs, whereby DWFNs were allowed to fish freely in any of 
the Pacific waters without restriction (Havice 2010). The 1992 Palau Agreement was a first 
attempt to reduce purse seine fishing effort by setting a cap on the number of vessels. This 
restriction was replaced with the VDS in 2007, which further defines tradable efforts using 
fishing days that are allocated to member states. Introduction of the VDS was an explicit 
move towards rights-based fisheries management (Aqorau 2009, Havice 2013), and its 
implementation began in 2012, soon after a cartel-like agreement was formed in 2010 to 
control the benchmark price for fishing days (Havice 2010). Through the VDS, PNA 
members aim to create scarcity and improve fishing efficiency and economic returns to 
members while maintaining sustainable effort levels (currently set at the 2010 levels) (Harley 
et al. 2014, WCPFC 2014), which is achieved through regulation of access to fishing 
grounds. Since its implementation the VDS has become an integral part of the PNA’s and the 
WCPFC’s management systems. The VDS covers approximately 70% of purse seine fishing 
that takes place within 20 degrees north and south of the equator, covering the EEZs of the 
eight PNA countries (see Figure 3.1). 
VDS rules require members to fish within the TAE limits, or sell those days at the benchmark 
price (or higher) to distant water vessels under license agreements. The minimum terms and 
conditions for license agreements with foreign vessels are coordinated under the 
‘implementing arrangements’ (PNA 2012), which require foreign vessels to be registered and 
licensed, report catches, maintain log books, allow observers on board and maintain 
transparency over their fishing activities (PNA 2010, PNA 2016). These operational 
requirements form the basis for all purse seine license agreements in the combined EEZs of 
the PNA member states, though the actual implementation at the country and fleet level 
remains key to management success. 
The distribution of TAEs is coordinated and agreed by members at the PNA annual meetings 
(PNA 2012, Clark 2014). The TAEs are allocated to purse seine vessels fishing under four 
types of agreement: (1) the US Tuna Treaty (UST), (2) the Palau Agreement, (3) so-called 
‘joint venture and flag state arrangements’ under the Federated States of Micronesia 
agreement (FSMA), and (4) the EU-Kiribati fisheries partnership agreement5. Table 1 
provides a brief comparison of the different agreement types and how they differ from the 
Palau Agreement for VDS, and they are expanded upon below. Further, for TAE allocation, 
priority is given to the FSMA and the UST treaty (the two multilateral agreement in the 
Pacific), while remaining days are allocated to countries to sell to their bilateral fishing 
partners (Clark 2014, Pangelinan 2014, Taanga. 2014). Table 3.2 provides the distribution of 
TAEs by country according to the three agreement types (excluding EU-Kiribati agreement) 
in 2014.  
The FSMA motivates PNA members to participate in domestic fishing rather than relying on 
access fees alone by allowing members to enter into joint ventures and flag state 
5 EU vessels with access through the EU fisheries partnership agreement were exempt from the VDS at the time 
of writing.
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arrangements with foreign companies. FSMA vessels are given concessions to fish in 
domestic waters at a rate of US$ 4,000 in 2014 as compared to the cost of fishing within the 
VDS area of around US$ 6,000 (see Supplementary Table 2.1). PNA countries realise that 
reduced access fees through the FSMA are undermining the Palau Agreement by undercutting 
the VDS benchmark price and offer additional incentives for DWFNs to increase fishing 
outside the VDS (PNA 2014, PNA 2015).
The UST treaty has similar implications on the VDS for two reasons. First, priority is given 
to the US vessels where 6,827 fishing days were contributed from PNA members6 in 2014
without pre-negotiations with the member countries. Second, the price of a US fishing day is 
set at US$ 5,500, still lower than the VDS benchmark price, although the application of the 
VDS to US vessels resulted in improving the total value of the UST treaty to US$ 63 million, 
which is about three times the amount that was paid by US vessels prior to VDS.  
3.4.2 Non-fishing Days and High seas efforts
Exceeding the assigned TAE under the VDS leads to an adjustment of the following year’s
vessel days by deducting “(i) the amount of the excess, if the excess is less than 100 days, and 
(ii) 120% of the excess if the excess is 100 days or more” (PNA 2012:11). Although the 
consequences of an infringement are clear, monitoring and enforcement remains weak due to 
existing loopholes associated with (pre)existing legal obligations to tuna regimes in particular 
the UST treaty and the FSMA (Aqorau 2014, Kumoru 2014, Pangelinan 2014). These 
loopholes prevent PNA from effectively enforcing VDS rules. In practice, countries fail to 
consistently apply their limit on fishing days and to stop fishing when their allocations have 
been exhausted. 
Respondents observed that under the FSMA fishing effort in both archipelagic waters and 
territorial waters is counted as non-fishing days and thus not deducted from the TAEs (PNA 
2015). In 2013 and 2014 non-fishing days reached 8,500 and 7,660 days, respectively, 
accounting for 15% of the total days fished in PNA waters (PNA 2014). We assume that the 
reported 7,160 days in the archipelagic waters were fishing days, but the remaining 500 non-
fishing days were transit days and not fished (see Supplementary Table 3). For our analysis 
we define excess efforts as days fished reported as non-fishing days in the archipelagic waters 
plus the days fished by EU/Spanish vessels which were not deducted from the Kiribati TAEs, 
giving 7,644 non-fishing days in 2014 (Table 3.2 column F, and Supplementary Table 3 for 
details). Assuming that TAEs reflect a sustainable effort level, we consider this excess effort 
as overfishing, implying that they will reduce future stocks. We refer to the reduction of stock 
as lost resources, and include it in the calculation of long-term incentives to deviate from full 
compliance (Table 3.3, column G, see also the Appendix in the Supplementary material).
6 In 2014 and 2015, US vessels claimed 8,000 days from PNA members.
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3.4.3 Incentives for compliance
We analyse the stability of the Palau Agreement by looking at the incentives set by the various 
external agreements to deviate from full compliance with VDS rules. The countries (players of 
the game) are the Parties to the Palau Agreement7 and we label the set of players as N, where a 
typical country is labelled � � �. Country � has a total allowable effort measured in days, ���, that 
are sold under different types of agreements, a, with different prices for the VDS benchmark 
price (����) applicable under the bilateral agreements8, the Federated States of Micronesia 
Agreement �����), the US treaty (���) and the EU-Kiribati Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
����). No revenues are collected for days fished in the high seas ���� = 0), but these days are 
deducted from the TAEs. The set of agreements is labelled as � = ����� ���� ��� ��� ���. The 
total allowable effort (fishing days) for country i is allocated to the different agreements, see 
Supplementary Table 2.1
��� � ��  � � �� ��  
� � �
The payoff of country �, for all  � � �, is therefore given by:
��  =  � ���� 
� � � 
�  ��
The stability of the Palau Agreement is dependent on the preference to stay in the coalition as 
opposed to leaving the coalition (i.e. free riding). We construct scenarios to compare the payoffs 
when countries fully comply with VDS rules, and the payoffs under partial compliance. Full 
compliance with VDS means that all conditions of the Palau Agreement are met. The conditions 
include limiting effort within the total allowable effort (fishing days), and selling fishing days at 
or above the agreed benchmark price (PNA 2012). We assume full compliance when, ������ =
 ��� �  =  ����� = ����� = 0, i.e. when ������ = ���. Partial compliance is when fishing days are 
allocated to agreements where the VDS benchmark price is undercut, i.e. ������ + ��� � +
����� + ����� > 0, or when countries fail to close their waters when their days are exhausted, i.e. 
�� > ���.
Days fished in domestic and archipelagic waters are reported as non-fishing days and are 
denoted ��� ��. Non-fishing days do not just mean foregone revenues from access fees in a given 
year, but also represent fishing efforts beyond sustainable levels (i.e., above and beyond the 
TAE) and therefore a loss of resources for future use. We calculate the value of forgone revenues 
due to overfishing ���� �� � ����) and estimate the impact of overfishing on the future 
sustainable (steady state) catch. To assess the latter we use a Gordon-Schaefer model (see 
7 Tokelau is a member of the Palau Agreement, but is not included in the payoff calculation given it is not a PNA 
member and accounts only for a small number of fishing days, see Supplementary Table 2.1. 
8 We use vds as notation for bilateral agreements as they strictly apply VDS.
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Supplementary material) and find that excess fishing of 15% beyond sustainable yields is 
associated with a reduction in sustainable harvests of about 2.2%. This implies a loss of 957 
fishing days to be subtracted from future TAEs. Assuming a discount rate of 5%, we estimate the 
value of lost resources due to overfishing (Table 3.3 column G); for details see Supplementary 
Table 4 and the explanatory note in Supplementary material. 
3.5 Payoffs under partial and full compliance
In order to assess the stability of the Palau Agreement and the incentives for VDS compliance, 
we estimate: 1. free rider payoffs, 2. VDS revenues from access fees for all PNA countries, 3. 
payoffs under full and partial compliance, 4. transfer payments received, 5. lost revenues and 6. 
lost resources due to overfishing (Table 3.3). We assume that free riders engage in overfishing 
and in doing so can at least fish all their vessel days and engage in fishing in the archipelagic
waters. Using the vessel days allocation and non-fishing days data (Table 3.2), free rider payoffs 
for individual countries are larger than their payoffs under full compliance (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). 
We conclude that with strict enforcement and full compliance to VDS rules the Palau Agreement 
would be unstable. Our results also indicates that under partial VDS compliance the Palau 
Agreement would only be stable in the short term but not in the long term (Table 3.4 columns b 
and c). 
We also observe that partial compliance is preferred to full compliance in the short term by a 
number of countries, including Marshall Islands, Palau, PNG, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (see 
Table 3.4 column d). However, these payoff calculations do not account for lost revenues and
lost resources from the allocation of fishing effort in domestic and archipelagic waters as non-
fishing days (see Table 3.3 columns F and G). The results indicate that from a longer term 
perspective, it does not pay to overfish even if revenues for non-fishing days were collected 
(which is not the case) (comparing Table 3.3 columns F and G). This holds even if we use a high 
discount rate of 10% and the result is strengthened when applying lower discount rates (see 
Supplementary Table 4).
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Table 3.4 Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) countries’ incentives for participation and 
compliance
Explanatory note
x Table 3.4 is linked to the columns in Table 3.3.
x See Supplementary Table 4 for i=5% and i=10%.
x All figures and total are rounded numbers. Countries with 0 incentives in fact, are having small negative 
incentives rounded to 0.
(Source: fieldwork)
Overall we estimate that lost resources due to overfishing amount to about US$115 million
assuming a 5% discount rate (Table 3.3). The results also show that the members of the PNA 
allow fishing outside the VDS area because transfers received from third parties are high enough 
to compensate for the lost revenues from forgone days. However, when potential future lost 
resources are considered, these payments are not enough to offset the externalities produced by 
the allocation of ‘non-fishing days’. As shown in Table 3.3 (column H) and Table 3.4 (column 
e), with a long-term perspective to management full compliance is the best option. In this case 
the only countries with an incentive to deviate from full compliance are PNG and Solomon 
because of their interests and participation in domestic fishing. Domestic fishing allows for 
fishing outside the countries’ EEZs and is therefore accounted for as ‘non-fishing days’. 
Transfers from third parties include dividends from joint venture fishing companies, benefits 
from employment, and grants for fisheries related development under the (pre)existing treaties 
  Incentives to participate  Incentives to comply 
PNA countries Stability under 
full compliance 
 
 
 
(million US$) 
 Short term 
stability under 
partial 
compliance 
 
(million US$)  
 long term 
stability under 
partial 
compliance  
 
(million US$) 
 Short term 
incentive to 
deviate from 
full compliance  
 
(million US$)     
Long term 
incentive to 
deviate from 
full compliance  
 
(million US$)    
  a=B-A  b=E-A   c=(E-G5)-A   d=E-B   e=(E-G5)-B  
FSM -4 -7 -24 -3 -19 
Kiribati -28 -29 -58 -1 -31 
Marshall -3 4 -4 7 -1 
Nauru -3 -5 -11 -1 -7 
Palau -1 0 -1 1 -1 
PNG -6 44 3 51 10 
Solomon 0 10 3 11 3 
Tuvalu 0 2 -2 3 -2 
Total PNA -46 20 -95 66 -49 
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(see Table 3.3 column D).9 The PNA’s joint benefits from these transfers in 2014 are around 
US$116 million, of which about 60% is received by PNG. From the Palau Agreement’s point of 
view, these benefits, however, come at the cost of lost revenues and excess efforts undermining 
the VDS rules due to concessions and reduced rates.10
Transfers from third parties offer an opportunity to look at the political challenges of why VDS 
cannot be fully implemented. Our payoff results indicate that the VDS implementation suffers 
from individual countries’ taking short-term gains offered through the (pre)existing access 
agreements at the expense of the long-term collective sustainability goals. The result indicates 
that the incentives are large enough to compensate for loss of revenues and lost resources from 
forgone fishing days, i.e. US$116 million compared to US$84.5 million11 currently. Hence 
overall, countries still have some incentives to deviate from full compliance with the VDS rules. 
This means that the transfers from bilateral contracts dis-incentivise full VDS compliance in the 
short term. On the assumption that TAEs are set optimally, the lenient implementation of the 
VDS implies that fewer resources will be available in the future.
Although it appears that PNA countries prefer partial compliance to full compliance in the short 
term due to the transfers received, this is not the case when countries adopt a long term 
perspective. Over the long term, partial compliance leads to overfishing and lower TAEs. The 
value of the resources lost due to overfishing (Table 3.3, column G) is very sensitive to the 
discount rate. Assuming a 5% discount rate, long term payoffs under partial compliance are less 
than under full compliance (Table 3.3 column H). Only at very high discount rates (exceeding 
8.7%) do PNA members have an incentive to maintain the status quo of partial compliance. 
However at the country level, three of the PNA members i.e. FSM, Kiribati, and Nauru have 
negative incentives to deviate from full compliance in both the short term and long term.12 The 
negative incentives indicate that these countries depend on revenues from access fees, and would 
therefore be worse off through violation of the VDS. This is because their benefits from transfers 
are not high enough to compensate for the cost of partial compliance. This is also true assuming 
a 10% discount rate (see Supplementary Table 4). Assuming a 5% discount rate, however, the 
collective advantage of full compliance amounts to US$49 million compared to partial 
compliance (Table 3.4, column e). 
In summary, the results provide empirical support of Finus and Maus (2008), who theoretically 
argue that partial compliance or pragmatic tolerance provides incentives for countries to remain 
in a coalition. This indicates that while PNA cooperation may not appear rational today, it is 
rational to cooperate for benefits in the future. It also means that prescribing full cooperation 
9 See Supplementary Table 1 for transfers from third parties calculation and Supplementary Tables 1.1 to 1.4 for raw 
and secondary data used for calculations.
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12 Six countries are having negative incentives to deviate from full compliance when considering the long term.
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today may cause a breakdown of the PNA if countries are myopic and give little weight to future 
gains of cooperation. Allowing slight deviations, pragmatic tolerance, may be an appropriate 
means of maintaining the coalition. The Nauru Agreement is therefore potentially internally 
stable under partial compliance with the VDS, although we acknowledge that individual 
countries still seem to have an incentive to leave. Full compliance is the first best outcome as 
revenue from access fees are greater than they are under partial compliance, but only if there are 
no incentives to deviate from full compliance. The presence of free rider incentives is then likely 
to make the Palau Agreement internally unstable. Therefore, partial compliance with VDS rules 
or pragmatic tolerance with deviation facilitates full participation in the Palau Agreement. 
3.6 Case analysis - Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Kiribati
To further understand the role of transfers from third parties in stabilising the Nauru Agreement 
under partial compliance, we now turn our attention to PNG and Kiribati. Both countries are 
central to the implementation of the VDS given they have the largest share of both fishing effort 
and catch within the PNA. As dominant players they also play the most important role in the 
overall stability of the VDS and therefore the success of new fisheries regionalism. They are also 
particularly interesting for our analysis because, based on the 2014 data, both Kiribati and PNG
have the most non-fishing days at 4,593 and 1,074 days respectively (see Table 3.2). 
Furthermore, both countries are firmly engaged in (pre)existing access and trade agreements 
with, amongst others, the European Union. We now provide a more detailed account on the 
influence of both countries on the stability of the VDS.
3.6.1 Papua New Guinea
The analysis of payoffs indicate that PNG is better off with partial compliance rather than with 
full compliance under the status quo (Table 3.3). Specifically, PNG’s estimated revenue from 
access fees under partial compliance is around US$76 million compared to US$93 million under 
full compliance (see Table 3.3, column C and B). However, PNG gains about US$68 million as 
transfers from third parties under partial compliance, making PNG’s current payoff under the 
status quo to be around US$144 million.
Transfers from third parties include grants and associated benefits from access agreements under 
the UST treaty and the FSMA. The UST treaty allocates at least US$0.5 million annually to each 
Pacific Island country in addition to any access fees (for details see Supplementary Materials). 
The distribution of FSMA grants is negotiated and decided bilaterally between the PNG 
government and foreign firms. However, the FSMA countries tolerate the high rate of “non-
fishing days” in the archipelagic waters - of which PNG has the largest area. Based on non-
fishing days data, we estimate the value of lost resources to PNG at around US$41 million 
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(Table 3.3, column G). But this estimate also shows that PNG’s long term payoff under partial 
compliance is still preferred to full compliance. Therefore, in the case of PNG we see a role for 
pragmatic tolerance even in the long term. PNG is better off as member than as a free rider, but 
this would not be true for full compliance. Also note that PNG’s short term incentive to deviate 
from full compliance is stronger than its long term incentive.
According to Hamilton et al. (2011), the EU interim economic partnership agreement that allows 
duty free access to the EU markets for PNG is also a factor undermining the VDS. The concern 
was that distant water fishing nations investing in processing capacity in PNG to gain access to 
FSMA flagged vessels will increase the overall fishing capacity in archipelagic waters. However,
the EU interim agreement has since forced PNG to improve the application and enforcement of 
the VDS, with specific attention being given to the declaration of non-fishing days in the 
archipelagic waters (Atuna 2015). Failure to do so could jeopardise about US$60 million in 
employment benefits if conditional access of PNG processing plants to the EU market was lost. 
Respondents argue that although PNG has addressed non-fishing days in 2015, by enforcing 
VDS in the archipelagic and territorial waters, the VDS price remains an issue. Our results 
indicate that addressing non-fishing days will reduce PNG’s lost resources from excess efforts 
(Table 3.3, column G), but could potentially improve long term payoffs. It therefore appears that 
addressing non-fishing days can present a positive incentive for long term resource stewardship, 
which also supports our claim that longer term gains can be realised by addressing compliance 
issues of the VDS. 
3.6.2 Kiribati
Our results indicate that Kiribati is better off under full rather than partial compliance with the 
VDS. Based on available data, Kiribati is currently earning about US$50 million under partial 
compliance compared to US$67 million should strict application of the VDS rules be applied
(Table 3.3). Like PNG, Kiribati also bears the highest loss of revenues for high seas fishing 
given their share of efforts in the high seas. However, an additional US$16 million in transfers 
from third parties increases the total payoff for partial compliance to US$66 million. These 
calculations highlight that the US$1 million shortfall under partial compliance should incentivise
Kiribati to support full VDS compliance. 
Transfers from third parties to Kiribati are contributed from grants and payments associated with 
the UST treaty, FSMA and the EU-Kiribati fisheries partnership agreement. While these 
transfers appear to offer some incentive for Kiribati to allocate part of its TAE to the high seas in 
support of its domestic or joint venture partners, they do not appear large enough to compensate 
for both current lost revenues and loss of resources. Based on the 2014 data, Kiribati contributed 
the largest share of fishing effort of all PNA members outside the VDS. Assuming a 5% discount 
rate, we estimate that this allocation leads to a US$30 million loss in future resources for 
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Kiribati. It therefore appears that the benefits from transfers are not large enough to compensate 
for Kiribati’s losses from fishing outside the VDS (Table 3.3 column H). Table 3.2 shows that 
Kiribati is the biggest defector with the highest share of fishing outside the VDS. Therefore, it 
also suffers the largest losses of revenues. For this reason, our result suggests that Kiribati is 
better off under fully enforced VDS rules given this will increase payoffs in both the short and 
long term (Table 3.4, columns d and e). Second, our result suggests that while Kiribati enforces 
VDS rules in the high seas by deducting TAEs, they could also improve benefits by engaging in 
domestic fishing and processing like PNG. A similar analysis also applies to other countries with 
negative incentives to deviate from full compliance, in particular FSM and Nauru. 
In contrast to PNG, the EU agreement with Kiribati appears to undermine the VDS. Kiribati has 
exempted the EU’s (mostly Spanish) purse seine vessels from the VDS and agreed to a vessel 
day rate of US$2,207 in return for US$8 million in aid from the EU. It appears that in doing so 
Kiribati is accepting short term over long term benefits. Including fishing efforts by the EU
vessels as non-fishing days leads to both lost revenues (Table 3.3, column F) and a loss of 
resources (Table 3.3, column G). After facing increased pressure from within the PNA to 
consistently apply VDS across all vessels, Kiribati began applying the VDS to the Spanish 
vessels in 2015. Because the EU did not agree to the terms of the VDS, the EU-Kiribati fisheries 
partnership agreement has been suspended. At the time of writing, Spanish vessels have left the 
Kiribati waters and are entering into a new fisheries agreement with Cook Islands. Though these 
latest changes are not included in our analysis the suspension of EU-Kiribati fisheries partnership 
will result in short term economic losses from reduced access payments for Spanish vessels. But 
in the long term Kiribati will gain by mitigating the future loss of resources (Table 3.3, column 
G), and will eventually improve the incentives for full compliance (Table 3.4, column e).
3.7 Implications for fisheries regionalism
Our analysis demonstrates the challenges of full VDS compliance by the PNA countries in the 
presence of free rider incentives. In doing so we provide insights in how the stability of the PNA 
as a ‘new fisheries sub-region’ adjacent to the wider WCPFC is maintained. Our empirical 
application supports the notion that players are better off under full cooperation in the long term 
(Kronbak et al. 2006, Bailey et al. 2013), but full cooperation only appears to be more beneficial
in the absence of free rider incentives derived from (pre)existing access agreements. As a result 
incomplete compliance emerges as the more rational option in the short term. The results also 
indicate that full participation is not always stable (Wangler et al. 2012). In support of Finus et 
al. (2008), we show that stability of coalitions can be improved when partial compliance to the 
VDS are tolerated by coalition members. This is what we call ‘pragmatic tolerance’. We find that 
a stable coalition is maintained as long as members’ payoffs improve marginally beyond free
rider payoffs. 
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The results also clearly point to the importance of the transfers from third parties to countries’
economic gains. In summary, without transfers from third parties, our results indicate that 
payoffs from participation are better with full compliance – which corresponds to the 
theoretically ideal situation and future goal. The role of these transfers in dis-incentivising 
compliance to the VDS opens up wider questions around the political economy of fisheries 
agreements and their implications for the success of fisheries regionalism. In our case, we 
observe that both violations and pragmatic tolerance to partial compliance with the VDS are 
strongly influenced by agreements with (and in favour of) distant water fishing nations. As such, 
the design and implementation of the VDS cannot be seen in isolation from the dynamic and 
complex nature of the underlying political pressure of the DWFNs gaining and maintaining 
access to tuna resources (e.g. Havice 2010; Parris 2010; Campling and Havice 2012). 
Understanding these political dynamics helps us to better understand the internal dynamics of 
tolerance in ensuring the ongoing stability of an international agreement (Finus et al. 2008, 
Wangler et al. 2012). As this study shows, the current levels of compensation for tolerating 
partial compliance may not be sustainable over the long term given that tolerance today may 
have negative impacts on future stocks, thus threatening sustainable tuna catches. 
The specific cases of PNG and Kiribati further demonstrate how the decisions of member states 
are largely based on short-term gains, even-though they would be better off under full 
compliance over the long-term. Despite criticisms of myopic decision-making (Chwe 1994, 
Walker et al. 2016), the results do indicate that countries are aware of the long-term value of the 
resource derived from full VDS compliance. It is therefore plausible that countries can be 
incentivised to remove loopholes in the VDS relating to the allocation and accounting of non-
fishing days and the alignment of access fees under different access agreements to the VDS 
benchmark price. Progress is indeed already seen in this direction. PNG has reduced the number 
of non-fishing days in response to the EU interim agreement. If such incentives for trade could 
be extended to other PNA members’ non-compliance issues, a new set of incentives may be 
developed to resolve these issues. Kiribati, despite facing short term loss, has chosen to enforce 
the VDS at the expense of a (pre)existing agreement with the EU, particularly the Spanish 
vessels. Both moves by PNG and Kiribati have improved the overall governance and 
transparency not only within PNA but also between PNA members and DWFNs.
Building on earlier observations, our results indicate that economic institutions like the VDS can 
strengthen forms of fisheries sub-regionalism like the PNA (Miller et al. 2014, Yeeting et al. 
2016). This paper adds to this observation by demonstrating that economic institutions can also 
play a key role in strengthening the political stability of these regional coalitions. But in support 
of Havice and Campling (2010) we also demonstrate that economic institutions are by no means 
isolated from the interests of powerful distant water fishing nations. Nevertheless, the VDS has 
re-opened the negotiation of (pre)existing access agreements with a view to apply consistent 
measures across all purse seine vessels in the PNA waters, and also the possibility of negotiating
improved conditions beyond the PNA. In effect, PNA members have been able to improve their 
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bargaining position for better economic gains from the treaties, not only in increasing economic 
returns, but also in developing clear limits and restrictions on fishing effort. The move towards 
consistent application of purse seine management across all purse seine vessels in the PNA 
waters have significantly improved transparency and better coordination of fishing access.
3.8 Conclusion
Our analysis provides two significant contributions to the study of international fisheries 
agreements. First, pragmatic tolerance of small deviations, and therefore short term partial 
compliance, can be an important stepping stone in moving towards full cooperation. In light of 
this finding, and similar to discussions around shallow agreements, full participation in 
international agreements on shared resources may be improved if some flexibility is allowed. 
Second, countries that receive greater benefits from transfers than the value of lost resources 
have incentives to support pragmatic tolerance, whereas members with less benefit from 
transfers have no incentive to give away their fishing days for free or at a low price. Once 
transfers are removed countries are likely to push for full VDS compliance rules in order to 
maximise their potential gains from full cooperation. 
These findings hold consequences for the design of new forms of fisheries (sub-) regionalism at 
scales both at and below the level of regional fisheries organisations like the WCPFC. If 
economic institutions like the VDS offer a requisite level of incentive to members to fully 
cooperate, they can directly influence politically motivated side payments or transfers that have 
historically obstructed the success and effectiveness of sub-regional cooperation for 
sustainability. Said differently, such economic institutions can provide a means of addressing 
inefficiencies by strengthening the de-facto political power of resource managers to renegotiate 
and restructure institutions and incentives. Further research could focus on comparative analyses 
at different scales and in different regions, including other regional fisheries organisations or 
other international regimes. Doing so would provide a more rigorous understanding of the 
economic and political linkages between states and their role in structuring region-building based 
on the stewardship of valuable and contested natural resources.
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Chapter 4. Does certification improve fisheries governance? The case of MSC certification 
of Western Central Pacific Tuna 
Abstract
The world’s largest tuna fishery is found in the fishing zones of eight Pacific Island countries 
who are Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), but despite regulatory measures, monitoring and 
enforcement has remained weak. Since 2010, the PNA states have been engaged in the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) certification program in facilitating transparency and disclosure and 
in improving the management of tuna in the region. However limited understanding prevails on 
how and to what extent the MSC program has achieved these expectations. This paper fills the 
gap by advancing our understanding on how the MSC program addresses monitoring and 
enforcement problems in the PNA tuna fishery. The study uses the principal-agent framework to 
examine the state (who is the Principal) and private firms (who are the agents) relationship in 
light of incentive gaps and how the MSC processes affect these relationships by closing these 
incentive gaps. In doing so, we focus on the role of MSC program in addressing imperfect 
control over catch and effort of purse seine fishery in the PNA waters in view of closing 
incentive gaps. Our findings suggest that; (1) there are incentive gaps at multiple-levels of trans-
boundary resource management; and (2) the MSC program has a role in closing some incentive 
gaps (although not all), and restructure the state and private relationship. We conclude that the 
private institutions like certification have a role in facilitating goals of public resource managers.
This chapter has been submitted to the Marine Resource Economics.
Yeeting, A.D., M. Bailey, H.P Weikard, V.R. Bidesi and S.R. Bush (Under Review) Does 
certification improve fisheries governance? The case of MSC certification of Western Central 
Pacific Tuna. Marine Resource Economics
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4.1 Introduction
For many fish stocks, regulatory institutions have not achieved the desired economic and 
ecological objectives of sustainable fisheries management because of weak compliance and 
monitoring (Beddington et al. 2007). As a result, about 90% of fisheries are over or fully fished 
(FAO 2016). The mismatch between the outcomes desired by fisheries managers (sustainability) 
and the outcomes observed in reality (overfishing) is referred to as an ‘incentive gap’ (Miller, 
2005; Vestergaard, 2010). This gap manifests itself based on the fact that resource owners and 
users have different and sometimes divergent interests. It is assumed that weak governance an 
ineffective management regimes result in larger incentive gaps (Bailey, Miller, Bush, van 
Zwieten, & Wiryawan, 2015). Closing the incentive gap depends on many things, but one 
important consideration is the extent to which information asymmetries associated with 
imperfect knowledge and control over a firms’ fishing activities can be addressed and objectives 
can be aligned through appropriate incentives (Bailey et al. 2017).
Because the principal-agent problem is usually one described between resource owners 
(government) and resource users (fishers), it has usually been used to examine how incentive-
based regulatory measures, such as transferable input (effort) and output (catch) controls can 
reduce the incentive gap (Clarke et al. 1987, Grafton et al. 2006, Vestergaard 2010, Havice 2013, 
Jensen et al. 2013). However, less attention has been given to alternative incentive-based 
approaches that operate in many ways outside the government, such as Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) certification which aims to reward sustainable fishing practices with preferential 
and higher value market access (Agnew et al. 2014). In this paper, we examine the role of the 
MSC in improving fisheries management by setting incentives for greater transparency and 
disclosure in the purse seine tuna fishery of the eight tuna rich countries of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA), thus helping to solve the principal-agent problem. 
The waters of the eight PNA countries - made up of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM),
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and 
Tuvalu – hold approximately 25% of the world’s tuna stocks (Aqorau 2015). Skipjack 
(Katsuwonus pelamis) is fished at a level less than what the stock could maintain sustainably and 
yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) are currently assessed as fully exploited (i.e., they cannot 
withstand more fishing pressure without problematic losses to the spawning biomass). But there 
remains concern over bigeye tuna (T. obesus) which is currently overfished with overfishing 
continuing (Harley et al. 2014, Hare et al. 2015). The status of bigeye tuna is related to its by-
catch in purse seine fishing on fish aggregating devices (FADs) targeting skipjack (Aqorau 2006, 
Harley et al. 2014, WCPFC 2015). So while the target skipjack fishery could increase its 
pressure, the potential consequences for the non-target species is problematic. In response, the
Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) has 
called for a reduction of at least 32% of bigeye fishing mortality from the average 2006-2009
levels.
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In 2010 the PNA member states decided to apply for MSC certification of skipjack and yellowfin 
with the dual goals of strengthening management of tuna resources and maximising economic 
returns from the market (PNA 2010, Aqorau 2014, Kumoru 2014, PNA 2015). The MSC 
standard combines three principles for sustainable fishing that include: (i) the status of the 
fishery or fish stock, (ii) the fishing method/gear that reduces impact on the ecosystem, and (iii)
the fishery governance and management framework (Ponte 2012, Bellchambers et al. 2016).
However, underlying these principles is the increased transparency through improved monitoring 
and control of both fishing activities through the fisheries standard and the chain of custody 
standard (CoC) (Auld et al. 2010).
In this paper we analyse the extent to which MSC fisheries and chain of custody certifications 
have increased transparency through improved monitoring and control and how the associated 
disclosure has closed what others have labelled  a ‘double’ principal-agent gap (Jensen & 
Vestergaard (2001), Bailey et al. (2016)). As explained below, we examine how the MSC 
certification program closes first the incentive gap between the PNA and member states, and 
second the gap between the member states and distant water fishing purse seine fishing fleets 
operating in the PNA waters.
In the next section, the MSC certification scheme is briefly outlined, then the (double) principal-
agent framework is introduced, and finally the problem of asymmetric information in the PNA 
tuna fisheries is discussed. Using the framework, the study analyses the extent to which the MSC 
certification program has addressed issues relating to incomplete information as a moral hazard 
and which in turn has improved compliance to the overarching conservation and management 
goals of the PNA. The paper concludes with a discussion on the significance of these findings to 
the role of private certification in facilitating the goals of public resource managers.
4.2 A double principal-agent framework 
Principal-agent theory has been variously applied to trans-boundary fisheries to analyse the 
relationship and level of compliance under conditions of imperfect information and imperfect 
control (e.g. Jensen et al. 2002, Jensen et al. 2013, Bailey et al. 2017). Research has 
predominantly focused on how states are able to set contracts under conditions where they have 
no or only partial access to private information about fishing practices when negotiating 
contracts for fishing access (Vestergaard, 2010). As argued by Clarke and Munro (1987),
principal-agent theory assumes that the principal has a formal authority to set incentives for rule 
compliance by agents, whereas the agents have an information advantage over the principal. In 
this situation the agents take actions to reach their own goals, thus revealing ‘incentive gaps’ as 
their actions result in an outcome that differs from what the principal tries to implement.
In the context of regulatory policy making incentive gaps are defined as the difference between 
the objectives of the regulator (principal) to implement an ideal or first-best situation and the 
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objectives of the agents who pursue their private interests. These differences arise due to 
asymmetric information. Asymmetric information has two forms in this context: moral hazard,
referring to imperfect control of effort and catch; and adverse selection, referring to imperfect 
information about the agents’ interests and conditions (Jensen et al. 2002). The principal agent 
framework analyses a principal’s challenge in setting contract conditions that enforce 
transparency and disclosure, and this challenge is due to the incentive gap. The principal chooses 
an incentive scheme that will maximise their own benefits while providing the agents the 
freedom of action to guarantee some minimum return (Grafton et al. 2006).
The principal-agent problem has been applied in fisheries to model the effect of subsidies 
(Jensen et al. 2002), landing and effort taxes (Clarke and Munro 1987), individual transferable 
and non-transferable quotas (Jensen et al. 2001, Jensen et al. 2002), trans-boundary tuna 
management in the Pacific (Bailey et al. 2017), and logbook schemes (Jensen et al. 2007). The 
findings of these studies indicate that under conditions of asymmetric information, first best 
solutions usually cannot be reached. These studies also highlight the lack of empirical evidence 
that show that incentives can in fact be set to reveal private information (Jensen et al. 2013).
Furthermore, fishery related studies have mainly focused on incentive schemes that are 
controlled by the state rather than ‘private’ or ‘non-state’ schemes such as third-party 
certification.
The trans-boundary context of tuna fisheries also highlights the complexity of understanding the 
impact that incentive based schemes can have on fisheries management. As outlined by Jensen 
and Vestergaard (2001, 2002) the role of incentives for revealing private information is also 
made more complex in regional trans-boundary resource settings, where asymmetric information 
problems involve at least two principal-agent relationships. Under these conditions regional 
organisations act as principals tasked with setting regional conservation and management 
measures, and member states act as both principals (over fishing companies) and agents (under 
regional rule setting organisations). The principal-agent framework therefore highlights multiple 
information asymmetries and as such multiple incentive gaps. 
In the remainder of this chapter we assess the role of the MSC as a private incentive based 
scheme in closing the apparent double incentive gap between the PNA, member states, and 
fishing companies in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). In doing so we argue that 
principal-agent theory can help to explain how private governance can improve management 
through improved disclosure, and can contribute to a wider understanding of incentive-based 
mechanisms in the context of complex, multi-level regional fisheries management regimes.
4.3 Analysing the PNA as a double principal-agent problem
The PNA Secretariat was established under the Nauru Agreement of 1982 to help member states 
develop and coordinate efforts to conserve their tuna resources, while at the same time maximise 
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sustained economic benefits for its members through commercial programmes (PNA 2010, PNA 
2012). The agreement gives the PNA Secretariat the mandate to conserve tuna stocks in its 
members’ EEZs with a particular focus on addressing overfishing associated with purse seine 
activities (PNA 1982, PNA 2009). In doing so, the PNA members signed the Palau Agreement in 
1994 to put limits on purse seine efforts which led to the adoption of the vessel day scheme 
(VDS) for effort control in 2007 (see Yeeting, Weikard et al. forthcoming). The PNA fishery 
constitutes a double principal-agent problem as tuna management measures and objectives are 
set at the regional PNA level while implementation takes place at the national level under fishing 
access as either: (1) bilateral agreements between one PNA member with a fishing state or 
company; or (2) multilateral agreements between a group of PNA members and a fishing state 
(in this case distant water fishing nations) or a group of fishing states (such as the European 
Union).
In support of the 1982 Nauru Agreement and 1994 Palau Agreement for purse seine control, the 
member states agreed to three implementing arrangements (IA) between 1982 and 2008. These 
arrangements set forth minimum terms and conditions of access to the fisheries zones of the 
PNA members. More specifically, they set standard procedures to coordinate and guide efforts to 
monitor and control purse fishing with aims to reduce overfishing of bigeye and to a lesser extent 
yellowfin tuna. However implementation remains within multi-level relationships between the 
principals and agents. For example, the PNA Secretariat is mandated to monitor fishing activities 
of its member states, whereas member states are mandated to monitor fishing activities in their 
national jurisdictions in-line with the national, regional and international regulations (Banks et al. 
2016). In this way, and regardless of the type of access agreement, the PNA Secretariat has no 
direct control or knowledge about effort and catch in member’s national jurisdictions (see 
(Yeeting et al. 2016, Yeeting et al. forthcoming)). The VDS as part of the second IA is a direct 
control over effort set by the PNA and is implemented at the national level, but relies on bilateral 
agreements which are beyond control of other member states. The double principal-agent 
framework that results (as illustrated in Figure 4.1) not only demonstrates the two incentive gaps 
in the PNA, but also defines the actors and their role in each principal-agent relationship.
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Figure 4.1 PNA double principal-agent Problem (Adapted and modified from Jensen and 
Vestergaard 2001; Bailey et.al. 2015).
4.3.1 Marine Stewardship Council Certification Program
The MSC label and fisheries certification aims to promote seafood sustainability by recognizing 
and rewarding sustainable fishing practices and influencing the choices buyers make when 
purchasing seafood. The MSC chain of custody is a traceability standard that is applied to the 
full supply chain from a certified fishery to the final sale. Fisheries that want to improve their 
fishing practices are assessed against the MSC standard for being well managed and sustainable. 
The process requires appointment of an independent third party accredited assessment body to 
assess the fishing practices. This involves a pre-assessment evaluation of the fishing, full 
assessment and further assessment surveillance audit to assess continued compliance with the 
MSC fisheries standards. Each company in the supply chain handling or selling an MSC certified 
product must have a valid MSC Chain of Custody certificate which is based on four core 
principles including: purchase from a certified supplier, products to be identifiable, segregated 
and recorded. This assures consumers and seafood-buyers that MSC labelled seafood comes 
from a certified sustainable fishery.
The 2011 certification of PNA free school skipjack fisheries passed the MSC third party 
assessment, although not without objections (Christian et al. 2013), with a score of >80% against 
all three principles, with six conditions and seven recommendations to be addressed by 2016 
(Banks et al. 2011). The fishery also achieved chain of custody (CoC) certification in 2013, 
thereby assuring the traceability of fish from the water to retail shelves marketed under the joint 
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venture brand between the Dutch based Brus Seafoods and the PNA countries ‘Pacifical’ 
(Brownjohn 2014, Brus 2014). All suppliers to, and buyers of, Pacifical must conform to the 
fishery and/or CoC standard for a consumer product to be labelled with the MSC logo. Using the 
PA framework, we first examine the extent to which the MSC enables the PNA to address moral 
hazard by setting management measures to control and monitor member states (noted as the first 
incentive gap in Figure 1). The second incentive gap emerges between member states of the PNA 
who regulate access to fish in their national jurisdictions under licencing agreements, and the 
fishing fleets as agents with whom the principal enters into contracts (as illustrated by the second 
incentive gap in Figure 1). More specifically we focus on how the requirements set out under 
MSC fisheries and CoC certification increase the transparency of private information for the 
PNA and restructure the two observed incentive gaps.
4.4 Empirical Approach
The empirical analysis was structured around four key lines of inquiry: (1) identify and define 
the different actors, objectives and incentives in the PNA purse seine fishery; (2) investigate the 
management challenges (moral hazards issues) and reasons for incentive gaps; (3) identify the 
management measures influenced by MSC; and (4) examine MSC’s implication on the PNA 
governance structure. These objectives were applied in a two-step data collection strategy. The 
first step involved reviewing the PNA implementing arrangements and noting policy changes in 
relation to the MSC fisheries and CoC standards (see Table 4.1). In doing so we limited the 
scope of our analysis to effort and catch controls as changes to improve regulatory requirements.
In the second step, we analysed the extent to which the MSC principles close the two incentive 
gaps by assuming that transparency reveals fishing activities when principles are complied with. 
In doing so we identify key improvements made for MSC compliance, as summarised in Figure 
4.2.
Data were collected through a combination of semi-structured interviews, participating in and 
observations at tuna regional meetings, literature, and regional and national document reviews. A
total of 30 face-to-face interviews were conducted with government officials (n=12), regional 
officials and experts (n=12), and representatives from fishing companies (n=6). The first set of 
interviews were conducted at a series of PNA meetings, 8-14 March 2014 in the Solomon 
Islands, and another at the 11th  regular meeting of the WCPFC, 1-5 December 2015 in Apia, 
Samoa. Interviews were recorded (with consent) and continued through follow up email 
exchanges on points of clarification. Questions focused on the experience, implications and 
challenges of aligning the third implementing measures of the PNA with the MSC program. 
Document reviews provided guidance on the changes to the regulatory measures and the role of 
PNA, state and fishing company responses to increasing transparency in response to these 
measures.
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4.5 MSC compliance and moral hazard
The following outlines the changes to the VDS and the implementing arrangements of the PNA 
for monitoring and enforcement related to the requirements under the MSC and CoC standards 
(see Table 4.1 for a summary).
4.5.1 MSC implications on the Palau Agreement
The Palau Agreement has driven the PNA’s objective to minimise purse seine and FAD impacts
on yellowfin and bigeye stocks, which we deem as consistent and parallel to the MSC principles.
The MSC assessment identified key sources of ‘moral hazard’ undermining the Palau 
Agreement. Here we mean moral hazard to refer to the fact that agents are taking on ‘risky’ 
behaviour that they are unlikely to bear its full costs. More specifically, these included: (1) the 
increase in vessel number from 204 in 1994 to 222 in 2007, and to more than 300 to date; (2) the 
expansion of the US fleet to 40 vessels, with an increase in effort by 74% in 2010 from the 2001 
efforts; and (3) the limitations of the Palau Agreement to apply effort control across all purse 
seine fleets in the western and central pacific ocean (WCPO) (Banks 2009, Banks et al. 2012).
The observed moral hazards in the first incentive gap, refers to the failure of member states to 
fish or sell fishing effort below or within the agreed allowable effort limits causing overfishing to 
continue. 
In addressing these issues, the MSC conditions and recommendations were designed to guide the 
PNA’s actions to a level within the scoring range of 80 to 100 for all MSC principles by 2016 
(Banks et al. 2011). Four out of five MSC conditions have been met and closed during the 
second and third round of surveillance audit (Banks 2014). The single remaining condition 
pushes PNA and WCPFC to establish clear harvest control rules focusing on yellowfin and 
bigeye (Aqorau 2014, Banks 2014). In doing so, the WCPFC agreed to a workplan aiming at 
target reference points for yellowfin by 2018 and bigeye by 2019 in order to develop harvest 
control rules (WCPFC 2016).
Our analysis, summarised in Table 4.1, shows the influence of the MSC principles on the PNA 
measures. MSC principles (1 and 2) have had little influence over the formulation of the VDS, 
rather the development of the VDS has been driven by the PNA member states as an innovative 
approach to protect their common interests, following the failure of many attempts to control 
effort towards the mid 2000 (PNA 2012, Aqorau 2014). Instead the Palau Agreement and the 
VDS are fundamental pre-conditions in meeting MSC principles 1 and 2 for a healthy stock and 
ecosystem impacts respectively.
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In contrast, MSC principle 3 has had a direct influence over the VDS throughout the certification 
period. To comply with principle 3, improvements in the coverage of the VDS was required 
indirectly, by including fishing effort in the high seas and archipelagic waters which were 
outside the VDS area of application. This was confirmed by respondents who argued that the 
VDS is a sub-set of the total PNA purse seine catch and effort because of the limited VDS 
coverage, that is, within the EEZs of its members (PNA 2012, Kumoru 2014, Pilling et al. 2014).
This issue was realised as soon as VDS was successfully implemented around 2012, when 
fishing outside the VDS area became attractive causing shifts in fishing effort. From the Palau 
Agreement point of view, the impacts of purse seine fishery outside the VDS undermines the 
Palau Agreement, and are observed moral hazards in light of asymmetric information (Aqorau 
2014, Banks 2014, PNA 2014, PNA 2016).
In support of the above claim, Table 4.2 shows the distribution of effort and catch data inside and 
outside the VDS. Our estimate of catch per unit of effort (fishing day) in the three fishing areas 
i.e. EEZs, archipelagic waters, and high seas, indicates alarming concern on high catch rates per 
vessel day outside the VDS areas especially the high seas: on average 45 metric tonnes (mt) per 
vessel day from 2012 to 2014 compared to catch per day in the PNA EEZs of 30 mt per vessel 
day (see Table 4.2). Also effort and catch distribution from 2010 to 2014, were estimated at 
around 76% (effort) and 78% (catch) inside the VDS, while the remaining 24% (effort) and 22% 
(catch) was outside the VDS. This was a significant portion of effort and catch outside the VDS 
that needed to be addressed. Accordingly, fishing outside the VDS area is considered as catch 
outside the unit of certification and not MSC eligible, justifying MSC requirement to improve 
VDS coverage.
The extent to which MSC has helped in addressing moral hazards or non-VDS fishing activities 
is by strengthening and enforcing the Palau Agreement to also include fishing activities outside 
the VDS area. Based on interview and document reviews, a progressive improvement in the VDS 
coverage is seen within the period of certification. They include: (1) the expansion of VDS to 
Tokelau’s EEZ (non-PNA country) in 2013 which added an additional 1000 tradable fishing 
days to be included under the VDS; (2) the expansion of VDS to the US fleets from mid-2013,
with 8000 days contributed from all PNA countries every year for the US fleets; (3) the 
expansion of VDS to the archipelagic waters of PNG and the Solomon Islands in 2015, which 
helped reduce high non-fishing days since VDS implementation; and (4) the expansion of VDS 
to high seas areas in-line with the high seas effort limits set by the WCPFC (WCPFC 2014, 
WCPFC 2015).
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Table 4.2 Distribution of fishing days within and outside VDS areas
  Inside VDS Outside VDS   
Year TAEs (days)/ 
year 
Days in the 
Archipelagic 
waters/year 
Days in other 
watersa  /year 
2010 43982 5825 3282b 
2011 46928 8199 2782c 
2012 45703 8082 5079 
2013 46284 7985 8497 
2014 45608 7160 8264 
Catch distribution (ave.2010-2014) 76% 7% 17% 
Effort distribution (ave.2010-2014) 78% 13% 10% 
Catch per unit effort d (mt) (ave.2010-2014) 30 18 45e 
Explanatory notes:
a-efforts in non-PNA waters and in the high seas
b&c- efforts in non-PNA waters only, high seas effort not available
d- average catch per unit effort from 2010 to 2014
e-exclusive of 2010 and 2011 because of incomplete data
(Source: fieldwork)
The outcome of expanded VDS coverage has two implications related to economic and 
conservation gains. Firstly, more days have become available to be traded in the case of Tokelau 
days, and at least US$90 million in revenue is collected from the US fleets for 8000 days
annually compared to US$23 million from past experiences (Ruaia 2014, Yeeting et al. 2016).
Secondly, VDS limits are being enforced outside the PNA EEZs, in the archipelagic and high 
seas areas, which addresses what PNA members claim as undermining the Palau Agreement, i.e. 
the abuse of non-fishing days and excessive efforts (Aqorau 2014, PNA 2015). These 
improvements to the VDS, largely influenced by MSC Principle 3, are designed to de-incentivise 
fishing outside the VDS area through its extended coverage of monitoring and control measures 
over fishing. In support of these findings, Table 2 also holds two contentious claims by; (1) the 
PNA to enforce effort control through the reduction of non-fishing days and excessive efforts 
which is fishing activities outside the VDS (Aqorau 2014, Kumoru 2014, PNA 2015); and (2) the 
MSC program to motivate fishing within the unit of certification – an incentive to expand effort 
control coverage (Banks et al. 2012, Banks 2014). In light of asymmetric information, moving
forward with the MSC conditions and recommendations are seen to facilitate better alignment 
with the Palau Agreement than before the certification, by addressing some moral hazards.
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4.5.2 MSC implications on the PNA’s implementing arrangements
Enforcement of the Nauru and Palau Agreements relies on the three implementing arrangements 
that aim to coordinate and guide efforts to monitor and control purse seine FAD fishing with the 
aims to reduce overfishing of bigeye and to a lesser extent yellowfin tuna. The arrangements are
x 1982: sets out the minimum terms and conditions (MTCs) for access to be granted to 
foreign fishing vessels that includes licensing procedures, maintenance of logbooks, and 
vessel monitoring scheme on vessels. 
x 1990: provides additional MTCs including maintenance of logbook in the high seas, 
prohibition of transhipment at sea, and observer program. The maintenance of logbook 
and observer program has revealed the issue about persistent increased FAD impacts,
which has led to the adoption of the third arrangement.
x 2008: allows for FAD management through a 3 months (July to September) closure and 
the two high seas pocket13 closures – the first FAD management measure to be adopted.
Nonetheless, misreporting of purse seine effort and catch have long existed and have been 
considered as a main source of moral hazard between member states and fleets leading to 
overfishing. In the PNA, fisheries managers claim that misreporting is a concern of fisheries 
governance due to decentralized arrangements of monitoring and enforcement (PNA 2016), the 
absence of a standardized data recording and reporting system, language gap and corruption 
(Pilling et al. 2014, Banks et al. 2016). Corruption refers to actions by fleets to avoid expensive 
fees and punishment in cases where non-compliance occurs. The complex nature of tuna 
management has led to inconsistent reporting standards and information gaps about catch and 
effort (Pilling et al. 2014, Banks et al. 2016). All these governance issues contribute to persistent 
misreporting and incentive gaps between states and fleets. For example, due to complex tuna 
management, observer and logbook coverage are a subset of regional total purse seine activities 
covering up to 80% and 85% respectively of all fishing activities in the countries EEZs 
(Williams 2012). For the remaining 20% and 15% information is missing, which accounts for 
fishing activities outside the countries EEZs not covered by these measures. Also, specific to the 
purse seine fishery, there was a lack of direct control over FAD fishing. 
Even with the three implementing arrangements, it is clear that there are still remaining 
asymmetric information problems. Our analysis summarised in Table 4.1, indicates that the MSC 
has no influence on the formulation of PNA implementing arrangements (Aqorau 2014, Kumoru 
2014), but like the Palau Agreement, MSC also influences some improvements and changes in 
an effort to establish harvest control rules and reference points. 
13 The two high seas pockets are the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of  FSM, Indonesia, Palau and 
PNG and the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall, Nauru, PNG, 
Solomon, Tuvalu. 
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We observe that the MSC principles have no implication on the measures of the first and second 
implementing arrangements (see Table 4.1) - including minimum terms and conditions for access 
to be granted to foreign vessels, maintenance of logbooks, electronic vessel monitoring scheme, 
and national observers on board - as they came into force with the Nauru Agreement in 1982 and 
1990 respectively, before MSC certification program began in the late 1990s and later became 
global standard towards 2010 (Gulbrandsen 2009) when picked up by the PNA in 2010 (PNA 
2010, Aqorau 2014). However, as we argue below, the MSC CoC, which relies on all the 
monitoring and enforcement measures under the first and second implementing arrangements 
and has specific traceability requirements, has helped to drive the change.
The changes to the first and second implementing arrangements, in particular the maintenance of 
FAD and non-FAD catch reporting, are attributable to the role of Pacifical in implementing the 
MSC CoC. Pacifical is a 50/50 shareholding company between the PNA Secretariat and a Dutch 
private company – ‘Sustunable’. It is established to facilitate both the marketing of the MSC tuna 
products on the one hand, and enforcement of the traceability system on the other hand. Pacifical 
acts on behalf of the PNA member states in serving their commercial interests, given the 
complex nature of tuna value chain and the lack of states ability to participate in commercial 
activities. Under Pacifical, fleets, firms and companies interested in harvesting and processing 
MSC tuna, sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Pacifical, on top of access agreements 
(where applicable for foreign fleets). These provide an additional contract with fleets and firms 
to indicate 1) their eligibility to harvest and process MSC tunas, 2) their willingness to 
participate in MSC fishing as well as support the PNA’s initiative for sustainability and 3) their 
willingness to a greater level of monitoring compliant to MSC CoC requirements and 
traceability. 
In practical terms, fleets wishing to land MSC eligible tuna are now required to apply for MSC 
trips before conducting MSC compliant fishing, and ensure traceability is in place from the site 
of harvest to an MSC processing plant14 (see (Daume et al. 2016). Monitoring involves the use of 
logbooks and VMS observer data, which records the time of catch, location, species and volume. 
This information is preserved for batches of fish landed through to the processing plants and 
ultimately consumer products. Through Pacifical, PNA states are also expanding control, and 
thus have information access over the tuna value chain, beyond just harvesting (Brownjohn 
2014, Brus 2014, Adolf et al. 2016). Landing in designated ports is encouraged to enable 
traceability monitoring through to MSC domestic processing to work, but also to facilitate 
landing of potential MSC catches to be processed in the PNA as well as landing of potential non-
target catches to be used for domestic consumption. 
14 In 2015, six eligible tuna processing plants are listed in the PNA. To date, SSTC Wewak of PNG, Frabelle Lae of 
PNG, have processed MSC eligible Tuna in the PNA (Brownjohn 2015).
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We observe that the MSC principles have no implication on the measures of the first and second 
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Again referring to Table 4.1, we also observe that the MSC program through principle 3 for 
effective management has had a direct influence on the improvement of the third implementing 
arrangement to reduce FAD impacts. In 2007, the PNA countries agreed to the third 
implementing arrangement to set limits on FAD sets through a three month (July to September) 
closure and two high seas pocket closures.15 In relation to MSC’s push for PNA and WCPFC to 
establish harvest control rules and reference points, new measures have been adopted (Daume et 
al. 2016). These new measures include: (1) the adoption of a revised management measures for 
bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the WCPO, high seas purse seine efforts limits to be 
implemented in 2015, the purse seine and longline catch measures for yellowfin tuna to be 
implemented in 2014 and extended to 2015, and a new section related to the provision of 
operational level catch and effort data by members; and (2) the adoption of a new conservation 
and management measures (CMM) 2014-06, on establishing a harvest strategy for key fisheries 
and stocks in the WCPO which was updated in 2016 with clear targets to agree on target 
reference points by 2018 and 2019 in order to develop harvest control rules (WCPFC 2016).
At the time of writing, the process of developing harvest strategies for tuna species has been 
ongoing. However, limit reference points have been agreed at the PNA and WCPFC levels 
(Aqorau 2015). Work on refining the target reference points and a harvest strategy for key target 
species has been progressing through a series of meetings and workshops through scientific 
committee meetings of the WCPFC (Hampton et al. 2012, Daume et al. 2016, WCPFC 2016).
Overall, we observe that the development of the third implementing measures for high seas 
limits and FAD management, are attributable to the conditions and requirements set out under 
the initial MSC audit on the PNA’s implementing arrangements. These implementing measures 
are also fundamental to dealing with moral hazard given they are all directly related to improving 
fisheries information and transparency for the PNA and member states through improving 
monitoring and surveillance of fishing activities in PNA waters. 
The real impacts of MSC program will ultimately be seen in the change or shift in fishing 
patterns, which is still to be observed. Based on interviews, the assumption is that FAD seasonal 
closure seems to give some positive contribution to the increase in the proportion of free school 
sets since 2010 (Hare et al. 2015, PNA 2016). Based on Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC) sets distribution data, 66% accounts for free school un-associated sets compared to 34% 
FAD sets (Pilling 2016). However, it is still observed that the average catch dependency ratio 
indicates the need for a further shift from FAD to free school in order to reduce fishing mortality
(Hare et al. 2015, Pilling 2016). The average catch per set between 2012 - 2014 in PNA EEZs 
was around 63% for purse seine FAD sets compared to 37% for purse seine free school sets
(Pilling 2016). Also, as Hare et al. (2015) demonstrate, free school sets increased during the 
three months FAD closure from July to September since 2010, while FAD sets increased outside 
15 The two high seas pockets are the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of  FSM, Indonesia, Palau and 
PNG and the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall, Nauru, PNG, 
Solomon, Tuvalu
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FAD closure. This implies that the increase in free school fishing is linked to new measures on 
FAD management associated with MSC outcomes, rather than fisher’s incentive to fish free 
school for MSC catches. Specifically, based on sets and catch per sets data, it is not clear 
whether this is attributable to the MSC certification, though there is an apparent direct link 
between the free school sets and FAD measures.
There are some necessary notes points of concern that need to be raised. Firstly, FAD and non-
FAD fishing and their impacts are not observed and controlled separately, but rather a 
controversial practice of ‘extreme compartmentalisation’ occurs. This means that one fishing trip 
can be made up of both ‘sustainable’ (MSC certified) and ‘unsustainable’ (non-certified) catch. 
What could potentially be happening is that boats going out and fishing on FADs can cash in on 
both a low value high volume fishery, while still cashing in on a lower volume higher value 
fishery by fishing on a free-school during the same trip. As mentioned in the paragraph above, 
this puts into question the extent to which certification is or can drive change towards more free 
school fishing. In fact, other than the increase in free school fishing during the FAD closure, 
FADs fishing effort has increased more than free school fishing since certification (Pilling et al. 
2016).
MSC observers are deployed to avoid MSC and non-MSC catch mixing during harvesting and 
transhipment at sea and also to improve port landings data. This is certainly commendable, but 
the second issue of note has to do with the credibility and efficacy of the observer program. 
Almost 8% of observers in the WCPFC (including but not limited to observers on MSC trips), 
reported that they experienced instances of things like assault, intimidation, and interference 
(WWF 2015). Additionally, almost 1 in 5 observed trips had instances of vessels failing to 
comply with CMMs (WCPFC 2015, WWF 2015). So while certification through MSC has made 
some governance changes, the magnitude of associated sustainability gains have yet to be seen.  
4.6 Discussion
Our study provides three important contributions to advance our understanding on principal 
agent problems in relation to asymmetric information and incentive gaps, and the role of market 
certification schemes in addressing them. First, our results are in line with Jensen and 
Vestergaard (2001, and 2007), showing that within complex fisheries regional setting with 
dynamic actors and interests there are multiple principals and agents, and therefore multiple 
incentive gaps and moral hazards (see Figure 4.2). Saying that differently, within the PA regional 
setting, there are multiple levels of incentive gaps, which brings attention to the fundamental 
question of between whom are incentives misaligned in order to create the resulting gaps. 
Identifying the actors (principals and agents) and their objectives are paramount in finding 
solutions to address asymmetric information problems. Second we demonstrate the significant 
role of the MSC program in addressing some asymmetric information problems and incentive 
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gaps (but not all) by incentivising change for sustainability. Third, we find that the PNA 
‘Pacifical’ model in implementing the MSC CoC program has played a significant role in 
configuring the double PA framework by building a direct relationship between the regional 
PNA (on behalf of member states) and fleets catching MSC tunas. In this way, some incentives 
can circumvent the double PA problem by reducing the gap to only one principal (PNA) and one 
agent (fleets).
The application of the double PA framework is useful in a regional setting where multiple 
agreements exist. It allows for the analyses of agreements in relation to specific and appropriate 
PA relationships, which are often overlooked in the analysis of agreements for trans-boundary 
resources. Our study builds on Jensen and Vestergaard (2001, 2002) and (Bailey et al. (2016), 
Bailey et al. (2017)), double PA framework by identifying the multi-levels of asymmetric 
information gaps between principals and agents and in doing so seeing the different strategies of 
MSC certification in incentivising change through its related principles. More specifically, we 
analyse the effectiveness of the Palau Agreement for VDS in the first PA relationship between 
the PNA secretariat and member states, and the three implementing arrangements for the second 
PA relationship between the member states and fishing vessels (see Figure 4.1). In doing so, we 
are able to determine between whom asymmetric information and incentive gaps exist, and how 
to identify appropriate actors in designing and finding solutions to address them.
Our case demonstrates that the Palau Agreement and implementing arrangements are designed to 
support the economic and biological objectives of the member states. We argue that these 
agreements have not been able to achieve their objectives due to persistent challenges associated 
with asymmetric information and incentive gaps that have materialized because of different 
objectives of multiple principals and agents. We observe the important role of the MSC program 
in incentivising change for and improvement of measures that in turn address asymmetric 
information and incentive gaps in the fishery. Our study argues that cooperative monitoring 
arrangements are more appropriate and effective than individual state monitoring, in light of 
trans-boundary tuna resources. We observe the role of MSC program in supporting cooperative 
arrangements in promoting and strengthening the role of regional PNA. The MSC program does 
so by not only validating existing PNA measures but also incentivising further improvements in 
tuna measures in order for the PNA to maintain certification. In this case, the MSC program has 
thus promoted the protection of states’ common interests, especially where member states have 
limited capacity to perform.
Reflecting on the double PA framework in Figure 4.1, the first incentive gap is observed between 
regional PNA and member states and caused by the complex nature of tuna regimes associated 
with different national regulations, and different bilateral and multilateral agreements. The direct 
relationship between the regional PNA and member states is important in relation to the principal 
agent problem for two reasons, namely 1) PNA is trying to get control over fishing access in the 
waters of its members through the expansion of harvest strategies, and 2) PNA is trying to 
address member states’ misalignment through multilateral and cooperative arrangements. We 
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demonstrate that the MSC has been central to this process in three ways (Table 4.1, illustrated in 
Figure 4.2). First, by meeting principles 1 and 2 of the MSC, related to stock status and 
minimising ecosystem impacts, the PNA was able to better comply with the conditions set for 
principle 3 on effective management by linking effort control to limit reference points (see Table 
4.1 for new measures). Second, by enforcing new reporting requirements for FADs, the PNA 
was able to improve the coverage and implementation of the VDS, place high seas limits and the 
established limit reference points. Thirdly, the MSC program supports the existing PNA 
measures by demanding the implementation of precautionary measures such as harvest control 
rules and reference points as prescribed under international laws - UNCLOS (Banks et al. 2012, 
Daume et al. 2016).
Figure 4.2 MSC implications on the incentive gaps of the PNA
In light of the complex nature of tuna regimes, we observe the second incentive gap between 
member states and fleets. In this relationship, complex and multiple PA relationships exist, as 
many states and fleets are involved. Through cooperative arrangements, member states designed 
three implementing arrangements to monitor fishing activities in their collective waters, yet still 
it has proven difficult to achieve first best solutions, as overfishing continued Our observation of 
this relationship is in line with observations of Grafton et al. (2006), on the challenge of the state 
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to choose an incentive scheme that will maximise their own benefits while giving the agent the 
freedom of action to guarantee some minimum return. As such, member states argue that with 
MSC, benefits from price premium is distributed along the value chain to private actors (State
excluded), while assuming sustainability benefits for the State in relation to addressing moral 
hazards. In light of this view, Figure 4.2 demonstrates that there is no impact of MSC on the 
incentive gaps between member states and fleets. This is not a surprise by the unclear economic 
benefits accounted for member states from the MSC program. 
What we instead observe is the role of the Pacifical in closing the incentive gap or creating a 
direct relationship between the PNA and fleets catching MSC tunas. The creation of Pacifical 
addresses the double PA problem faced by the PNA, in particular for a portion of the purse seine 
fishery engaged in MSC fishing. By creating new informational demands that are compliant to 
MSC fisheries and CoC certification, the PNA has 1) created a direct link to eligible MSC fleets, 
and 2) expanded control over the firms and companies in the MSC tuna value chain. We 
demonstrate in Figure 4.3 that the Pacifical model highlights the program’s governance 
contribution by configuring the standard double principal agent relationship within a complex 
regional setting. Configuring this double principal agent relationship reduces a double incentive 
gap by creating a direct relationship between the regional PNA and the fleet level, in support of 
member states. This is consistent with claims about the role of MSC in facilitating fisheries 
regionalism (Yeeting et al. 2016) by strengthening states performance to monitor fishing 
activities in their waters. In addition, the CoC promotes transparency by going beyond the 
standard monitoring requirements and demanding new information about traceability. 
Traceability improves informational quality by observing fishing activities all through the tuna 
value chain. 
Overall, it therefore appears that a combination of VDS and FAD measures, with all the 
monitoring schemes under the implementing arrangements and traceability, have improved not 
only effort control but also observation and monitoring of purse seine fishing activities in the 
whole PNA as well as the value chain. Nevertheless, while the creation of Pacifical CoC 
addresses the double PA problem and improves tuna governance to some extent, the overall goal 
of motivating more free school fishing still seems yet to be met. The extent to which the PNA
and the MSC program, has been successful in moving the fishery to meet this overall goal, 
instead of simply performing the requirements set out by the MSC remains unclear. Evidence to 
date shows that the distribution of FAD and free school sets and catches has not yet changed 
from before the implementation of MSC. Instead the MSC has influenced the overall 
improvement and additional measures on FAD management and VDS coverage. This means that 
while the provision of information is met, thereby reducing moral hazard in the fishery, it is less 
clear if these information incentives will translate into incentives for changing fishing practices 
from non-certified FAD fishing to certified non-FAD fishing. 
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Figure 4.3 MSC COC implications on the PNA double principle agent problem
Our principal-agent application of the MSC program, provides evidence of the potential and role 
of private schemes in the revelation of catch and effort information. Through the lens of principal 
agent theory, we demonstrate the role of MSC program through three processes in overcoming 
asymmetric information problem and incentive gaps. These include 1) validating existing 
measures through the assessment process, 2) improving regional measures through MSC
conditions, and 3) increasing transparency by the flow and control of information through 
traceability. More specifically from the principal agent perspective, they do so by identifying 
asymmetric information problems with existing measures, and using MSC conditions and 
traceability requirements to affect change and improvement in overcoming the problems.
Lastly, our analysis of the MSC program also supports claims of Jensen et al. (2007) and others, 
saying that under the conditions of asymmetric information it is difficult to reach the first best 
option. As indicated we demonstrate that the PNA measures and the MSC program have been 
successful in overcoming different levels of asymmetric information and reducing the incentive 
gaps, but the first best solution of only free-school fishing remains elusive. There are still 
remaining asymmetric information and incentive gaps (perhaps minimal) that will continue to 
undermine fisheries regionalism and cooperative arrangements for trans-boundary tuna 
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resources. This implies the ongoing need for a coherent and more effective approach in affecting 
institutional change for sustainability. 
4.7 Conclusion
Our study provides empirical evidence of multi-level incentive gaps in a complex trans-boundary 
problem and regional setting, and the role of the private MSC program in addressing them. We 
build on Jensen and Vestergaard’s (2001, 2002) and Bailey’s et al. (2016, 2017) double PA 
framework by confirming for the PNA case that there are multi-level asymmetric information 
problems and resulting incentive gaps. Within complex regional settings we also observe the role 
of a market-based mechanism, here a certification scheme, in addressing some but not all 
incentive gaps. In particular, our application of the double principal-agent problem and our 
attempt to analyse the role of the MSC scheme, opens up the potential of the private certification 
incentive in addressing these multi-level incentive gaps and asymmetric information problems. 
In overcoming these multi-level problems, we analyse the significant role of the MSC scheme in 
providing multi-level impacts by affecting change in a complex regional setting. The multi-level 
impacts of the MSC scheme are related to the different strategies of the MSC scheme driven 
from its principles based on stock status, ecosystem conditions, management system, and the 
CoC, which all have a role in addressing the different problems within a complex regional 
fishery setting.  
From a fisheries regionalism perspective, the MSC program is not only validating PNA measures 
and cooperative arrangements but is facilitating improvements where States have limited 
capacity to perform. This is observed in the creation of a direct relationship between regional 
PNA and fleets through the PNA-Pacifical model. This direct relationship also implies the 
relevance and key role of the regional PNA in monitoring and controlling fishing activities in the 
collective PNA waters. In other words, this is not undermining the State’s role in controlling 
fishing activities in their waters, but rather acknowledging the State’s limited capacity to do so, 
and in fact strengthening control of the State through reducing the incentive gap and better 
aligning the objectives of principals and agents. 
While we demonstrate the role of MSC program in addressing asymmetric information within 
the different principal agent levels, further studies could look at the economic benefits of 
implementing the MSC program to quantify and reflect on the level of incentive gap closed as a 
result of the certification program. Second we also demonstrate how MSC conditions have 
affected changes in management measures at the PNA and WCPFC levels, but remains unclear 
how these measures have affected change at the fleet level i.e. fishing activities and patterns. A 
study or review of the MSC program to effectively affect or incentivise change in fishing 
activities and patterns could potentially leads to more effective change for sustainability. 
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Chapter 5. Only one path to sustainability? Understanding the role of MSC certification in 
regional fisheries management organisations
Abstract
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) facilitate international cooperation for 
the management of shared trans-boundary fish resources like tuna. However, RFMOs are 
challenged with dynamic interests which have slowed progress towards collective decisions on 
establishing key management measures such as harvest control rules (HCRs) and target and limit 
reference points. The private institutions like the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), a third-
party certification standard, have been introduced to incentivise the adoption of these and more 
measures. The role of MSC as a private institution is thought to work in a linear way – providing 
economic incentives for meeting its standards. However, based on a comparison of three RFMOs 
in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Ocean, this chapter shows how the MSC influences decision 
making in very different ways. In doing so we demonstrate different ‘pathways’ through which 
MSC has been applied to create change at the RMFO level. The findings hold relevance for a 
wider understanding of how third party certification contributes to change beyond market 
incentives alone.
 
A version of this chapter is undergoing final revisions for publication in the forthcoming book:
Yeeting, A.D. and S.R. Bush (Forthcoming) Only one path to sustainability? Understanding the 
role of MSC certification in regional fisheries management organisations In Smart mixes in 
relation to trans-boundary environmental harm: interactions between international, state; 
and private regulation, p. xx-xx J. Van Erp, M. Faure, A. Nollkaemper and N. Philipsen 
(Eds.). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
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5.1 Introduction
Overfishing, overfished stocks and overcapitalization of fishing fleets are functions of the 
success or failure of inadequate institutions (Squires et al. 2016). Rules for the exploitation of 
trans-boundary fish stocks like tuna are set by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(RFMOs), with authority mandated through the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). RFMOs require coastal and fishing states to cooperate through international 
agreements to ensure the conservation and promotion of optimum utilization of highly migratory 
species within and beyond the exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Under the international laws 
(UNCLOS), RFMOs are expected to establish appropriate management measures in line with 
precautionary sustainability approaches. Despite the achievement RFMOs represent as 
international platforms for the management of tuna resources, their effectiveness in setting and 
enforcing effective effort limits and rules for harvesting tuna (even when measured against their 
own goals) has been limited by the difficulty of aligning political and economic interests of 
member states (Grafton et al. 2006, Squires et al. 2016). In light of RFMO’s delayed actions in 
reaching for appropriate agreements in promoting sustainability for trans-boundary tuna 
resources, this chapter examines the role of smart mixes or mixed approaches in facilitating 
regulatory systems at the RFMO level. 
One particular challenge faced by RFMOs has been the establishment of harvest strategies that 
refers to harvest control rules (HCRs) and reference points to promote a precautionary approach 
to management as required under UNCLOS and FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries (Hilborn et al. 2005). Harvest strategies are considered to represent a best-practice 
approach to fisheries management decision making for the establishment of harvest rules 
(HCRs). They are proactive, adaptive and provide a framework for taking the best available 
scientific information about a stock or fishery and applying an evidence and risk-based approach 
to setting biological target and limit reference points (harvest levels). The challenge in setting 
these rules and levels is that they should be developed in the management planning stage with 
the involvement of all stakeholders (Hilborn et al. 2005, Hampton et al. 2012). However, the 
complex nature of tuna fisheries, including multiple species and gear types, contributes to the 
difficulties in member states cooperating for these sustainable management. As Aranda et al. 
(2012) argue, the adoption (or not) of HCRs and reference points by RFMOs is a function of the 
(mis)alignment of political and economic goals of participating states given their vested interests 
in different species of tuna, the fishing gears used to catch them and the protection of often long 
standing access arrangements (see also Bailey et al. 2013, WCPFC 2014).
To align diverging national interests of RFMO members, scholars and policy makers alike have 
searched for ‘smart mixes’ of political and economic institutions (Borzel et al. 2002, Andonova 
2010, Ponte 2012, Foley et al. 2016). One such ‘mix’ is the adoption of third party certification, 
such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), to set requirements supported by apparent 
market demand for sustainably managed fisheries – which includes the establishment of limit 
reference points and HCRs (Gray et al. 2007, Lodge et al. 2007, Allen 2010, Jones et al. 2016).
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2010, Ponte 2012, Foley et al. 2016). One such ‘mix’ is the adoption of third party certification, 
such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), to set requirements supported by apparent 
market demand for sustainably managed fisheries – which includes the establishment of limit 
reference points and HCRs (Gray et al. 2007, Lodge et al. 2007, Allen 2010, Jones et al. 2016).
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The three principles of the MSC require 1. the maintenance of healthy stocks, 2. limited impacts 
on the ecosystem, and 3. an effective management system to regulate fishing activity
(Gulbrandsen 2010). By setting scientifically HCRs and reference points as major conditions for 
the fisheries it certifies that the MSC is considered a credible market institution for incentivising 
change in management regimes like RFMOs. 
Using a new institutional economics (NIE) framework, this paper compares three cases of MSC-
RFMO interaction to understand the role of third-party certification in contributing to the 
establishment of precautionary management measures for sustainability. In doing so we compare 
the interaction between MSC and RFMOs in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Ocean. Specifically, 
we examine how private institutions like the MSC facilitates state (public) regulation in 
improving measures for sustainable fishery, align incentives and address tuna management 
problems at the RFMO level. While previous analysis has focused on the role of MSC in 
improving rights and governance on individual fisheries, there is limited understanding of how 
the MSC program has contributed to systemic change at the RFMO level, in particular in relation 
to the adoption of HCRs and limit reference points. 
Our analysis contributes to debate on the role of market institutions in facilitating state’s 
objectives for sustainability. While still unclear, controversies against the MSC process in 
certifying the fishery with conditions for improvement opens up questions about whether 
‘improve-first-certify-second’ or ‘certify-first-improve-second’ pathways have a chance to 
facilitate improvement for sustainability. This study do this by identifying longitudinal 
‘pathways’ of improvement which can explain different sequential ordering of interaction 
between market and political institutions. In doing so we respond to claims that there is one order 
or process of applying third party certification, as well as the associated notion that absolute 
compliance to a standard, which leads to a priori exclusion from certification, is better than more 
inclusive approaches incremental problem identification and improvement and exclusion of 
poorly performing producers (e.g. Christian et al. 2013). Instead we argue that step-wise 
improvement of setting and closing conditions as a tailored process of improvement can offer 
more effective long term change in complex governance settings like RFMOs.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first provide an overview of the new institutional 
economics framework and its relevance for understanding smart mixes of market and political 
institutions. We then present the results of our three RFMO case studies, the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCFPC), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the 
International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT). Data are based on 
an extensive review of the certification documents available through the MSC, documents on 
each of the RFMO sites, as well as 16 semi-structured interviews with the fishery (MSC clients) 
n = 4, MSC respondents for each RFMO n = 7, and non-MSC respondents n = 5. The interviews 
are conducted from October, 2016 to April, 2017 through telephone and Skype due to different 
locations among interviewees. We then discuss these cases with a view to characterising 
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different improvement pathways emerging from these cases before drawing conclusions of the 
wider implications and application of our findings.
5.2 Understanding dynamic institutional interaction
The new institutional economics (NIE) framework describes the formation and effectiveness of 
different types of institutional interplay (Williamson 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2004). The NIE 
framework focuses on the evolutionary interaction between economic (market) and political 
institutions. NIE offers an interdisciplinary approach to analyse the form and function of 
institutions in allocating rights and responsibilities for efficient resource use and stewardship 
(Coase 1984, Williamson 1990, Paavola 2007). NIE also opens up an understanding of how the 
interaction of different kinds of institutions lead to (in)efficient policy outcomes and designs for 
innovative policy solutions in addressing misalignment and dynamics (Hilborn et al. 2005, 
Pacheco et al. 2010). The application of NIE is therefore relevant for understanding the 
challenges facing fisheries agreements and the processes of finding solutions for trans-boundary 
stocks in a dynamic multi-lateral setting. 
Williamson (2000) provides a hierarchical NIE framework consisting of four institutional levels, 
each with a different pace of change (see Figure 5.1). In this study we focus on the interaction 
between political and economic institutions in the formation of governance institutions. RFMOs 
are political institutions representing member states with a mandate to conserve shared resources. 
Governance institutions are rules for mitigating conflict and creating mutual gains by ‘crafting 
order’ through contracts and enforcement mechanisms (Williamson 2000, Pacheco et al. 2010),
which encompass precautionary measures like HCRs and limit reference points. Finally, 
economic institutions refer to structured incentives and motivations for operational decision 
making, which we argue corresponds to the role of the MSC standards and certification. The 
MSC standards and certification offer an incentive scheme through its eco-labelling instruments 
with an associated price premium on sustainable seafood products. The dynamic nature of 
agents, resources and knowledge encompassed by economic institutions are subject to 
continuous review, with greater frequencies of change compared to governance and political 
institutions (Ostrom 1990). This also means that experimentation and iterative improvement are 
also likely in these economic institutions compared to the other institutional levels (Pacheco et 
al. 2010).
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Figure 5.1 New Institutional Economics Framework (Adapted and modified from Williamson 
2000 and Acemoglu et al. 2004, 2005).
Acemoglu et al. (2004, 2005), builds on Williamson’ NIE framework by emphasising the 
evolutionary interactions between political and economic institutions that are based on 
feedbacks. They point to the interaction of influence and feedback as de facto economic power 
derived from the economic institutions, and de jure political power on the other hand, derived 
from the political institutions. Both Williamson (2000) and Acemoglu (2004), recognise the role 
of these interactions in a continual state of co-evolution reflecting the interactions between 
dynamic actors involved. In this sense the creation of governance institutions, such as law and 
policy, opens up questions about the kind of incentives required, and ultimately how they 
influence the balance between de jure and de facto power. 
Previous studies have pointed at the variety of ways in which third party certification, as an 
economic institution, has generated changes in political and governance institutions. Foley 
(2013), for example, shows how MSC instigated change by conflating the state as a client and 
enforcer of regulatory change. Similarly Adolf et al. (2016) show how the state can reposition 
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itself as not only a client for MSC certification, but in doing so gain greater control over value 
generation in international markets. Gulbrandsen (2014) has also demonstrated that the principles 
of dynamic interactions can be drawn to understand how governance outcomes have been 
reached. Outside fisheries, research on international regimes has similarly demonstrated that the
interaction of public and private modes of governance are located in ‘regime’ complex, where 
cooperation and completion between actors shape the formation of regime rules (Pattberg 2005).
While all of these examples point at the form and function of institutional interaction, we argue 
that little attention has been given to the sequence of interactions and how this sequence can shed 
light on different strategies for applying economic institutions to create new incentives for 
changes in political institutions.
Characterising the sequence of institutional interaction opens up the possibility to identify 
different ‘pathways’ of institutional interaction and change. In doing so we imply an active 
choice and application of not only which institutions to apply to address an incentive gap, but 
also a strategy for the order and timing of its application. This in turn opens up the possibility to 
identify strategies for applying a tool like MSC to shape incentives for cooperation around rule 
setting by political actors. Pathways in this sense do not only mean structured dependency on a 
set of actors, interests and instruments (Peters et al. 2005), but also a series of decisions that can 
be made by fishery managers in the development of an overall strategy for change. As 
Overdevest and Zeitlin (2014) argue, such pathways are emergent because rather than being a 
unified set of rules and procedures set out by a multi-lateral regime, they are processes of 
experimental rule setting within multi-lateral organisations like RFMOs. In these pathways, 
economic institutions like certification can then be seen as a recurrent causal process that can 
explain (but also be used to shape) strategies for change in complex institutional settings.
These pathways should be understood analytically as stylized, ideal-typical trajectories leading 
from a characteristic starting point (national or international, public or private) towards the 
emergence of governance institutions. By characterising these improvement pathways we can 
therefore move beyond assumptions that underpin much of our understanding of the potential for 
and how third party certification create change. In doing so we challenge the assumption that the 
MSC has a single mode of change; starting with a fisheries improvement project, moving to pre-
assessment then full assessment, where protest may disqualify a fishery (see Figure 5.2). Instead 
we open up the possibility of multiple pathways of change, which while generally following the 
expected sequence above, may illicit different responses from political actors and therefore 
different ways of bringing about change to governance institutions like HCRs and limit controls. 
As we now go on to illustrate there are multiple iterations of this assumed sequence of events 
involved in the certification of a fishery.
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Figure 5.2 Expected MSC-RMFO pathways for developing precautionary management measures
We analyse and compare the sequence of interactions between the MSC and three RFMOs in the 
next section. Specifically we analyse how MSC-RFMO interactions in the three cases brings 
about institutional change for the adoption of HCRs and reference points. We do this by 
examining RFMOs past experiences and challenges with precautionary approaches. Second we 
evaluate the emergence and implications of MSC programs through selected MSC fishery clients 
within each RFMO. Lastly we determine and compare improvement pathways in each of the 
three RFMOs in making conclusions for the successful application and timing of MSC processes 
in facilitating change at the RFMO level.   
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5.3 Comparative analysis: MSC-RFMOs interaction.
5.3.1 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
Setting HCRs and reference points. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC), established in 2004, is responsible for managing straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) (Tsamenyi et al. 2004); a region that 
accounts for approximately 60% of annual global tuna production (Harley et al. 2014). The 
WCPO is home to the remaining healthy tuna stock that provides about two-thirds of the world’s
tuna supply every year (Havice 2010, Havice 2013). Of this catch, 80% of the total landings of 
the region are from the EEZs of the eight member states of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) (est. 1982) including the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.
Tuna management in the WCPO is divided between three regional bodies including the WCPFC, 
PNA and the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) (est. 1979). The FFA represent all 
22 coastal states of the Pacific Ocean including the PNA. The FFA focus on the general 
management of all tuna species and fisheries, while the PNA focuses on the management of 
purse seine and skipjack tuna (Barclay et al. 2007). But both FFA and PNA share common 
interest in ensuring: 1. effective management of tuna stocks and its ecosystem and 2. better 
governance for equitable distribution of wealth from tuna fishing in their collective EEZs. When 
the WCPFC was established in 2004, the FFA and PNA became sub-regional blocs within the 
WCPFC, in which the WCPFC provides a platform for coastal and fishing states to cooperate in 
managing fisheries of the Pacific Ocean. 
The WCPFC meet annually to determine total allowable catch/effort limits for highly migratory 
stocks as the commission may decide, and adopt standards for the collection and timely 
exchange of data on fisheries in the convention area (Havice 2010, 2012). Decision making 
depends on the advice and recommendation of the Scientific Committee, but instruments are 
adopted by consensus as binding conservation and management measures (CMMs). Furthermore 
the Scientific Committee rely on the work and advice of the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Communities (SPC), with strong political supports of the FFA and the PNA.
Since the 1990s the advice of the Scientific Committee is to reduce effort and catch to maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). Achieving this requires a harvest strategy with clear and defined target 
and limit reference points for all tuna species to be able specify measurable benchmarks 
(Hampton et al. 2012, WCPFC 2015). Yet the development of reference points has proven 
politically sensitive due to potential trade-offs between the benefits and costs between purse 
seine and longline fisheries in the region, which are respectively more or less important to 
different member states (Barclay et al. 2007, Havice et al. 2010, Parris 2010, Bailey et al. 2013).
In particular, purse seine fisheries deploying Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) targeting 
skipjack has led to overfishing of both yellowfin and bigeye tuna exploited by longline and
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handline fisheries (Harley et al. 2014). The challenge in reaching agreement on setting 
precautionary limits to yellowfin and bigeye exploitation at MSY levels is to balance the 
interests of coastal and distant water fishing states taking into account the wealth generated by 
maintaining growth of the skipjack purse seine fishery.
MSC process. In response to the failure of WCPFC to formulate appropriate measures to put in 
place harvest controls and levels, the PNA has worked at the sub-regional level to set measures 
for sustainable fishing in line with their wider objective of generating greater wealth from their 
tuna resources. At the first presidential summit in 2010 the leaders of the eight PNA countries 
signed the Koror declaration, which established the intention to have skipjack and yellowfin 
certified against the MSC standards, and in doing so, expand their management control of tuna 
resources in the supply chain (PNA 2010, Aqorau 2015).
In preparation of the Kokor declaration the PNA underwent MSC pre-assessment in 2009 of their 
skipjack and yellowfin tuna purse seine fishery setting on ‘free school’ (or non-FAD) tuna, 
naturally occurring ‘FADs’ such as floating logs, and associated fisheries using anchored and 
drifting FADs (Banks 2009). The result determined that only the skipjack targeted purse seine 
fishery setting on free school tuna would pass full assessment, whereas yellowfin was considered 
ineligible because of concerns related to the health of the stock in other areas of the WCPO, 
especially in the Philippine and Indonesia waters. The PNA free school purse seine fishery 
entered full assessment in 2010 and was certified in 2011 with six improvement conditions and 
seven recommendations for improvement within the certification period to 2016 (Banks et al. 
2011, Banks et al. 2012).
A major condition for re-certification was the adoption of appropriate limit and target reference 
points and the development of more effective harvest control rules by the PNA and WCPFC. 
These conditions were agreed to by the PNA and an action plan was developed for monitoring 
through an annual surveillance audit process within their 5-year certification period (Banks et al. 
2011, Bellchambers et al. 2016). The agreed action plan also includes explicit milestones for the
WCPFC to initiate identification and development of appropriate reference points in 2012 (year 
1) which should be adopted in 2013 (year 2). Before re-certification in 2016 the PNA and 
WCPFC also committed to a well-defined HCR consistent with the limit reference point (Banks 
et al. 2011, Banks et al. 2012).
The PNA argued that the ‘third implementing measures’ developed in 2009 and the Vessel Day 
Scheme (VDS) established in 2007 constitute their harvest strategy for the skipjack purse seine 
fishery (Banks et al. 2012, Aqorau 2015). In particular, they refer to the vessel day scheme, and 
the third implementing arrangements (catch retention of all tuna, seasonal FAD closure, partial 
high seas closures, full observer coverage and the use of electronic vessel monitoring system) for 
purse seine vessels as their harvest strategy. However, even if these implementing measures 
qualified the PNA for closing out their MSC condition for HCRs, their challenge was to ensure 
that they had them adopted as binding CMMs at the WCPFC level, which would extend 
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implementation to the entire WCPO. For this reason, the adoption of HCRs and reference points 
at the WCPFC is key for PNA’s achievement against MSC conditions and milestones and hence 
for PNA to maintain its certification for re-assessment.
The PNA has demonstrated progressive improvement in line with the conditions and milestones 
set by the MSC certification towards 2016. New CMMs have been adopted by the WCPFC either 
as a result of or in parallel to the MSC conditions for the PNA (Daume et al. 2014, Daume et al. 
2016). In 2012, the introduction of HCRs and limit reference points were presented and 
discussed at a series of workshops and sessions at the 8th annual meeting of the Scientific 
Committee in preparation for the Commission’s meeting (Hampton et al. 2012). These 
discussions led to CMM 2014-06 on establishing a harvest strategy for key fisheries and stocks 
in the WCPO, with a work plan to be achieved by 2017, and CMM 2015-06 which sets interim 
target reference points for skipjack tuna at 50% of biomass in the absence of fishing (WCPFC 
2015). As a result, five of the six initial conditions from the initial assessment have been closed 
out, including those for setting limit reference points for skipjack (Daume et al. 2014). The 
condition for setting a harvest strategy remains in progress. 
Pathway. The pathway of institutional interaction that emerges from this case conforms largely 
to the expected sequence of stages improvement of the MSC certification process (see Figure
5.3). The PNA purse seine fishery has moved from pre-assessment to certification and is pending 
re-certification. In the process key conditions for improvement have been observed, related 
directly to the definition and implementation of a HCRs and limit and target reference points. 
The PNA as a political institution has responded by working to close out these conditions in 
accordance with the surveillance audits. What this case emphasises, however, is the role of the 
PNA as a sub-regional level in using the MSC to set and measure progress to establishing a 
harvest control strategy in the absence of progress at the RFMO level. Reflecting the notion of 
dynamic experimentation in environmental regimes (Overdevest et al. 2014), the PNA states 
have played an active role through the MSC process to initiate dialogue and negotiation for the 
establishment of measures that will promote MSY based on precautionary approaches in line 
with UNCLOS.
Questions have been raised, however, as to whether the improvements seen to date at both the 
PNA and RFMO levels are attributable to the MSC process. Many of the elements associated 
with the harvest control strategy were established at the time or even before the MSC pre-
assessment in 2009, perhaps indicating that the PNA would have anyway made progress to 
establishing a strategy for skipjack tuna. In that sense the MSC certification only verifies the 
actions the PNA was already undertaking. Though this may be true, the MSC still appears to 
have played a role in creating adequate incentives for the PNA to go beyond an internal 
management strategy. Without the MSC it may have been less likely that the PNA would have 
negotiated for the adoption and implementation of the VDS, negotiate and propose the process 
for adopting HCRs and reference points at the WCPFC, nor develop an action plan with well-
defined milestones for improvements. Perhaps most importantly, it appears there would have 
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establishment of measures that will promote MSY based on precautionary approaches in line 
with UNCLOS.
Questions have been raised, however, as to whether the improvements seen to date at both the 
PNA and RFMO levels are attributable to the MSC process. Many of the elements associated 
with the harvest control strategy were established at the time or even before the MSC pre-
assessment in 2009, perhaps indicating that the PNA would have anyway made progress to 
establishing a strategy for skipjack tuna. In that sense the MSC certification only verifies the 
actions the PNA was already undertaking. Though this may be true, the MSC still appears to 
have played a role in creating adequate incentives for the PNA to go beyond an internal 
management strategy. Without the MSC it may have been less likely that the PNA would have 
negotiated for the adoption and implementation of the VDS, negotiate and propose the process 
for adopting HCRs and reference points at the WCPFC, nor develop an action plan with well-
defined milestones for improvements. Perhaps most importantly, it appears there would have 
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been less ambition to contribute to the reduction of negative impacts from purse seine fisheries 
beyond PNA waters on the overall tuna stocks.
Figure 5.3 WCPFC-MSC improvement pathway
5.3.2 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
Setting HCRs and reference points. The Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission (IOTC) was ratified in 1993 and made operational in 1996 under Article XIV 
of the FAO Constitution to manage tuna and tuna-like fishes in the Indian Ocean. The IOTC area
of competence is the Indian Ocean, defined as FAO statistical areas 51 and 57, including 
‘adjacent seas’, expanding to north of the Antarctic Convergence (IOTC-PRIOTCO2. 2016).
Membership of IOTC is open to Indian Ocean coastal states and to countries or regional 
economic integration organisations which are members of the United Nations (e.g. the Bay of 
Bengal Programme), or one of its specialised agencies and are fishing for tuna in the Indian 
Oceans (IOTC 1993). The adoption and design of economic institutions or policy instruments 
depend on the advice of the Scientific Committee and designated Working Parties for key 
species and fisheries.
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Historically pole and line and long-line were the primary tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean, with 
a combined reported annual total catch between 400,000 to 600,000 metric tonnes (mt) (IOTC 
2009, IOTC 2012). With the introduction of the purse seine fishery in mid-1980s catches 
increased steadily to peak at 625,074 mt in 2006 (IOTC 2009). In 2006, the member countries of 
the IOTC agreed to reduce bigeye catches to the 2004 level and yellowfin to below the 2000 
level (Anonymous 2009). Subsequently, catches declined to 455,999 MT and 428,719 MT in 
2009 and 2010 respectively (IOTC 2012). Although the IOTC was successful in reducing catch 
levels, it remains unclear whether this reduction would achieve MSY for bigeye and yellowfin in 
the long run without the adoption of further HCRs and limit and target reference points. The 
reason for this is related to concerns over the increasing purse seine impacts on yellowfin and 
bigeye stocks in the long run, coupled with the lack of political support and Scientific 
Committee’s capacity and capability to push for the adoption of precautionary approaches that 
would promote the MSY due to short term interests of some Parties (Huntington et al. 2009, 
IOTC 2009).
Unlike the WCPFC, the IOTC Agreement does not refer to the application of a precautionary 
approach (IOTC 1993, IOTC 2009). Instead it seeks solutions for optimal utilization throughout 
the convention area, and ensuring effective information about the fishery for scientific evaluation 
and advice (IOTC 1993). This is because the IOTC agreement was formed before the UNFSA 
and FAO CCRF of 1995 (Fanning et al. 2007). For that reason, the IOTC Agreement lacks the 
definition of important elements such as fishing, fishing operations and fishing vessels, which 
are significant impediments to the efficient implementation of the agreement (IOTC 2009). The 
first round of performance review of the IOTC conducted in 2009 recommended that this 
oversight be reformed and the ecosystem and precautionary approaches adopted – which would 
in turn provide a basis to establish HCRs and reference points.
MSC process. The introduction of the precautionary approach to the IOTC began through the 
engagement of the MSC certification of the Maldives pole and line skipjack fishery in 2012. At 
the start of the assessment process, the Maldives submitted a formal application for full 
membership of the IOTC in response to the MSC requirement to contribute to the management 
of the skipjack stock within the IOTC framework. This brought the fishery, which accounts for 
21% of the global pole and line tuna catches (and 80% of reported skipjack tuna catches) in the 
Indian Ocean under the RFMO (IOTC 2015). Handline targeting yellowfin tuna was initially part 
of the Maldives MSC application but was suspended due to the poor condition of the stock.
The rationale for the Maldives to apply for MSC certification began in 2008 (IOTC 2009), as 
part of a wider plan supported by the World Bank to manage the bait fishery on which the pole 
and line industry depends (Huntington et al. 2009). Within this action plan the government 
outlined the need for a precautionary approach to realise the sustainable development of fisheries 
for economic diversification and growth (Huntington et al. 2009). The development of a 
precautionary approach drove the Maldives to enter the MSC process, due to a clear indication of 
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a healthy skipjack stock and minimum pole and line negative impacts on the fishery ecosystem, 
and also seeing the potential role of the MSC program in helping to develop and achieve their 
strategy for implementing the precautionary approach. The pole and line fishery within the 
Maldives EEZ went through MSC pre-assessment from 2009 to 2010 and successfully completed 
full assessment in November 2012, with eight conditions for improvement within the five years 
of certification until 2016 (Huntington et al. 2009).
In response to the MSC conditions the Maldives government developed an action plan to reach 
certification within the five years (Scott et al. 2014). The plan included a clear timeframe for the 
development of a fisheries management plan for skipjack by 2012, a review of catch, effort and 
size frequency data by the end of 2013, and the implementation of the management plan by the 
third quarter of 2014, and a recovery plan for yellowfin tuna. However, two of the eight MSC 
conditions were the development of HCRs and establishment of target and limit reference points 
for skipjack tuna, which required implementation by the IOTC (Huntington et al. 2009). After 
their membership to the IOTC, the Maldives conducted a number of sessions with other coastal 
states on the relevance and importance of establishing HCRs and reference points with the 
support of key international and private organizations, including the International Pole and Line 
Foundation (IPNLF), International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF), World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), the World Bank and the MSC itself. 
The end result was the adoption of Resolution 12-01 on the implementation of the precautionary 
approach, which marks the introduction of the precautionary approach and harvest strategies in 
the IOTC (IOTC 2016). The Maldives subsequently submitted a proposal to the IOTC in 2013 
for the implementation of an interim HCRs rule for skipjack tuna. The proposed HCR formulated 
a procedure for making harvest policy decisions to achieve a desired state. In 2013 as part of the 
surveillance audit there was also an attempt to assess the eligibility of yellowfin stocks against 
MSC Principle 1 for healthy stock which started in 2013 (and still in progress to date) (Scott et 
al. 2014). In 2016, Resolutions 16-01 and 16-02 were adopted, which set a stock rebuilding plan 
for yellowfin. They do this through reductions by gear type to reduce the 2016 catch level by 
20% relative to 2014 (IOTC 2016). Resolution 16-02 was adopted for the establishment of HCRs
for skipjack tuna in the Indian Ocean – the first harvest control rule to be developed (IOTC 
2016).
The experiences of the Maldives contrasts markedly with the experiences of the second fishery in 
the IOTC to apply for MSC certification. Echebastar, a family company from the EU and 
Seychelles fishing in the region since 1981 applied for MSC certification in 2013 for their free 
school purse seine fishery targeting bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack (Nicks et al. 2015). The 
assessment was finalized in November 2015, showing that all three units of certification scored 
above the 80 point threshold for certification. However, the final approval for certification was 
upheld due to the absence of HCRs and reference points at the IOTC (Nicks et al. 2015, WWF 
2016). Six of the ten conditions identified by the assessors related to the development and 
adoption of HCRs and reference points for all three species (yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack) by 
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2019. But in contrast to the Maldives, which faced similar conditions, the Echebastar fishery was 
not certified. At the time of writing the Echebastar fishery is still undergoing an assessment 
process, and yet no evidence or progress seen for the fishery to influence improvement at IOTC.
Pathways. We observe two slightly different improvement pathways of MSC in the Indian 
Ocean (see Figure 5.4) that do not adhere to the expected pathway (as outlined in Figure 5.2). 
The Maldives pole and line case shows a pathway based directly on certify-first-improve-second 
which imply a certified fishery with the political engagement with improvement conditions at the 
IOTC level. On the other hand, a private fishery unit of certification remains in a prolonged 
assessment process despite having the similar requirement for improvements set for the IOTC 
level.  
Figure 5.4 IOTC-MSC improvement pathway
In comparing the two pathways, we find that the public-private engagement is more successful in 
driving change at tuna RFMOs than the fishing industry (private) acting alone without the state’s 
support. The difference between these fisheries is the Maldives’ capacity as a member state of 
the IOTC to influence decision making at IOTC. This implies that a pathway of ‘certify first and 
improve second’ appears more attainable to a client-state than a private unit of certification like 
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Echebastar, which has less potential to influence decisions at the IOTC-level. The Echebastar 
case in turn raises questions about the credibility of the MSC process in supporting fisheries 
without the ability to influence what are essentially political decisions at the IOTC level (WWF 
2016). Having HCRs and reference points for skipjack adopted at IOTC in 2016 does open up 
the potential for Echebastar to progress certification of skipjack perhaps subject to the 
suspension of yellowfin and bigeye. The case therefore shows that although private intervention 
is key for improvements and changes at tuna RFMOs, our IOTC cases demonstrate the 
significant role of the state in using private institutions is seen to have a chance of success with 
political support speeding up developments at the RFMO levels.  
5.3.3 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
Setting HCRs and reference points. ICCAT was established in 1970 in response to the 
widespread concerns over the overexploitation of stocks of tuna and tuna-like fishes in the 
Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas (Hurry et al. 2008, Allen 2010). Historically, 
overexploitation of Atlantic tuna was driven by the expansion of the large-scale long line sector 
and purse seine fishery in the late 1950s and mid-1960s respectively (Saunders et al. 2016). The
ICCAT convention area covers more than 30 species, of which Atlantic bluefin tuna is the most 
economically and politically significant, followed by bigeye, albacore and yellowfin (Saunders et 
al. 2016). The stated objective of ICCAT is to “cooperate in maintaining the populations of these 
fishes at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes” 
(cited in Hurry et al. 2008 p.1).
The Commission currently includes 51 contracting member states and is organised into a number 
of constituent bodies responsible for data collection, the definition of conservation and 
management measures and recommendations for monitoring, control and surveillance. The 
specific functions and tasks of ICCAT are separated based on the sub-regional division of fish 
stocks. These sub-regional divisions are particularly important because the stocks represent the 
political interests and capacity of the actors and participants of the fishery. For example, albacore 
tuna is treated as three separate stocks in the northern Atlantic Ocean, southern Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean Sea. Bluefin is divided into the Eastern and Western Mediterranean stocks and 
Swordfish into the Northern, Southern and Mediterranean stocks. Bigeye and yellowfin in 
contrast are treated as a single stock.
ICCAT catches increased from 1950 to a peak of nearly 600,000 mt in 1994, from which time 
they have declined (ICCAT 2015). After 50-60 years of stock decline and growing pressure on 
the Commission from nongovernment organisations (NGOs) and key member states, ICCAT 
adopted a number of long term recovery plans for, albacore since the 1990s and bluefin in the 
late 2000s (Hurry et al. 2008, Saunders et al. 2016). These plans focused on setting catch limits, 
size limits, seasonal closures based on both areas and times of fishing, and the closure of the 
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Gulf of Mexico spawning area for the bluefin stock (Allen 2010, Carleton et al. 2010). ICCAT 
has adopted a number of recommendations for northern albacore since 1998 including limits on
fishing capacity, which was later updated for north Atlantic albacore catch limits for the period 
2008-2009, as well as subsequent recommendations for the establishment and implementation of 
a rebuilding program.
Although plans are in place to recover overexploited stocks, the recovery of stocks has been 
slow, with claims that ICCAT has failed to reach its own objectives (Hurry et al. 2008, Merino et 
al. 2016). Critiques of the recovery plan have focused on the failure of the Commission to adopt 
appropriate recommendations of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) due 
to the political pressure from member states and economic pressure from the industry (Hurry et 
al., 2008). Others have noted the failure of some contracting parties to comply with their 
obligation to provide timely and accurate data, as well as the presence of illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported (IUU) fishing efforts (Saunders and Haward, 2016). Some respondents also note that 
until 2008 ICCAT measures were based on the recovery plan with the aim of increasing biomass 
instead of developing a clear management plan, which has undermined the long term 
sustainability of the stocks in question. 
The outcome of the 2008 independent review of ICCAT recommended the adoption of the 
precautionary and ecosystem approach to fisheries management in line with the 1995 FAO 
CCRF and UNFSA (Hurry et al. 2008). However, ICCAT countered this review by stating that 
the precautionary and ecosystem approaches were already introduced in 1997 when ICCAT 
established an ad hoc working group and committee, and since 1998 ICCAT progressed by 
adopting subsequent recommendations for stock recovery plan. But as respondents noted, 
progress was slow and substantive change lacking because of the persistent dynamic political 
issue of conflicting conservation and economic interests (also see Hurry et al. 2008). From 2008, 
more practical and ongoing work has been done within the separate committees and panels in 
broadening their efforts to incorporate precautionary and ecosystem approaches, including the 
continued dialogue on the definition and evaluation of precautionary reference points and HCRs 
through the implementation of a management strategy evaluation approach (Saunders et al. 
2016). Such dialogue continues until these days, and there has not been any decision on the 
adoption of such measures supporting a precautionary approach to management.
MSC process. Many claim that the MSC has played a significant role in influencing 
improvement towards the adoption of precautionary approaches in ICCAT (ICCAT 2015, Atuna 
2016, Silva et al. 2016). However, MSC’s presence in ICCAT, is both narrow and recent. This is 
mainly due to the poor status of most tuna stocks in ICCAT and the ongoing recovery work plan 
for all tuna stocks (Hurry et al., 2008; OPAGAC and WWF, 2016). We identify three types of 
MSC engagement in the Atlantic Ocean, which includes a failed assessment, an ongoing 
fisheries improvement program, and one certified fishery. We outline these three engagements 
with MSC, and in doing so examine how this multiple engagement has influenced the 
development of HCRs and reference points in the Commission.
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The St. Helena pole and line fisheries for albacore, bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack tuna went 
through MSC assessment from February 2009 until July 2010 (Carleton et al. 2010). This small 
isolated island located inside the southern tropics of the Atlantic Ocean has a capacity of 500 mt 
of fish providing income to 40 fishermen on the island. The fishery failed the assessment because 
albacore, bigeye, yellowfin failed the MSC’s stock status requirements at the regional level. For 
example, the status of bigeye and yellowfin for the entire Atlantic, the eastern half of the Atlantic 
for skipjack, and the southern Atlantic for albacore (Carleton et al. 2010, ICCAT 2016, Silva et 
al. 2016). After the St. Helena assessment there was no further involvement of MSC in ICCAT 
managed fisheries until 2016 because it was not until then that the health of stocks were at a 
requisite level to be certified (ICCAT 2016, Silva et al. 2016).
The Producers’ Association of Large tuna Freezers (OPEGAC) developed and agreed to a global 
tuna fisheries improvement plan (FIP) work plan in 2016 with WWF in response to the slow 
progress by ICCAT in setting requirements for implementing a stock rebuilding plan (OPAGAC 
and WWF, 2016). Accordingly and in line with ICCAT’s rebuilding plan for bigeye, yellowfin 
and skipjack tuna, OPAGAC agreed to prioritise activities to meet MSC standard for healthy 
stocks noting key ICCAT’s recommendations for tropical tunas. These recommendations include 
the establishment of a multi-annual management plan, updating catch limits on bigeye and 
yellowfin to the 2010 levels, and a framework for developing a harvest strategy for each stock 
(ICCAT, 2015; OPAGAC and WWF, 2016). Though none of the ICCAT-OPAGAC fisheries are 
MSC certified or in assessment, there are apparent interests from the fishery for tropical tunas to 
enter MSC once stocks are fully recovered and MSC standard for healthy stock is satisfied.
Also in 2016, the north Atlantic albacore (Spanish) fishery was awarded full MSC certification. 
The clients are the Spanish Inshore Producers Organisations from Guipuzcoa (OPEGUI) and 
Biscay (OPESCAYA), and the San Martin de Laredo Fishermen Guild. The fishery covers 129 
vessels, of which 87 are troll vessels that capture albacore from June to October and 42 pole and 
line vessels which fish from July to November, within the Bay of Biscay and adjacent North 
Atlantic waters. In 2014, the fishery accounts for 28,000 mt total allowable catches which is well 
below the MSY catch level of 31,680 mt.
The northern albacore fishery’s interest in MSC certification began in the late 2000s, but did not 
comply due to the status of the stocks. They re-entered the certification process in 2014 when the 
stock is still recovering and went into full assessment in 2015 when there was a near full 
recovery of the stock (97%). The fishery was ultimately awarded certification in July 2016 (Silva 
et al. 2016). One of the five conditions set under the certification is to develop a clear and well-
defined HCRs despite ICCAT having recommendation 11-13 for HCRs is in place and 
operational. The point raised by the MSC assessors was that these HCRs remain too poorly 
defined to assess north Atlantic albacore as a separate stock (Silva et al. 2016). A condition is 
raised and MSC is organizing a pilot harmonization meeting for ICCAT albacore fisheries. This 
means that while HCRs were under development, progress had been seriously stalled. In 
response the northern albacore fishery has developed an action plan to adopt a well-defined 
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HCRs by the Commission by 2020, which reinvigorates the ICCAT’s existing strategic plan 
from 2015 to 2020 (ICCAT 2015).
Pathways. In contrast to other RFMOs what we see here are multiple pathways converging to 
reinvigorate a stalled process of setting HCRs and reference points (see Figure 5.5). These 
pathways are separate in that they are set up in separate fisheries and regions. But they also differ 
in the order through which they seek to pressure ICCAT. The St. Helena failed, but played an 
important advocacy role in highlighting that when measured against an independent measure the 
ICCAT process was failing. The OPEGAC FIP is based on a more traditional process of closing 
out conditions before certification, which in itself is a risky proposition because it based on an 
ambition for certification rather than the risk of (very publically) losing certification. The 
northern albacore certification may play a highly complementary role to the OPEGAC FIP 
because it is under a strict timeline to close out conditions, similar to what we see in the WCPFC 
and IOTC cases. 
Figure 5.5 ICCAT-MSC improvement pathway
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5.4 Discussion
Our study confirms that there is no single pathway of progressive improvement in RFMOs 
through engagement with the MSC certification process. Instead we find multiple pathways of 
engagement and improvement. Our observations of how the MSC plays a dynamic role in the 
RFMOs also contributes to a wider understanding of how market-based instruments can 
influence change. We see that the MSC works perhaps most effectively in the context of RMFOs 
when conditions have to be closed with a clear time line to re-certification. We also see that the 
change is more likely to occur when it is the state (member countries of RFMOs) that is the 
client of certification, rather than private actors. In doing so we move beyond assumptions that 
underpin much of our understanding of the potential for and how third party certification 
facilitate improvement through a single mode of change. 
Together the three cases demonstrate that the MSC has enabled different and multiple strategies 
of those seeking certification to stimulate the implementation of precautionary management 
measures in RFMOs through the adoption of new measures for harvest strategies. In the case of 
the WCPFC we see the leading role of the sub-regional PNA in initiating rules and measures that 
were pre-conditions for the third party certification. However, once certified the MSC conditions 
pushed the PNA to lobby for the implementation of reference points at the regional level. The 
IOTC case also demonstrates the effect of the conditions set out by MSC certification, with 
membership of the Maldives and precautionary measures established during rather than before 
the certification process began. The prolonged certification process of the Echebastar
certification also shows an apparent bias to state rather than private units of certification.
Although such a bias is not made explicit in this case, comparison with the other two cases also 
support such a claim. When member states are engaged in the MSC process they are inherently 
better positioned to see changes through than companies having to lobby member states to act on 
their behalf. Finally, the ICCAT case shows a more fragmented process of RFMO change, with 
failed, ongoing and certified fisheries all contributing to reinvigorate a stalled process of 
adopting precautionary measures at the RFMO level. 
Reflecting the NIE framework of Acemoglu (2004) and Williamson (2000), our analysis of 
MSC-RFMO interaction also sheds light on the different strategies for applying economic 
institutions to create new incentives for changes in political institutions. Our results support the 
role of both de facto economic and de jure political power in creating dynamic negotiations over 
the formulation of governance institutions such as a harvest strategy. The results also 
demonstrate how the MSC as an economic institution sets multiple de facto incentives for state 
action that go beyond market payoffs in the form of assumed price premiums. All three cases 
show the important role of the MSC conditions that set a clear and publically accountable goal 
for member states to achieve collectively at the RFMO level. But perhaps more importantly, 
these conditions provide a clear timeline. This means that the dynamic interaction between 
economic and political institutions is not open ended, but sets along a clear improvement 
pathway to re-certification. Meeting this timeline set outside the RFMO appears to enable 
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progress to realising the adoption of the legal principles (for precautionary management) set out 
under international law (UNCLOS).
Reflecting wider discussions over the interaction of political and economic institutions is the 
important role for the state as a client to the MSC. Building on the work of Foley (2012, 2013),
we observe that the role of the state in certification is direct rather than facilitative. This appears 
to be all the more important in the context of RFMOs where only member states have the right to 
negotiate and ratify harvest control measures and reference points. The Echebaster case in the 
IOTC draws out most clearly the contrast with the weaker negotiating position of private units of 
certification who remain reliant on states to close out conditions for them. This not only reflects 
the weaker bargaining position of private actors, it also indicates the multiple and changing 
incentives for states to demonstrate the sustainability of their fisheries. As Adolf et al. (2016) and 
Miller et al. (2014) note in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, the boundaries are blurring 
between the position of the state as a political and economic actor given the PNA owns, regulates 
and plays a role in marketing its tuna. What this reflects is the prominent role that small island 
states (the PNA and the Maldives), whose economies are dependent on tuna resources (see for 
example Schurman 1998, Barclay et al. 2007), have had in responding to the potential for greater 
wealth generation from tuna through the MSC processes. Their engagement with MSC is 
politically driven by the need to ensure long term economic benefits and wellbeing of their 
populations.
Our observation of multiple pathways of MSC-RFMO interaction holds consequences for how 
the role of certification as a tool for improving fisheries management should be understood. By 
recognising the existence of these multiple pathways our results contrast to recent critiques of the 
role of conditions in the MSC process. Christian et al. (2013) argue that the objections procedure 
of the MSC is flawed because while objections are lodged against fisheries these rarely lead to a 
fishery being denied certification. Similarly WWF’s (2016) review of MSC engagement in the 
Indian Ocean claims that “the reliance on conditions only perpetuates a psychology that sub-
standard fisheries should be embraced within ‘the MSC Program’ in order to foster their 
improvement. Experience to date has largely discredited this notion” (p. 2). Both of these authors 
ultimately argue that fisheries should improve their performance before being certified, and in 
being so, allowed to make sustainability claims in the marketplace. There are certainly concerns 
that conditions set by the MSC in the WCPFC, IOTC and ICCAT remain open. However, we 
argue that a more linear process of ‘improve-first-certify-second’ would essentially reduce any 
pressure to move along a clear timeline of improvement. Reflecting on our observation of the 
more effective position of states as clients of certification, we argue that a ‘certify-first-improve-
second’ pathway does can provide an effective means of incentivising change.
Finally, the multiple pathways of MSC-RFMO interaction demonstrate the value of 
experimentalist approaches to institutional change in international environmental regimes 
(Overdevest et al. 2006). The various pathways observed not only highlight the value of 
certifying fisheries and setting conditions over time, but the value of parallel processes of, for 
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example, failed and successful certification and FIPs. We argue that even unsuccessful 
certifications contribute pressure on RFMOs, just as failed attempts to close out conditions do. 
This is not to say that ultimately it is outcomes that need to be seen in terms of the improving 
status of stocks. Instead it places greater appreciation on the multiple and various outputs 
certification leads to procedural change in political institutions like RFMOs as well as the rule 
change in governance institutions (Green 2013). For example, looking beyond the outcomes in a 
single fish stock we see that conditions for establishing HCRs and reference points at the RFMO 
level also oblige all members to implement and comply, which in turn improve governance and 
management of trans-boundary tuna resources at all waters regardless of where the fish is caught.
5.5 Conclusion
We challenge the assumption that the MSC has a single ‘theory of change’: starting with a 
fisheries improvement project, moving to pre-assessment then full assessment, where protest 
may disqualify a fishery. Instead we observe the possibility of multiple ‘pathways of change’,
which refers to the significant role of sequential interactions between economic and political 
institutions, and the active choice and application of strategies by MSC clients to affect change. 
In doing so certification appears to be an effective means of aligning political and economic 
interests of member states to push for the adoption of precautionary fishery management 
measures as set out under UNCLOS.
Our analysis demonstrates the important role of MSC conditions in structuring these 
improvement pathways. But they also show that the application of the MSC is closely related to 
the specific structure of the RFMOs as political institutions. Building strategies for change in 
RFMOs therefore requires a ‘smart mix’ of certification into the structure and rules that govern 
these regional organisations. Our results also support the mode of certify-first-improve-later, by 
showing that including rather than excluding fisheries in the MSC process will ultimately bring 
the most lasting change towards sustainability. In short, if a fishery is excluded from certification 
until it has reached requisite level of a priori improvement, it is less likely to overcome political 
resistance to change. In all three cases, regardless of the outcomes reached, the MSC stimulated 
changes to governance institutions. Finally we conclude that the state continues to play a 
significant role in the success of economic institutions like third party certification. 
Further research should focus on how these institutional outputs observed in RFMOs can in turn 
be translated to outcomes in terms of economic benefits to fisheries and its impact on the status 
of stocks. This would provide insights into the long term viability of the MSC program. As
interest in the MSC is increasing from private clients in tuna fisheries a closer look at the MSC 
procedural process in view of balancing the role of the private and state clients in closing out the 
MSC conditions is needed. These results would demonstrate the benefits of wider engagement in 
certifying tuna and potentially stimulate a further shift to ‘global tuna governance’ beyond the 
state.
102
102 103
Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
The failure to achieve sustainable and equitable outcomes in trans-boundary tuna fisheries is a 
consequence of inefficient and ineffective institutions at national, regional and international 
levels. This thesis has argued that these inefficient and ineffective institutions have been 
dominated by regulatory political systems and are, hence, constitute what are termed here as ‘old 
tuna regimes’ (OTRs). These ‘old’ institutions, represented by the five tuna RFMOs mandated 
under the UNFAS (including the WCPFC), have not been able to achieve the policy goals of 
biological and economic sustainability (de Yturriaga 1997, Aqorau 2006, Parris 2010, Bailey et 
al. 2010, de Bruyn et al. 2013). Many of the institutional challenges that these old style regimes 
face are due to a combination of dynamic political interests of actors and inappropriate 
incentives, coupled with the consistently increasing demand for global tuna products that 
continue to put pressure on tuna stocks (Havice et al. 2010, Aqorau 2015).
At the same time this thesis has explored the emergence of what are labelled ‘new tuna regimes’, 
a mix of regional and sub-regional organisations employing a range of incentive based 
mechanisms emerging that use market or economic incentives to meet tuna sustainability goals. 
In doing so the thesis has asked: What characterises the shift from old to new regimes for trans-
boundary tuna management, and to what extent is the emergence of a new tuna regime able to 
achieve sustainable and equitable outcomes in the Western and Central Pacific?
The remainder of this thesis explores this question by discussing the extent to which we see a 
shift from old to new tuna regimes, what generalizable characteristics can be identified and 
whether they incentivise state-state and state-industry cooperation to achieve sustainable and 
equitable outcomes. Building on a new institutional economics perspective to trans-boundary 
fisheries governance, the central message emerging from this discussion is that the shift from old 
to new regimes is facilitated through a step-wise process of strategic and dynamic interactions 
between public and private actors. It is also clear from the results that the emergence of new tuna 
regimes does not mean old tuna regimes will totally disappear. Instead these regimes
complement each other – opening up multiple new opportunities for responsive forms of 
sustainability governance into the future.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section (6.2) presents an overview of the findings 
of the four chapters of the thesis. This is followed in section 6.3 with a discussion on how the 
findings from these chapters contribute to a better understanding of how incentive based tools 
and mechanisms can contribute to (public/public and public/private) cooperation for meeting the 
goal of sustainable trans-boundary fisheries management. Based on this discussion section 6.4 
reflects on the contribution of the thesis to the integration of new institutional economics with 
the game theory approaches. The final section then presents policy recommendations and 
directions for future research.
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6.2 Revisiting the empirical chapters
The empirical chapters of this thesis were organised around four sub-questions all contributing 
insights on how economic incentives are created by state and non-state actors to implement and 
enforce conservation and management measures in tuna management. In doing so the chapters 
contributed insights into how competitive behaviour between states and fishing fleets in 
regulatory or (old) state-only tuna regimes can be improved by a mix of short and long term 
incentives for the creation of new (or adaption of existing) tuna management regulations and 
measures.
Chapter 2 addressed the question: How has the shift from an old to new tuna regime come about 
and what institutional changes implemented in the PNA have facilitated this shift? The 
assumption underlying this chapter claims that weak political institutions are attributable to the 
lack of property right over trans-boundary fish stocks, which in turn undermines long-term 
sustainability outcomes. This is also true for tuna management in the Western and Central 
Pacific, where the PNA member states have struggled to set clear access rights and conservation 
and management measures over the tuna in their individual and collective EEZs. The historical 
outcome, and key characteristic of old tuna regimes, has been a continued increase in fishing 
effort, tuna landings and by-catch of non-target species. The long term outcome is in turn the risk 
of unsustainable exploitation of (some) tuna stocks while coastal states only receive limited 
economic benefits compared to the overall value of the catch landed.
The chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the significant institutional shift from a regulatory 
based regime to one using new economic instruments for tuna management in the waters of the 
PNA. The incentive of such instruments being both improved conservation outcomes and a
contribution to domestic wealth generation. The PNA have achieved this shift to new economic 
instruments through the VDS and MSC program, both of which require political institutions (the 
PNA secretariat and ministers, to set governance institutions for monitoring and enforcement of 
purse seine fishing. The results indicate that the initial experience with the VDS and MSC 
certification opens up the possibility of characterising new tuna regimes as those which can 
realign de facto economic with de jure political power to achieve long term sustainability 
outcomes.
The results of this first empirical chapter also argued that the future of these new economic 
instruments will be determined in large part by the strength of continued cooperation among 
participating actors. But to ensure success, both regional and sub-regional institutions also need 
to continue to enable both political and economic actors to realise the incentives made available
through these instruments. The limited understanding on the extent to which new tuna regimes 
can facilitate cooperation through political institutions to maintain governance institutions for 
conservation and wealth distribution motivated the second and third research questions of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 3 addressed the second sub-question of this thesis: To what degree has the 
implementation of the vessel day scheme in PNA brought about greater stability of the Palau 
Agreement? The chapter analysed the extent to which the early implementation of the VDS has 
been challenged by the willingness of member states to allow for a degree of deviation from the 
allocation of vessel days under this arrangement. The results showed that the apparent laxness in 
VDS rule enforcement derives in part from both loopholes in pre-existing regional treaties, as 
well as pressure from distant water fishing nations (such as the US and EU) when negotiating 
new access arrangements. But the analysis also showed that this deviation (or partial compliance)
with VDS rules, contrary to what was expected, play a role in stabilising the VDS and PNA.
Furthermore the results indicate that requiring full compliance with VDS rules may in fact 
present strong incentives for PNA members to deviate from the VDS regime and undermine long 
term cooperation between member states under the Palau Agreement.
Building on game theoretic notions of the strength of coalition formation, the analysis 
demonstrates that successful regional cooperation is not just about strict compliance. It is also 
about what is termed ‘pragmatic tolerance’ – allowing small deviations to facilitate stable 
international agreements. By identifying pragmatic tolerance as a key dimension of the apparent 
success of the VDS (at least over the short term), the chapter demonstrated that state cooperation 
cannot be isolated from external political and economic influences. It also raised questions over 
how incentives and cooperation for sustainable management that are not delivered by the VDS 
can be filled by other instruments such as MSC certification. 
Chapter 4 therefore addressed the third sub-question: To what extent does third party 
certification increase transparency through improved monitoring and control and, in doing so,
address misaligned interests between states and private sector actors in the fishery? Underlying 
this question is an ambition to consider how new tuna regimes can also facilitate improved 
engagement by the state (both individually and collectively at the PNA level) with private sector 
fishery actors. Using a double principal-agent framework the chapter explored how incentive 
gaps between the state (at both national and regional levels) and private actors were closed using 
the MSC principles to increase transparency and disclosure of how purse seine fishing is 
performed in the waters of the PNA. The results showed that within complex regional settings 
like the WCPO new economic instruments like the MSC can address some, but not all of the 
apparent incentive gaps. The MSC is successfully applied to this end by setting demands for 
greater transparency on the PNA implementing measures around its three principles - stock 
status, ecosystem conditions, management system, and the chain of custody.
The results also demonstrate that the MSC program facilitates improvements to fishing practices 
in ways that the states cannot. This is most directly observed through the creation of the Pacifical 
joint venture model. Because this model forces member states to maintain a direct relationship 
with fishing fleets and as a result monitoring and control in the collective waters of the PNA are 
enhanced. In other words, the PNA’s use of the MSC certification acknowledges the limited 
capacity of the member states’ to enforce the conservation and management measures set at the 
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regional level and instead strengthens state control by better aligning the objectives of the PNA 
(as principals) and fishing fleets (as agents). Over the long term this may mean that the PNA 
level assumes ever greater control over fishing activities in behalf of (but still constituted by) 
Pacific islands states. 
The fourth and final sub-question, addressed in chapter 5, asked: Can private institutions such as 
third party certification facilitate improvements to conservation and management measures at 
the RFMO level? This question moves beyond the WCPO, to seek a more general understanding 
of the role of economic institutions, in this case the MSC certification, in incentivising change in 
political institutions to establish key management measures such as harvest control rules (HCRs) 
and target and limit reference points. The chapter compared three RFMOs in the Pacific, Indian 
and Atlantic oceans.
The results of this final empirical chapter show that the MSC engages with RFMOs in different 
ways leading to multiple pathways of improvement. In doing so the results confirm that market 
institutions like the MSC have a positive effect on regional management organisations especially 
when conditions are set for RFMOs to respond to in a given period to avoid sanctions such as 
losing the certification. The analysis indicates that change at the RFMO level is more likely to 
occur when it is the state (i.e. one or more member countries of an RFMO) that is the client of 
certification, rather than private actors. What also emerges from this analysis is that the 
application of the MSC is closely related to the specific structure of the RFMOs as political 
institutions. But it is also apparent from this chapter that the effectiveness of the MSC is 
determined by the response of these political institutions. For instance, the MSC appears to be 
more effective when including rather than excluding fisheries from the certification MSC 
process. This means that including fisheries in a pathway of change rather than immediately 
setting the bar so high as to comply and enter the programme is more likely to lead to positive 
outcomes in the long term. Conversely, if a fishery is excluded from certification until it has 
reached requisite level of a priori improvement, the influence of the MSC to contribute to 
overcoming political resistance is greatly diminished.
6.3 Overcoming the challenges of old tuna regimes
Based on the results of the four empirical chapters, we now turn to a discussion of how new tuna 
regimes are able to address key challenges of old tuna regimes. As outlined in the introductory 
chapter of the thesis these are: (1) the weakness of international political institution in setting and 
enforcing property rights; (2) their inability to effectively enforce compliance to conservation 
and management measures; and (3) problems of asymmetric information and misalignment 
among participating actors. Overall it appears the results provide evidence of different strategies 
and pathways that can facilitate movements toward long term outcomes for both sustainability 
and equity in the context of dynamic regional institutions. It also appears that both sustainability 
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and equity are not mutually exclusive goals as long as institutional change incorporates both 
goals over the long-term. 
6.3.1 Reinforcing property rights, control and economic gains  
Given the trans-boundary nature of tuna fisheries, management sub-regional and regional levels 
are required to set conservation and management in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Lindroos 
2008, Bailey et al. 2010, Pintassilgo et al. 2010). To date this has proven a central challenge of 
RFMOs in the absence of high sea property rights, which in turn means they have offered 
inadequate incentives to coastal and fishing nations to voluntarily comply. But given the divisive 
nature of access agreements between DWFNs and individual coastal states, compliance to 
RFMO rules within their waters has also proven less than perfect.
The two economic institutions covered in this thesis, the MSC and VDS, demonstrate the 
significant role of the PNA as a political institution in creating and innovating new economic 
institutions towards the late 2000s. Both of these institutions are representative of level 4 of the 
NIE hierarchical framework, and as such reflect institutions that structure incentives and 
motivations for strategic decisions making (Williamson 2000). The analysis of the MSC and 
VDS show that the PNA, as a new tuna regime, has strengthened these economic institutions to 
reinforce the strength of cooperation and international credibility as a political institution
responsible for reinforcing property rights over their fisheries resources through collective 
participation. Seen through an NIE lens, the implications of new tuna regimes are linked to the 
interplay between de facto controls of the PNA states and de jure control of firms and distant 
water fishing nations driven by the interactive feedback between political and economic 
institutions (Pacheco et al. 2010, Squires et al. 2016). Specifically the analyses of the VDS and 
MSC program show that the implication of these new regimes is a change in incentives related to 
resource and market access for distant water fishing nations. In doing so the PNA are able to 
directly reinforce the formal political institutions responsible for conservation and management 
of tuna resources opening up for new outcomes that brings back better economic returns to small 
island coastal states while restricting fishing rights in their collective waters.
The specific goal of reinforcing property rights is primarily seen through the design and 
implementation of the VDS. Before the implementation of the VDS, the Palau Agreement 
allocated rights to a limited number of 205 vessels. However, this arrangement failed to allocate 
rights to member states and therefore failed to give states the freedom to exercise their sovereign 
rights over fishing activities in their individual waters. By allocating exploitation rights using 
limits on fishing days, the PNA member states are given the possibility to re-negotiate access 
with fishing nations and companies alike based on the number and price of fishing days in their 
waters. This has allowed the PNA members to leverage their limited fishing days by either, (1) 
allocating it to domestic vessels or (2) selling to distant water fishing nations in return for access 
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fees. These measures have increased PNA’s control over the level of fishing effort with limited 
fishing days to support both conservation and economic goals set by the WCPFC and the PNA 
member states.
Control over fishing activity is also extended through the MSC program. But importantly the 
MSC is ‘additional’ in the sense that it has reinforced the capacity of the PNA to also extend 
control over market access. It does so by reinforcing or validating coastal states regulations to 
land and sell MSC eco-labelled fish to export markets. As such the MSC also facilitates greater 
de jure power by the PNA over tuna resources by reinforcing greater de facto control over tuna 
resources (Yeeting et al. 2016). Moving forward the PNA, as a new tuna regime, anticipates that 
greater credibility of its implementing arrangements can reinforce sustainability goals set out 
under the Palau Agreement, as well as address equity such as the domestic development 
aspirations under the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement.
6.3.2. Regime effectiveness and stable regional institutions   
As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, cooperation for achieving the obligations for trans-
boundary fisheries management set out under the UNFSA has historically been slow and 
ineffective. In old tuna regimes it is apparent that cooperation is undermined by the diversity and 
dynamism of the actors involved – the more diverse and dynamic the less effective it can become 
in achieving its (conservation) goals (Wangler et al. 2012). The WCPO, with its many regional 
treaties has been a case in point: weak cooperation has led to weak compliance (see also Cullis-
Suzuki and Pauly 2010; Aranda et al. 2012). But building on the work of Havice (2010, 2013) 
the results also show that the VDS has been central to creating improved cooperation by 
delivering incentives to the PNA states, which has in turn brought about greater stability of the 
sub-regional PNA as a new tuna regime.
While the results of this thesis demonstrate the role of VDS regime in strengthening the PNA 
political institution, it is also evident that full cooperation and compliance has not been reached. 
As outlined in chapter 3 the political processes that often challenge international fisheries 
agreement by applying coalition theory is also seen in the PNA waters. What this points to is that 
regional fisheries agreements are by no means isolated from the political interests and external 
influences of DWFNs (see De Fontaubert 1995; Parris 2010; Hanich et al. 2010). Instead these 
external influences affect the stability of PNA countries whose fisheries agreements are highly 
influenced by the interest of distant water fishing nations (DWFN), especially from the US and 
EU. These DFWNs protect the commercial interests of their fishing industries by negotiating 
fisheries agreements to secure fishing rights of their vessels (Havice 2010, Campling 2016, 
Yeeting et al. 2016). As outlined in the previous section, pragmatic tolerance of the PNA states 
recognises the political problems associated with diverse participating actors in the PNA, thus 
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Suzuki and Pauly 2010; Aranda et al. 2012). But building on the work of Havice (2010, 2013) 
the results also show that the VDS has been central to creating improved cooperation by 
delivering incentives to the PNA states, which has in turn brought about greater stability of the 
sub-regional PNA as a new tuna regime.
While the results of this thesis demonstrate the role of VDS regime in strengthening the PNA 
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As outlined in chapter 3 the political processes that often challenge international fisheries 
agreement by applying coalition theory is also seen in the PNA waters. What this points to is that 
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influenced by the interest of distant water fishing nations (DWFN), especially from the US and 
EU. These DFWNs protect the commercial interests of their fishing industries by negotiating 
fisheries agreements to secure fishing rights of their vessels (Havice 2010, Campling 2016, 
Yeeting et al. 2016). As outlined in the previous section, pragmatic tolerance of the PNA states 
recognises the political problems associated with diverse participating actors in the PNA, thus 
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currently plays a role in stabilising the PNA coalition. But it is unclear for how long pragmatic
tolerance is able to maintain the PNA coalition.
Following chapter 4, the stability of the PNA is also affected by the credibility of the 
implementing measures attributed by the MSC certification process. By establishing this 
credibility in the market the PNA has not only consolidated greater access to information on the 
fishery as a whole, but also a social licence to continue managing tuna fisheries at the sub-
regional level (see for example Miller and Bush 2014). This credibility again represents a 
feedback from the market, through the MSC as an economic institution, to reinforce the stability 
of the PNA as a political institution. And, following this logic, this credibility also extends to the 
reinforcement of the PNA implementing measures that over the long term are likely to be more 
effective as a result.
6.3.3 Aligning incentives through market instruments – transparency
Monitoring and enforcement of private actors is a considerable challenge for states who do not 
have the capacity and incentive to monitor fishing activities in their waters (Jensen et al. 2013).
All of the empirical chapters present evidence of how states can address monitoring and control 
through transparency and disclosure using economic institutions. Transparency and disclosure 
directly point to improvement pathways for the development of more effective governance 
institutions (corresponding to level 3 of the NIE hierarchical levels; see Figure 1.4, 2.1 and 2.3). 
The NIE framework demonstrates the role of MSC program as an economic institution in 
restructuring incentives and the governance institutions that follow. The principal-agent theory 
builds on this application by focusing on the management control problems driven from 
incentive gaps between participating actors, and the role of new regimes in closing these 
incentive gaps through improved transparency and disclosure in the fishery. Aligning incentives 
and closing of incentive gaps is a management objective that could potentially address 
information problems in the fishery (Bailey et al. 2016, Bailey et al. 2017). For example, the 
MSC program has enabled the PNA to facilitate goal alignment through improved transparency 
and disclosure by both states and the private sector. In NIE terms, if economic institutions can 
provide appropriate incentives they can facilitate institutional change for long term outcomes. 
The incentive lies in the eco-labelling program, but perhaps more important to the change 
process is the independent third party comprehensive assessment that is carried out in order to 
assess their capacity to manage and maintain healthy tuna stocks. 
While the NIE framework provides space for public (political and state) and private (economic) 
interaction to improve fisheries governance, the application of the double principal-agent 
framework shows that there are multiple participating actors, with multiple incentive gaps in 
regional fisheries settings like the PNA. Specifically the double principal-agent framework 
provides a structured approach for analysing the regional PNA fishery and, in doing so, broadens
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the understanding of the complexity of multilateral fisheries agreements. By understanding how 
such gaps can be closed by complying to the demands of third party programs like the MSC it is 
clear that greater transparency can drive change in institutions to create more effective 
management outcomes (cf. Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010), as well as by actors who had 
previously not been willing to cooperate.
This result goes far beyond the PNA and WCPFC. It holds an important insight for 
understanding that in complex regional settings, like RFMOs, simple cause and effect is 
complicated by the scope of control states have over fishing activity, while also being 
answerable to international law. While incentive based mechanisms remain ‘suasive’ or soft 
instruments, this thesis has shown they can play a central role in creating new modes of 
transparency and therefore pressure for change. 
This conclusion is further supported by the findings in chapter 5, which also argues that the MSC 
can facilitate progress towards the implementation of precautionary management approaches at 
the RFMO level. Indeed, both chapters 4 and 5 are consistent in demonstrating the leading role 
of the state in using the market instruments in making changes to improve transparency and goal 
alignment between participating actors. The mix state-private or market approach re-emphasised
the interplay between de facto controls of the states and de jure control of firms driven by the 
interactive feedback between political and economic institutions as a way forward to improve 
governance institutions (Pacheco et al. 2010, Squires et al. 2016). Here improvement in
governance institutions refers to transparency and goal alignment in a diverse regional and 
international setting for trans-boundary stocks.
6.4 Reflections on an integrated NIE theoretical findings
We now turn to a discussion of how the results of this thesis contribute to the wider theoretical 
goal of integrating NIE with coalition and principal-agent theory. In the introduction of the thesis 
it was argued that such an integrated framework can provide a means of assessing how different 
institutional arrangements drive or hinder cooperation to develop management measures for 
resources such as fisheries - both among and between states and privates using market 
incentives. The integrated NIE framework was proposed to examine current institutional 
arrangements and help provide a deeper understanding of how more efficient and effective 
governance institutions could emerge for the management of trans-boundary stocks under 
varying degrees of public and private international cooperation.
A primary theoretical insight of this thesis is that the NIE framework is both relevant and 
insightful in the context of trans-boundary common pool resources. The application of NIE to 
common pool resources has focused primarily on the transaction costs associated with moving to 
a private resource regime. For instance, Liebecap (2008) argues that such shifts to closing the 
commons emerges in contexts where the cost of setting boundaries and monitoring rules exceed 
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the benefits of doing so. Inherent to this argument, Liebecap argues, is an assumption that 
maintaining common pool resources is an inefficient and ineffective second best outcome.  But 
as information becomes clearer (and incentives are created) these transaction costs can be 
assessed in terms of whether they support or hinder the creation and maintenance of common 
pool management (see also Ostrom 1990, 1992). This in turn opens up the possibility to come to 
agree upon modes of resource use that can take place with relatively lower transaction costs, and 
that can reduce the degradation of common pool resources.
Such a transaction cost rationale to NIE fits directly with the results of this thesis. The role of 
incentive mechanisms such as the VDS and MSC have both reduced net transaction costs by 
offering greater economic returns for cooperation around common pool resource management. It 
also plays into the ‘bounded rationality’ logic of NIE that assumes that (1) actors have a finite 
capacity to take on information and (2) institutions (both the state and market) are central to the 
provision of such information (see Dequech 2006). The MSC is particularly instructive in this 
sense. As information is made more transparent through the MSC assessment process common 
pool resource managers are able to better understand the benefits that are derived from such 
transparency (cf. Ménard and Shirley 2014). There is naturally a cost to the monitoring, control 
and surveillance required by such systems. But by having the information at hand key actors can 
make decisions over the cost and benefits of management.
By adopting Williamson’s (2000) hierarchical levels of institutions this thesis has built on the 
transaction cost focus of NIE to emphasise processes of dynamic interaction and institutional
change. The results show that new tuna regimes are subject to continuous review as a function of 
the actors, knowledge and resources that constitute each set of rules, as well as the modification 
of rules in each institutional level. In addition to transaction costs alone, the results also show 
that the transformation to a new tuna regimes requires new ways of incorporating knowledge, 
resources and interests of actors that are constantly changing overtime. This means that
institutions of all levels are required to continually adapt to these changing conditions (Pacheco, 
2010, Overdevest et al. 2014). However, seeing institutional formation in terms of transaction 
costs or as dynamic processes alone is insufficient to understand the extent to which new 
economic instruments can contribute to long term cooperation for sustainable common pool 
resource management.
The integrated NIE framework applied in this thesis drew upon game theoretic approaches of 
coalition and principle-agent theory to understand cooperation. This was done by integrating the 
degree and type of cooperation to understand the likelihood of reaching desired long term 
outcomes through the application of economic institutions given their interaction with political 
institutions. This means not only understanding how agents respond to economic incentives, but 
also how states’ decision making conditions and voluntary collective action develop and 
implement new management rules (or governance institutions) for environmental stewardship 
(see also Gerber et al. 2009, Pacheco et al. 2010, Gulbrandsen 2013, Kozenkow 2013). Three 
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key theoretical insights emerge from the thesis that contribute to the development of NIE in the 
context of new regimes for trans-boundary resource management.
First, combining NIE and coalition theory opens up an understanding that states, as political 
institutions, are able to internalise the cost of rule setting in such a way as to reinforce the 
protection of their property rights. The goal of using economic approaches is partly connected to 
how NIE framework perceives the significant role of economic incentives and motivations in 
making changes. Coalition theory provides an explanation of how economic institutions reduce 
costs and produce economic benefits in such a way that stimulates long term and potentially full 
cooperation (see Finus 2008; Pintassilgo et al. 2010). By taking into consideration the pay-offs 
under cooperation versus non-cooperation insights are gained into how costs and benefits are 
rationalised within the state. But perhaps more importantly, it demonstrates how dynamic such 
decision making processes are. For instance, the coalitions of states that make up the PNA are 
subject to external pressures in the form of access treaties, which provide considerable transfers 
or benefits in return for partial deviation from the VDS. While short term pragmatic tolerance of 
deviations from these rules can deliver short term economic returns, long-term benefits will be 
derived from the strength of level two political institutions ability to set and enforce level three
governance institutions for the management of resources.
Such an observation reinforces the dynamic nature of institutional interaction by pointing out 
how incentives are delivered over time. It also directly relates to the speed at which these 
institutions are likely to change. As outlined by Williamson (2000) and Pacheco et al. (2010), the 
slow speed of political institutional change is offset by faster moving economic institutions. 
However, short term economic incentives such as transfers from third parties (see Chapter 3),
can be outweighed by recurrent and accumulating benefits delivered collectively (i.e. between all 
parties of a coalition) over a longer time period. Theoretically speaking, this demonstrates that 
cooperation around common pool resources can be undermined by external parties wishing to 
gain access rights (e.g. Holzer 2008; Acheson et al. 2015). But if recurrent benefits are 
internalised at a rate faster and with greater certainty than these externally derived benefits then 
the coalition can in fact be maintained. Said differently, the dynamic interaction between all 
institutional levels are as robust as their ability to build internally reinforcing incentives at a 
faster rate than externally derived disincentives for cooperation.
Second, combining NIE and principle-agent theory opens up new insights to how information 
and transparency can also facilitate institutional interaction that reinforces the creation and 
enforcement of management rules. Following Pacheco et al. (2010), the more transparent 
governance institutions are the more they are likely to promote improved levels of cooperation. 
Such an observation was apparent in this thesis where, as an economic institution, the MSC was 
used by the PNA to enforce greater transparency on both the PNA member states and, in turn, 
enable these states to demand greater transparency from fishing fleets. Complicating this picture 
further, and representing the multiple incentive gaps outlined in this case, the PNA was also 
directly benefited from having a mandate through the MSC process to by-pass the states in 
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demanding greater transparency directly from fishing fleets also. The theoretical consequence of 
this observation returns us to some core insights in NIE, in that the agents (both the state and the 
fishing fleets) were ‘bounded’ by the requirements of the certification process combined with the 
access arrangements set out by the sub-regional state. Even though not all vessels are bound by 
MSC requirements, those that have provided the PNA with a means of extracting information 
that was previously resisted because of cost and ‘privacy’. The outcome for states and vessels is 
a choice to bear the cost of cooperation or the cost of at least partial exclusion from the resource 
and/or potential wealth generated from the fishery over the long term.
In NIE terms, the application of the transparency and disclosure opens up insights on the 
dynamic interaction between institutional levels. Demands from political and governance 
institutions alone have historically not generated the level of information in common pool trans-
boundary fishery resources. At face value economic institutions (like the MSC) are relatively 
simple ‘price premium’ market tools. But as outlined variously in this thesis, such tools offer far 
more in terms of promoting institutional change when strategically applied by political 
institutions in the design of governance institutions (see also Foley 2013, Gulbrandsen 2014, 
Adolf et al. 2016). That is, when tied to the opportunity cost of fleets exclusion from a fishery, or 
the fisheries exclusion from a market, the relative cost of information provision is reduced. The 
more states can integrate these costs in the design of the governance institutions, which directly 
set rules for the exploitation of a resource, the more returns they will have in terms of not only 
setting rules for access and (by default) property rights. But it also open up opportunities for 
monitoring, control and surveillance over the behaviour of those actors involved.
The findings of this thesis confirm that there has been a shift from old to new tuna regimes in the 
WCPO and beyond, all with the aim of addressing historical inefficiencies in achieving 
sustainability and equity. The analyses in all four chapters demonstrate the role of hybrid 
regulatory systems where the states uses market institutions in finding solutions to improve 
fisheries outcomes, governance and transparency in a fishery (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010, 
Foley 2013). How these changes have progressed, are clearly demonstrated and explained by a
clear interplay between de facto controls of the PNA states and de jure control of firms and 
distant water fishing nations, driven by the interactive feedback between political and economic 
institutions play a facilitative role in making significant changes at different and specific 
institutional levels (in line with Pacheco et al. 2010). Taking this perspective to a broader level, 
validates the importance of recognising the nature of dynamism in states’ decision making 
conditions in enabling voluntary collective action in the domain of environmental resource use.
In summary, the application of the NIE integrated framework is particularly rewarding in not 
only providing direct response to questions on the role of new regimes on cooperation but also 
measure the extent of how cooperation has been achieved, how it can be sustained, and what 
needs to be done to further cooperation. Broadening the application of the NIE framework, this 
thesis also contributes to insights on the impact of public policy into the role of incentives 
created through economic institutions to achieve desired environmental outcomes (see for 
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instance Paavola 2007). However for trans-boundary environmental problems, such desired 
outcomes are based on the success of institutions to enhance cooperation both at the sub-regional 
and regional level, which have been demonstrated in this thesis. 
6.5 Characterising new tuna regimes
New tuna regimes employ a mix of public and private institutions to enable a fishery to 
overcome political stalemates and reaching long term goals related to sustainability and equity. 
In the introduction it was argued that old tuna regimes are failing to affect change because of 
inappropriate incentives and the domination of command and control regulatory systems. As 
outlined in the above sections new tuna regimes specifically use incentive and market based
approaches to promote mixed approaches or public-private engagement. But they are also 
characterised by four other key characteristics. By identifying these characteristics it is possible 
in the long term to determine their ongoing emergence as an effective means of stimulating 
cooperation for sustainable and equitable trans-boundary tuna management.
The first characteristic of new tuna regimes are their use of incentive and market based 
approaches. The key determinant of the success of new tuna regimes is the degree to which they 
integrate political, governance and market institutions to develop and apply incentives for change 
(Hilborn et al. 2005, Grafton et al. 2006, Pacheco et al. 2010, Vestergaard 2010). Political 
institutions must first promote collective participation by both national governments and fishing 
fleets alike. Market institutions then have to be developed to operate either in conjunction with 
the state, or through the input markets for property and access rights (such as the VDS) or output 
markets for final products (such as the MSC). Finally, governance institutions need to build on 
participation and market incentives to set and achieve specific sustainability and wealth equity 
goals which in turn are recognised and agreed upon at both market and political institutional 
levels.
Second, new tuna regimes utilise a mix of state and market based incentive mechanisms that 
recognises the multiple interests and actors in formulating management decisions for 
sustainability. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that the success of these regimes is driven 
from such interaction at different levels – from the fleet to the nation state, to sub-regional and 
finally regional level. States engaging with programs like the MSC have a chance of affecting
change at the RFMO level compared to the private fisheries. Economic institutions then set 
multiple de facto incentives for state action that go beyond market pay-offs to also consider long 
term conservation gains. Seen as such, and building on the work of Foley (2012, 2013), we 
observe that state plays a directly facilitative role in the adoption and application of certification. 
This appears to be all the more important in the context of RFMOs where only member states 
have the right to negotiate and ratify harvest control measures and reference points.
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Third, new tuna regimes need to effectively govern dynamic political interests and actors that 
continue to undermine regional cooperative agreements for trans-boundary tuna resources. 
Hence there is a need for a strengthened, more effective and more coherent institutional 
framework for global environmental (fisheries) governance (Biermann et al. 2008, De Young et 
al. 2008, Young 2011). This can be achieved through better coordination of multi-lateral 
agreements and treaties in regional settings with diverse participating actors and interests. New 
tuna regimes do this. They complement old regimes by driving improvement in governance and
transparency in the fishery through innovative measures that promotes long term outcomes. New 
tuna regimes also play a role in facilitating institutional change – such as developing new policy 
instruments or management measures. They as such provide a forum for deliberation over the 
design and/or application of these measures. Again, reflecting the NIE framework, they do this 
through step-wise interactions between, political (state) and economic (private and market) 
institutions, or as NIE theory stresses, the interplay between de jure and de facto powers as 
pathway towards cooperation for sustainability and better economic returns for coastal states.
Fourth, the scale of jurisdiction of a new tuna regimes is also significant for their success. New 
tuna regimes are closely related to what has been termed ‘new regionalism’ (Keating 1998,
MacLeod 2001, Miller et al. 2014). New regionalism emerged against the backdrop of increasing 
the dynamic geo-political and geo-economic landscape, to address the challenges faced by nation 
states in managing trans-boundary resources (Tarte 2014, Aqorau 2015). In new regionalism, the 
private actors representing the industries, private institutions and even the market are encouraged 
to participate in institutionalised cooperation. In doing so, new regionalism move beyond the 
state by adopting integrated approaches that also include non-government actors and incorporate 
mixed approaches by the state, market and civil society (MacLeod 2001, Biermann et al. 2009,
Gulbrandsen 2010, Foley et al. 2016). The thesis argues that new economic institutions like the 
VDS and the MSC program represent new forms of fisheries regionalism that integrate incentive 
and market based approaches and promote public-private engagement in addressing governance 
and management issues for trans-boundary tuna resources (Miller et al. 2014, Yeeting et al. 
2016).
6.6 Policy recommendations and future research
6.6.1 Policy recommendations
New tuna regimes do not emerge overnight. They instead come about through an evolving, step-
wise set of progressive improvements of political, market and governance institutions. This 
implies that change is inherent to new tuna regimes and that there is continued effort to ensure 
that long-term sustainability and equity goals are set and reached in all tuna fisheries. While the 
case of the WCPO opens up the possibility of new tuna regimes, its status is far from secure. 
Furthermore, the development of new tuna regimes in other RFMOs and sub-regional 
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organisations is only starting. How to ensure the transfer of new tuna regimes’ elements to other 
(old) tuna regimes and fisheries management bodies more generally requires further attention 
from policy makers, NGOs and researchers alike. 
An overarching finding of this thesis reflects the role of member states of (sub-) regional 
institutions as having the authority to choose and influence decisions at relevant institutional 
levels in order to facilitate change. This does not mean that private actors do not have a 
significant role in designing and developing fisheries improvement programs that can be used by 
the state in helping them promote regulatory systems in-line with long term outcomes. What 
needs to be recognised is that states and private organisations need to align incentives with the 
conditions of the fishery - identifying and including potential incentives and benefits that can be 
received from market incentives. In light of improved benefits from these new approaches, this 
study recommends the expansion of incentive and market based approaches, such as the MSC 
and VDS, to other tuna RFMOs and sub-regional management programmes. It is also 
recommended that these organisations learn from the PNA case to ensure that their own design 
process can set effective incentives that would suit the conditions of their own fisheries.
However, it is important to emphasise that these benefits can only be gained through a collective 
effort of the constituent member states of sub-regional or regional groups. As evident in this 
thesis, regional arrangements like the Palau Agreement and the third implementing arrangement 
of the PNA do not only set standards for the coordination of purse seine fishery in the collective 
waters of its members. They also strengthen coastal states’ sovereign rights over their shared 
tuna resources. Learning from these collective arrangements and their implications for long-term 
outcomes, this study recommends that the PNA states maintain their coalition to work together 
as a group in negotiating future tuna treaties. Only through this sub-regional coalition are the 
PNA states able to improve their share of the benefits from their tuna resources. Furthermore, it 
is clear from the findings of the thesis that work remains to be done for further improvements. 
While improvement pathways are seen through the innovative approaches of the PNA, these 
innovative approaches need to be further strengthened and expanded to improve its coverage. 
This can be only done through improved joint efforts and support of all PNA member states. 
External influences, such as the US and EU, will remain key and important players in the Pacific 
tuna fishery. The political economic challenges associated with trans-boundary tuna resources 
are therefore inevitable and will continue to be part of the challenges for decision making 
processes. This thesis recommends that full compliance is not always an ideal first-best solution, 
but rather some deviations or less than full compliance is. Though game theory scholars suggest 
full compliance and full cooperation as ideal for the benefits of all, achieving full compliance 
and cooperation is difficult in real life. Therefore this thesis recommends that short term partial 
compliance can be an important stepping stone in moving towards full compliance and 
cooperation. Therefore regimes should allow some flexibility to accommodate dynamic political 
interests in order to be effective. 
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The findings of the RFMO-MSC interaction demonstrates the role of MSC in promoting 
precautionary approaches for sustainability. This is exciting for fisheries scientists and managers 
who have long been asking for the establishment and adoption of precautionary approaches with 
clear reference points and harvest control rules for all species. Movement into this path is seen in 
different RFMOs who have direct engagement with the MSC certification program. This finding 
should be sufficient to confirm the need to further expand the application of MSC certification 
program to other areas and fisheries for a widespread fisheries improvement across different 
fisheries sectors. 
Overall the findings of the thesis stress the role of new tuna regimes in facilitating improvements 
at the management level. While it is well understood that institutional inefficiencies are driven 
by the political challenges associated with diversity, this thesis emphasises the role of new tuna 
regimes in breaking through these historical inefficiencies driven from political challenges. 
6.6.2 Future Research
This study demonstrates useful analyses of the emergence and implications of new tuna regimes
for reaching long term outcomes. However, as new tuna regimes continue to evolve, further 
research is needed to advance our understanding of their role in advancing sustainability and 
equity in tuna fisheries. 
Although the PNA is applauded for the successful implementation of the VDS, it has also faced 
criticism from non-PNA participants (including DWFNs with fishing interest in the Pacific). 
Others like New Zealand and Canada, turn to catch quota systems by putting limits on tuna 
catches while VDS puts limit on efforts (fishing days). This raises the obvious question of how 
VDS could potentially contribute to sustainability as effort creep is seen to emerge as a result. 
Further research is needed to provide a direct response to this question. A comparative analysis 
at different scales and in difference regions, including other RFMOs or international regimes 
could provide useful information. Such research would provide a better understanding of the 
economic and political linkages between states and their role in structuring region-building based 
on the stewardship of valuable and disputed natural resources. 
Second, it is clear from this thesis that the VDS addresses the equity question but remains 
unclear how it may contribute to sustainability. It is acknowledged in this thesis that the 
limitation of the VDS to address sustainability issue is due to political dynamics which are 
reflected in non-VDS regimes that are also in operation along the VDS. These non-VDS regimes 
are putting limitations to the full implementation of the VDS and as tuna is a trans-boundary 
resource, one cannot determine the effectiveness of the VDS for tuna stocks. Until the VDS 
reaches its full potential, it would be more appropriate to analyse how the VDS contributes in 
rebuilding the tuna stocks. The proposal for VDS to improve its coverage is not new as it is also 
among the MSC conditions for PNA fisheries improvement. However, it is unclear how this will 
be done. Two recommendations for future research are as follows. First, an in-depth political 
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dynamic analysis of how to integrate these multiple regimes with hopes to close VDS loopholes 
and improve VDS coverage, without disadvantaging participating actors would enable the VDS 
to reach its full potential. Second, an analysis of the implication of the full implementation of the 
VDS would advance our understanding on the effectiveness of VDS not only for equity but also 
for sustainability. 
Further study is also needed to estimate the degree to which incentive gaps have been closed as a 
result of the MSC certification program. Measuring and comparing the incentive gaps before 
MSC programs and incentive gaps after the MSC programs could provide useful economic 
information for politicians to further understand the extent of how much incentive gaps is closed, 
the motivation and the potential next steps to be taken to close the remaining gaps. Furthermore, 
while the new economic instruments like the MSC program appear to improve cooperation and 
the formulation of governance institutions it remains unclear how this institutional change affects
fleets i.e. fishing activities and patterns. A study or review of the MSC program itself is needed 
to examine the potential of the MSC in incentivising change at the fleet level in different 
RFMOs. Knowing this could potentially help the MSC certification program review its incentive 
schemes in order to effectively affect change towards sustainability at the fleet level. 
It also remains unclear how new regulations can in turn be transformed into economic benefits 
for fisheries and what impact these incentives will have on the status of the tuna stocks. Further 
research is needed to provide more insight into the long term viability of the MSC program as 
well as for participating agents to understand the economic incentives associated with the MSC 
program. This could help to improve the MSC or similar incentive based mechanisms in the 
context of trans-boundary common pool resources.
The MSC program has developed from both state and private clients in tuna fisheries. Yet this 
thesis demonstrates the successful implementation of MSC processes by the state but limited 
success is seen with the private companies. A closer look at the MSC procedural process in view 
of balancing the role of the private and state clients in closing out the MSC conditions is needed. 
The results would improve the potential of private clients to participate in the MSC program, for 
the wider engagement in certifying tuna and to stimulate a further shift to ‘global tuna 
governance’ beyond the state.
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The following are supplementary materials used to calculate VDS outcomes and countries’ 
payoffs under full compliance and partial compliance reported in Tables 3.3. Transfers from 
third parties, non-fishing days and high seas efforts are also provided and used to support 
calculations and estimates for short term and long term incentives reported in Table 3.4. The 
Appendix explains how we assess the reduction of stock and the sustainable level of harvests due 
to overfishing. 
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Appendix: Estimating the value of future lost resources
To arrive at an estimate of the value of the resources lost due to excess fishing (declared non 
fishing days) we assume that the fishery can be described by a simple Gordon-Schaefer model 
and the total number of vessel days currently distributed to PNA members reflects the maximum 
sustainable yield. Excess effort is associated with lower (steady state) harvests. Denote fish stock 
by S, effort by E and g (growth rate), k (carrying capacity) and e (catchability) are parameters of 
the model. In the steady state growth equals harvest.
(1)  �� �1 �  ��  � = � ; and  (2)  � = ���
 =� � �1 �  ��    � = ��
��) =�  � = � �1 �  �� ��
Using � = ��� and substituting for S, we get
(4) � = ��� � 1 �  ��  � �
The first order condition for optimal effort  ���� = � = �� �1 �  
�
�  �� �  
���
�  � =� �� =  
�
��   
Excess effort is expressed as � ���  with 1 �  �. Substituting excess effort into (4) we can derive 
the resulting harvest with excess (1 � �) efforts. 
� = �� � ���   � 1 �  
�
�  � 
�
��  � =  � 
��
� � 1 � 
�
� )
� =  ���  �� �  
��
� )
We can see that H is decreasing in the excess effort �. Using the 15% overfishing � =
������ ���
����� ����  + 1 = 1.1495, harvest will be reduced to 97.8% of the optimal harvest. This implies a 
loss of 4�4�� �  �.97� = 957 ����. Since these days are lost in all future years, using discount 
rate � = �.�5, the net present value of the lost resources using the benchmark price is 
 ��$ �,��� � ��.�� � 957 = ��$ 114.� �������. For  � = �.1, the estimated value of lost resources 
is around US$ 57.4 million.
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Summary
Overfishing and overcapitalisation of fisheries is an international management problem causing a 
downward trend in the share of sustainable fish stocks over the last four decades. The share of 
fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels has declined from 90% in 1974 to 69% in 2013. 
Tuna has fared no better with 41% of stocks estimated by the FAO to be fished at biological 
unsustainable levels. Despite the declining share of sustainable fish stocks, demand for tuna is 
still high and the significant overcapacity of tuna fishing fleets remains. Nearly all of the tuna 
regional fisheries management organisations are under pressure to implement harvest control 
rules for tuna, as required by them under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, but 
progress has been slow. In the Western and Central Pacific scientific advice has also called for a
reduction of at least 32% in fishing mortality from the average 2006-2009 levels. To succeed to 
achieve these goals new mechanisms that can incentivise states to cooperate to make these 
changes are needed.
The eight tuna rich countries of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) have incorporated
incentive based mechanisms to push both state and non-state actors to collaborate in achieving a 
common goal for sustainability and equity. These mechanisms are (1) the vessel day scheme 
(VDS) - a state-led incentive scheme designed to manage access to the tuna fishery by domestic 
and distant water fishing fleets implemented in 2007 and (2) the Marine Stewardship Council - a
private certification program which certified the portion of the fishery not fishing on fish 
attraction devices in 2011. In integrating these incentive based mechanisms to promote improved 
state-based regulation this thesis argues the PNA represents what can be labelled a ‘new tuna 
regime’. It is conceived of as new because by integrating these mechanisms the PNA holds the 
potential to overcome the political stalemate that plagues so many other so called ‘old’ regional 
fishery management organisations that have not incorporated such tools.
Using a multiple inductive case study approach this examine the PNA case thesis asks: What 
characterises the shift from old to new regimes for trans-boundary tuna management, and to 
what extent is the emergence of a new tuna regime able to achieve sustainable and equitable 
outcomes in the Western and Central Pacific? To answer this question the thesis combines New 
Institutional Economics with game theoretic approaches to analyse the role of economic 
institutions in incentivizing change towards sustainable and equitable trans-boundary tuna 
management. The analysis of the apparent shift to new tuna regimes is carried out under four sub 
questions, each corresponding to a chapter of the thesis.
Chapter 2 addresses the question: How has the shift from an old to new tuna regime come about 
and what institutional changes implemented in the PNA have facilitated this shift? Central to the 
analysis in this chapter is the design, allocation and exercise property rights by weak political 
institutions. In doing so the chapter asks how the shift from old to new tuna regimes has come 
about and what institutional changes have been implemented to strengthen the political 
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institutions (government, (sub) regional and international institutions) in protecting its property 
rights. To understand the emergence and implications of new tuna regimes in the WCPO, the 
analysis uses the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature and framework to examine the 
implications of new tuna regimes (labelled as new economic policy instruments) on institutional 
change. The results shows the driving role of the political institutions of PNA in creating and 
innovating new economic instruments towards the late 2000s. They also indicate that these new 
regimes have helped the PNA countries to reinforce their property rights and in doing so 
negotiate new deals that brings greater economic returns to small island coastal states.
Chapter 3 addresses the second sub-question of this thesis: To what degree has the 
implementation of the vessel day scheme in PNA brought about greater stability of the Palau 
Agreement? The analysis focuses on the extent to which the VDS has brought about greater 
stability to the member countries of the Palau Agreement for purse seine tuna fisheries 
management. The analysis employs coalition theory to examine the effectiveness of the PNA 
agreement for purse seine effort control, and in doing so, investigate how VDS facilitates 
strengthening of the PNA political institution for collective participation. The results show that 
full implementation of the VDS is undermined by the influence of DWFNs and that instead of 
strict enforcement of the rules a degree of pragmatic tolerance between the PNA members has in 
fact strengthened the coalition. However, it remains unclear for how long pragmatic tolerance is 
able to maintain the PNA coalition. The findings of this chapter also provide further insights on 
the role of dynamic interactions between economic and political institutions to reach long term 
sustainability and equity outcomes for tuna fisheries.
Chapter 4 addresses the third sub-question: Can third party certification increase transparency 
through improved monitoring and control and in doing so address misalignment in the fishery?
In answering this question the chapter examines how the MSC program has increased
transparency in the PNA through improved monitoring and control. It also examines how, in 
doing so, goal misalignment between the state and private actors in the fishery are overcome.
The analysis uses the principal-agent framework to examine this (mis)alignment between the 
state (principal) and private firms (agents) and how the MSC certification process, rather than 
market incentives and outcomes, plays a role in closing these incentive gaps. The findings 
suggest that (1) there are multiple-levels of incentive gaps in trans-boundary resource 
management and (2) that the MSC program has a role in closing some but not all of these gaps. 
The chapter concludes that within complex regional settings like the WCPO market-based 
mechanism like the MSC set demands for greater transparency on the PNA implementing 
measures around its three principles - stock status, ecosystem conditions, management system, 
and the chain of custody. In doing so the MSC can play an important role in setting new 
incentives for international cooperation towards reaching sustainability and equity outcomes in 
trans-boundary fisheries management.
Chapter 5 addresses the fourth and final sub-question of the thesis: Can private institutions such 
as third party certification facilitate improvements to conservation and management measures at 
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the RFMO level? This chapter investigates the role of the MSC program in other tuna regions 
beyond the PNA and WCPFC and in doing so focuses on the role of such as third party 
certification in facilitating the alignment of RFMOs with UNFSA requirements. By comparing 
RFMOs of the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans the analysis confirms the facilitating role of 
MSC in helping RFMOs progress towards precautionary measures for sustainability. In doing so 
the analysis advances our understanding on the different and multiple ways in which the MSC is 
used to create change at the RFMO level. This in turn challenges the notion of a single 
improvement pathway of ‘improve-first-certify-second’. Instead it a more progressive 
application of the MSC could be to ‘certify-first-improve-second’. This insight also indicates the 
effectiveness of the MSC is also determined by the response of these RFMOs as political 
institutions. In short, if a fishery is excluded from certification until it has reached requisite level 
of a priori improvement, it is less likely to overcome political resistance to change.
Overall this thesis advances an understanding of institutional change as a process of dynamic and 
progressive improvement built on the interaction between political (state) and economic (private 
and market) institutions. Recognising this interplay opens up potential pathway to achieving 
cooperation for sustainability and better economic returns coastal and fishing nations alike. The 
analyses in all four chapters demonstrates the role of hybrid regulatory systems where the state 
uses market institutions in finding solutions to improve fisheries outcomes, governance and 
transparency in the fishery. While all four empirical chapters focus on different research
questions and use different theoretical frameworks and approaches, they are all interlinked by 
providing answers to questions about sustainability and equity. They do so by demonstrating the 
role of new tuna regimes in facilitating institutional change for these long term outcomes.
The thesis also characterises new tuna regimes as having four key elements. First, the success of 
new tuna regimes is the degree to which they integrate political, governance and market 
institutions to develop and apply incentives for change. Second, new tuna regimes utilise a mix 
of state and market based incentive mechanisms that recognises the multiple interests and actors 
in formulating management decisions for sustainability. Third, new tuna regimes need to 
effectively govern dynamic political interests and actors that continue to undermine regional 
cooperative agreements for trans-boundary tuna resources. Fourth, the scale of jurisdiction of a 
new tuna regimes is also significant for their success. New tuna regimes are closely related to 
what has been termed ‘new regionalism’. If all of these characteristics can be identified and 
transformed into strategies it might be possible for tuna regimes to develop progressive 
improvements of political, market and governance institutions. This implies that change is 
inherent to new tuna regimes and that there is continued effort to ensure that long-term 
sustainability and equity goals are set and reached in all tuna fisheries.
Further research is required to provide further insights into how new tuna regimes emerge in 
other regions around the world and at different scales. These could include RFMOs, but also new 
forms of sub-regional cooperation between states and/or between states and the private sector. 
Such research could build on this thesis by further elaborating on the kinds of economic 
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institutions that can incentivise the dynamic interaction with political institutions and positive 
outcomes in the design and implementation of the UNFSA. Further research is also needed to 
examine the effectiveness of these institutional improvements in improving fishing patterns and 
practices at the fleet level and how they in turn affects improvement of the stocks.
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